Prison management theory and practice : with special reference to Risdon Gaol by Paterson, WC
PRISON MANAGEMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE: 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO RISDON GAOL 
by 
Wilva, C tth5 ow 
W cicJaterson, BA (Hons) 
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
at the University of Tasmania 
March, 1988 
DECL A R AT ION 
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award 
of any other higher degree in any university and that, to the best of my 
knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously 
published or written by another person, except where due reference is 
made in the text of the thesis. 
W C Paterson 
March 1988 
Acknowledgements  
I wish to thank. my  Supervisor, Dr S V Rao, not only for his advice and 
assistance during the preparation of this thesis, but also by providing 
inspiration to continue my administrative studies. 	He is both mentor 
and friend. 	The Staff in the Political Science Department have been 
subjected to 'Prisons' for the past four years, and I thank them for 
their patience. 	The following made approval for the topic and access to 
'privileged' 	information 	simple: 	Mr John Howe 	( former Director of 
Corrective Services ), Mr Brian Westwood ( former Deputy Chief 
Sueprintendent ), Mr Bill Harvey (Chief Superintendent ), Mr Peter Patmore 
(Acting Director of Corrective Services) and Mr John Ramsey ( Secretary 
of the Law Department ). I wish to thank. the TP0A• for answering the many 
questions posed. My thanks and regards to the Prison Officers of all 
ranks who talked freely and gave me considerable insights into the 
prison and ideas which duly led to other considerations. Mr D 
Hornibrook ( former Controller of Prisons), Mr E M Bingham, Mr M G 
Everett. and Mr G A Pearsall ( former Attorneys-General ) answered my 
questions frankly and of fered further assistance, if required. My 
typist, Ms Beverley Brill, has my admiration for coping so adequately 
and working to finish this at 	what must have been a constant 
interruption to personal and family life. 	My children - Jock, Jeanie 
and Bumble - can now be noisy again. 	My wife, Jayne, has my love and 
thanks for proof reading and correcting my 'anglais'. 	She can now 
return to reading her eminently more pleasurable Mills and Bodns. 
Abstract 
The thesis addresses the issues of contemporary prison management and 
prison managers. 	It discusses recent American at tempts to introduce 
organisation 	theories 	and 	management 	principles 	into 	the 	prison 
environment to assist the managerial function. 	The thesis argues that 
the bureaucratic paramilitary nature of 	the prison 	inhibits innovation 
and encourages, the 	maintenance of 	traditional custodial management 
practices. 	It suggests that the practice of promoting managers using 
the 'seniority principle' entrenches the custodial' practice which in 
turn leads • to ineffective management, staff and inmate discontent, and 
centralised control. 
The thesis argues that the manager's role cannot be considered in 
isolation. 	It must take account of the many external and internal 
factors such as penal 	philosophy and Government 	policy, staff and 
inmate interactions, among others. 	The manager's success depends on his 
skills and attributes in balancing and harmonising these variables. 
The thesis questions the American practice of investigating the prison 
using the open-systems approach. It takes the view that the prison is 
a closed system and that research should be conducted on this premise. 
The thesis demonstrates the difficulty of locating the prison within 
organisation theory and suggests that present methodological tools are 
inadequate for prison management investigation. 
R isdon 	Prison management 	practice is examined 	using 	administrative 
management principles. The thesis suggests that the changing nature of 
prison philosophy has not materially affected the management routine 
established Prior to the prison's opening in 1960. The establishment of 
the Law Department in 1982 relegated the former Prisons Department to 
Divisional status within the newly created organisation. Centralised 
decision-making at Head Office and Prison Senior Mangement level has led 
to industrial unrest, unclear goals and a power vacuum. 
The recommendations of the Grubb Report ( 1976 ) are 'considered and it is 
argued that many of the points made then should still be implemented. 
The current hierarchical structure of the prison staff should be altered 
to provide opportunities to encourage staff 	to seek promotion and 
provide management with a ready pool of future managers. One method of 
reaching this goal is the introduction of Unit Management. 	The thesis 
concludes by suggesting the Risdon Prison must have a primary function 
containment, and base its managerial practices on that premise. 
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The key occupational group in industrial society is management. 
Effective  direction of human efforts - whether in the public or 
Private sectors of an economy - is central to the wise and 
efficient utilisation of human and material resources. 
The 	Australian 	prison 	has 	attracted considerable 	publicity in 	recent 
months through, on the one hand, a sequence of escapes, disturbances and 
riots, 	and 	on 	the 	other, 	enquiries 	into 	the 	high 	incidence 	of 
aboriginal deaths in custody. 	Media exposure and criticism2 have been 
answered 	by 	Ministerial 	statements on 	prison policy 	and practice. 3 
Governments, 	however, 	have traditionally Placed the blame for poor 
prison management on the previous holders of off ice 4 and there appears 
to be little impetus for change of the prison system unless impelled by 
Royal Commission, 5 Parliamentary enquiry , 6 or internal investigation 
whether public 7 or private . 8 
'Campbell, 3 P, quoted in Hall, R H, Occupations and the Social  
Structure, Englewood Cliffs, N 3: 1975, p.136. 
2 For example, The ABC documentaries, "Out of Sight, Out of Mind", 
ABC Television, 14 & 15 October 1987, & The Mercury, Hobart, 2 & 3 
November 1987, articles on Jika Jika or 'K' Division in Pentridge 
Prison, Victoria where 5 inmates suffocated to death. 
3The Attorneys-General of Victoria and Tasmania have both issued 
statements to the media concerning their respective prison systems. 
4 1nterviews with former Tasmanian Attorneys-General of both 
political persuasions. 
51n NSW the Royal Commission into Prisons, 1976 conducted by Mr 
Justice Nagle (hereafter called the Nagle Report). 
61n Tasmania, the Report of the Commissioner of Enquiry into the 
administration of the Prisons in Tasmania, 1976, by Judge Grubb, 
(hereafter called the Grubb Report). 
7The Lewer Report: Recommendations of Report Relating to the 
Department of Corrective Services (NSW Parliamentary Paper No.81 of 
1973-74). 
81n Tasmania, for example, The Mellick Report, 1986, into an escape 
at Hobart's Risdon Prison. 
2 
Many of these reports have been critical of prison management, citing 
managerial incompetency, lack of training, failure to adapt to change, 
and corruption as the most common grounds for complaint. 	The prison 
manager's task is thankless. 	It is his duty to carry out Government 
decree and his skills in achieving the implementation of prison policy 
largely determine the prison's functioning and stability. It has been 
suggested that the prison managerial position is amongst the most 
stressful in the workforce, 9 and the dropout rate, particularly in 
Australia is startling. 10 
Prisons have been subject in the past to much academic analysis with 
sociological, 	psychological, 	and penological perspectives predominating. 
The 	general 	literature 	on 	prisons 	has 	a 	multitude 	of 	studies 
investigating 	attitudes, 	groupings, 	institutionalisation, 	punishment 
philosophies and treatment practices. 	However, little consideration has 
been given to the management of prisons, or the prison manager. 11 
The 	managerial 	position 	in 	any organisation is 	subject to 	many 
variables. 	A planned routine might be desirable, but 
... organisations are not, by nature, cooperative systems; 	[thus] 
top managers must exercise a great deal of effort to control 
9 See, for example, Burke, R 3, & Weir, T, "Is managing a corrective 
institution a demanding occupation?", unpublished paper, 1979, York 
University, Toronto, and Burke, R 3, & Weir, T, "Life experiences, 
satisfactions and health among wives of correctional and probation/ 
parole aftercare adminstrators", unpublished paper, 1980, York 
University, Toronto. 
IONearly 50 Heads of Agencies and Senior Prison Managers have left 
the Austraian Prison System between 1972 and 1987. From 
conversations with Bill Kidston, Director-General, Office of 
Corrections, Victoria. 
"See, for example, Archembeault, W G and Archembeault, B J, 




The prison manager, 	similarly, 	copes 	with 	many situations but his 
responsiblity is magnified when providing a community service. 	The 
clientele 	of 	his organisation are unwilling 	participants in the legal 
system. 	He not only manages the willing - the prison staff - but an 
inmate population which increasingly is challenging his authority. 
Prisons operate on a daily routine. 	Cells are unlocked, meals are 
provided, labour is commenced. 	Inmates are locked up at set times, and 
the process is repetitive. 	This routine, however, is always tenuous. 
To the periodic threat of disruption by industrial action of staff or 
inmate 	discontent 	are 	added 	problems of overcrowding, 	lack of 
facilities, or size of institution. The manager has to be constantly 
aware that a change to routine can act as a catalyst to property damage, 
injury, or even death. Since World War II his role has become more 
stressful. Centralised prison systems have largely removed 
decision-making from the institution and the manager's success may be 
keyed to Head Office edict. 13 
The centralisation of the prison service has raised many issues, but 
none more pertinent than the qualifications for management which many of 
the incumbents lack. Many of the managers in the Australian system 
reached senior positions through attrition, and promotion through the 
12 Perrow, C, in Dale, E, Readings In Management: Landmarks and New  
Frontiers, (3rd edn) New York: 1975, McGraw-Hill, p.165. 
13 Most prison systems have centralised head offices which are part of 
Government Departments. For example, in Scotland, prisons come 
under the jurisdiction of the Scottish Home and Health Department, 
whilst in Tasmania, prisons are part of the Corrective Services 
Division of the Law Department. 
4 
ranks. 14 	Prison 	Officer 	recruiting 	standards 	have 	always 	been 
questioned, and it is generally accepted - in view of little evidence to 
the contrary - that many of the Australian prison managers have achieved 
their rank through the 'seniority princiole'. A direct result of this 
policy has been the breakdown in communication and cooperation between 
the Head Office 'public servant' - with little knowledge of the prison 
environment, and the 'professional' prisonmanager. The prison manager 
views his experience in the service as the major attribute necessary to 
direct, while the public servant reaches high office through a 
combination of educational and training expertise. 
The other major Western prison services have provision for lateral 
recruitment to the lower echelons of the management hierarchy. England, 
for example, has a two-tiered system - managers (officers) and staff 
(other ranks). During the 1970s and early 1980s most of the managers 
were recruited through the lateral concept, but the powerful English 
Prison Officers Association ( the staff union )has constantly challenged 
this practice, claiming discrimination against prison officers who aim 
to progress to managerial status. 15 
The expansion of 	Western business interests has resulted in _great 
technological change. 	Work places have been ergonomically designed to 
meet the changing needs of industry. 	New work practices have been 
initiated. 	Progress has been made in the increasingly important field 
"See for example, Rinaldi , F, Australian Prisons, Fyshwick, ACT: 
1977, F & M, p.197. 
15This practice is currently under review. 
5 
of industrial relations. 	Managerial techniques have been refined to 
meet the change. 	This new 'industrial revolution' has not included the 
contemporary prison. 	It remains essentially unchanged in design and 
practice from its eighteenth century forebear. 	Prison managers are 
working in an environment inspired by retributive penology. 	One problem 
now faced by governments is that Victorian architectural principles 
still provide the structure for modern prison design. 16 This design, 
however, is antipathetic to the prison philosophy currently in use. 17  
The managerial task is thus compounded by design and rapidly changing 
prison philosophy, and, more importantly, by an increasing public 
scrutiny. 
There is little substantive data on the characteristics required by the 
'average' prison manager, although_ the works of Bowker,  , 18 and Nelson & 
Lovell 19 attempt to profile the English and American incumbent, and 
some comparative use can be made of this research on 'correctional' 
managers. 2° There has been virtually no research on senior prison 
managers with the literature available being largely autobiographical. 21 
I 6Houses of Correction built for the inmate to repent his sins. 
17Johnstone, N, The Human Cage: A Brief History of Prison  
Architecture, New York: 1973, Walker & Co. 
I 8Bowker,  , L H, Corrections: The Art and the Science, New York: 1982, 
Macmillan 
I 9 Nelson, E K ( Jr ), Lovell, C H, Developing Correctional  
.Administrations, ( Washington, DC: Joint Commission on Correctional 
Manpower and Training, 1970). 
20They have a variety of titles - Governor, Superintendent, Director, 
Warden, among others. 
2 IFor example, Brockway, Z R, Fifty Years of Prison Service, 
Montclair, NJ: 1969, Patterson Smith. 
6 
Dunphy claimed in 1981 that 
... failure to anticipate change, refusal to recognise the need for 
change, a delayed reaction to it, can result in organisational and 
personal disasters through the loss of contro1. 22 
Although this statement was a general comment on organisations, it can 
be applied to the contemporary prison system. 23 
Prisons worldwide face the major problem of overcrowding. 	In Australia, 
it has been claimed that the prison system is in a state of crisis. 24 
Long range predictions suggest the system will be unable to cope with 
the increasing numbers by the year 2000. 25 
	
Moreover, current moves to 
provide 	more bedspace 	are 	offset 	by the closing of antiquated 
institutions. 26 
Governments have taken some measures to alleviate this overcrowding. 
These include alternatives to imprisonment, such as Victoria's Community 
Based Corrections, the proposed introduction in NSW of 'house' arrest 
using electronic surveillance techniques, Tasmania's liberal use of 
22Dunphy, D C, Organisational --change by choice, Sydney: 1981, McGraw-
Hill, p.xii. 
23Deaths at Jika-Jika (H Division) Pentridge, Victoria; riots at 
Parklea, NSW; Bogga Road, Queensland; and the Adelaide Gaol, South 
Australia. 
24Harding, R, "Prison Overcrowding: Correctional Policies and 
Political Constraints", Aus & NZ J of Crim, 20, 1, March 1987, 
pp.16-32. 
25Walker, J, Forecasting Prisoner Numbers: A Computer Model for  
Correctional Administrators, Canberra: 1984, Australian Institute 
of Criminology. 
26For example, the new remand centre in Adelaide, SA, will replace 
the Adelaide Gaol. 
7 
probation and parole, and South Australia's early release programmes. 
Unfortunately, most Governments face a backlash against these programmes 
when an offence is committed by a person who should still be physically 
imprisoned. Furthermore, these measures fail to address the fundamental 
issue of prison management. 
Not only are prison numbers increasing, but the recent practice in some 
Australian jurisdictions of giving long sentences with minimum parole 
periods poses prison managers with the problem of placating these 
inmates who, effectively, have little to lose should they create 
trouble. 	The American authorities, faced with similar developments but 
on a larger scale, have investigated current managerial practices in an 
attempt 	to discover whether techniques from industry, and other 
Government agencies have any place in the prison setting. 	Some authors 
have already claimed that changes in prison management have paralleled 
changes in theories of formal organisation. 27 There is, however, 
little evidence to substantiate this. 
Although the application of these theories and principles is to be 
commended they do not readily integrate into the prison environment. 
Managers of prisons have two groups to organise - staff and inmates. 
Staff, recently, have shown a certain reluctance to accept managerial 
fiat, while the inmate situation tends to vitiate inmate compliance. 
Additionally, however sound the formal organisation theory or management 
principle, it still has to be implemented' by a management staff who, 
27 Allen, h E, Simonsen, C E, Corrections in America: An Introduction  
(3rd edn) New York: 1981, Macmillan, p.356. 
S 
because 	of 	recruiting 	patterns, 	mav 	not 	possess 	the 	necessary 
intellectual capacity for the task. 
Purpose of the Study 
The thesis will address the dual issues of prison management (see Figure 
I) and managers (see Figure 2) in general, and the management of HMP 
Risdon, Tasmania (hereafter referred to as Risdon Prison) in particular. 
The management of prisons per se is subject to many variables - changing 
prison philosophy, Government decree, the input of pressure groups like 
the civil libertarians and prisoner action groups, industrial 
discontent, inmate unrest, and a public which still expects the prison 
authorities to change the criminal into a useful member of society. 
Many management problems (see Figure 2 ) can be partially resolved if 
the system has a number of institutions where inmates of various 
categories and classifications can be dispersed. The limited facilities 
of a small state like Tasmania make particular demands on its prison 
managers. 	Another major problem which faces most prison managers, and 
particularly those in Tasmania, 	is a lack of a referent body and 
empirical work directed towards the management of prisons. 
: • 9 




A 	Concerned with both internal 
and external organisational 
issues. 
Concept includes management. 
Broad and general scope of 
authority. 
Top administrative personnel 
are responsible and account-
able to some larger organis- 
ation or political unit of 
government outside the frame- 
work of the organisation. 
Politically vulnerable 
Time and energy spent primar-
ily dealing with issues and 
people outside of the formal 
organisation. 
Formulates policy. 
Responsible for long-range  
planning and makes decisions 
affecting the entire 
organisation. 
A 	Concerned 	with 	internal 	organis- 
ational issues. 
B 	Concept is included in 
administration 
C Narrow 	and 	specific 	scope 	of 
authority. 
Management personnel are 
responsible 	and 	accountable 	to 
some unit within the framework 
of the organisation. 
Less politically vulnerable, 
except to organisational politics. 
Time and energy spent primarily 
supervising personnel within the 
formal organisation. 
G Implements policy; 	converts policy 
to action. 
Responsible 	for 	day-to-day 
	
or 
short-range planning. and most 
management decisions affect only 
segments of the organisation. 
Often positions are 
	
Most positions are covered by civil 
appointive; personnel subject 
	
service; 	transfers and 
	
loss of 
to frequent transfer or loss jobs less frequent. 
of jobs. 
28 
28From Archembeault and Archmebeault, op.cit., p.49. 
10 
It appears that prison management has traditionally been overlooked , 	or 
bypassed, 	when 	theories of 	organisational 	practice and management 
principles have been developed. 	By its nature, the prison has remained 
a 'closed' environment. 	Investigative access has been limited. 	Those 
who have ve	gained entrance have directed 	their investigations 	to 	the 
social phenomena rather than the managerial aspects. 	:Organisational 
literature pays scant 	at tention to this complex area. 	Perhaps 	the 
prison has not been seriously considered as an appropriate area 	of 
investigation. 	In addition, the role of prison managers, as perceived 
by themselves and others, may have differed from that of managers of 





OPERATES PRISON SERVICES 
DIRECTS FISCAL MANAGEMENT 
PRISON ADMINISTRATION 
INTERFACES WITH LARGER UNITS OF GOVERNMENT OR 
SOCIETY 
JUSTIFIES BUDGET REQUESTS 
NEGOTIATES WITH EMPLOYEE UNIONS 
11 
Figure 2: Differences Between Prison Management and Administration  
29 
The early charismatic prison managers such as Maconochie - in charge of 
the penal colony at Norfolk Island, 30 Brockway, at New York's Elmira 
Reformatory, 31 and du Cane in England, 32 were viewed as social 
reformers rather than prison managers. 
The rapid growth of prison building in the late 19th and early 20th 
century did not keep pace with managerial recruitment. 	Governments 
29 ibid, p.48. 
30Seet Allen & Simonsen, op.cit., p.44. 
31 ibid, p.46. 
32See Thomas, J E, The English Prison Officer Since 1850, London: 
1972, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ch.3. 
12 
tended 	to employ 




harsher with adverse 
with authority. 35 
threatened to assume 
their freedom became 
with 	reference 	to 	the 	philosophical 	mode 
preferred managerial recruit had a military 
overcrowding became prevalent conditions became 
consequences for inmate interaction with peers and 
Managers confronted by an inmate population who 
control of the very environment structured to limit 
stricter and those managers who could not cope were 
simply replaced within the system by those who could. 	Little importance 
was attached to the broader managerial function. 	The manager's ability 
to maintain order in his establishment became the dominant factor in 
determining his suitability for the task. 
These recruitment practices continued well into the 20th century. 
During 	the 	1960s, 	a concerted movement 	to staff 	prisons with 
'specialists' 	psychiatrists, 	psychologists and, social workers among 
others, provided the catalyst for prison management reform. Such 
specialists used to dealing with other 'professionals' drew attention to 
the deficiencies in managerial ranks, and the inadequacy of the 
essentially custodial orientation of most managers within the system. 
During this period - characterised as the Rehabilitation phase in prison 
philosophy 36 - Governments not only provided finance to effect change 
33 Newman , D J, Introduction to Criminal Justice ( 2nd Edn ) 
Philadelphia: 1975, Lippincott, pp. 308-309. 
34 See, for example, Allen & Simonsen, op . cit  . , Ch. 2," and Ignatieff,  , 
M, A Just Measure of Pain, London: 1978, Macmillan, especially 
Ch .4. 
35Ignatieff,  , op. cit  . 
36Newman, op . cit  . 
13 
in inmate behavioural patterns but appointed these specialists to senior 
management positions in the expectation that their professional 
techniques would counter the extravagances of a custodial management 
practice. However, the specialist manager not only encountered problems 
similar to his predecessors, but was also confronted by a hostile prison 
staff reluctant to accept the superiority of expert knowledge over 
knowledge of the prison operation. 
Since the 1960s, the pace of prison construction has accelerated - most 
notably in America and England, and to a lesser, but still significant, 
extent in Australia . 37 The Australian authorities have, in some 
instances, recognised that the time-honoured managerial practices need 
to be changed. 	Courses are now conducted for prospective prison 
managers. 38 	However, the usefulness of these as yet uncompleted 
courses has still to be ascertained. 
Australian 	prisons 	differ 	in 	size, 	classification, 	and 	isolation. 39 
Unlike its mainland counterparts, Tasmania has a single maximum security 
institution where inmates of all categories are accommodated. 40 
The other states have a variety of institutions ranging from the 
'maxi-maximum' security prison, 41 - such as Pentridge in Victoria, and 
37Three new prisons are due to be opened in Victoria whilst several 
are in the planning stages in Queensland. 
38For example, The Governors Training Course, Office of Corrections, 
Victoria, and the Queensland Management Development Programme. 
39Rinaldi, op.cit., provides a detailed account. 
40There is a separate institution at Risdon for female inmates. 
41 A term now used to describe the American mega-fortress prison. 
14 
Long Bay in New South Wales, to the open plan prison farm found in most 
jurisdictions. 42 This thesis suggests that the managerial problems 
encountered at Risdon Prison are more varied, and of greater intensity, 
as a consequence of concentration of all inmate categories. 
The thesis also focuses on prison managers. 	Rinaldi has pointed out 
that it is impossible "to give a pen picture of a typical prison, since 
no such institution exists". 43 It is similarly impossible to give a 
portrait of the 'average' prison- manager in the Australian Prison System 
- due, largely, to the lack of centralised information, and a reluctance 
by those in charge of the prison systems to give access to 
information. 44 
General Propositions  
1. That any organistional investigation of the prison must be taken 
from a 'closed systems' approach because the basic function of the 
prison is to effect control and maintain routine. 	Interaction with 
the 	task 	environment 	is 	confined 	to 	senior 	level 	system 
administration personnel (see Figure I) and responsible Minister. 
2. That 	the 	prison 	is 	not 	easily 	identified 	within 	the 	various 
organisational 	models 	thus 	making 	investigation 	subject 	to 
typological constraint. 
3. That, as yet, the techniques available for investigating management 
and staff interaction have little relevance in the prison setting. 
42Tasmania 1-is an open prison farm for low security inmates. 
43Rinaldi, op,cit., p.13. 
44The author attempted to gain access to the Victorian system for 
study purposes but was told he had to be vetted first. Further, 
15 
4. That 	the 	changing 	philosophies 	have 	contributed 	towards 	the 
promulgation of diverse and contrasting models of prison management 
practice. 
5. That the movement by Governments to assimilate prisons into 
combined larger Departments has, in the first instance, cemented 
their bureaucratic tendencies, and, second, provoked conflict by 
centralising decision-making thus forcing prison managers to become 
functional bureaucrats. 
6. That, apart from external factors impinging on managerial practice, 
internal elements such as staff, inmates, and specialist attitudes, 
determine largely how the prison functions. 
7. That despite the fact that prisons are undergoing very rapid 
change, 	little long-term planning can be discerned in Risdon 
Prison. 	Present managerial practice tends to be of an ad hoc 
nature, largely due to a centralised decision-making process. 
8. That a small scale prison system, because of the diversity of 
inmate categories, must mirror the elements of the large scale 
system. 	The only practical solution is to set up discrete units 
with specially trained staff. 
The Chapters are arranged generally to follow these propositions. 
Chapter 	I, 	'Locating the 	Prison 	in Organisation Theory', 	briefly 
that not only was this subject to a security clearance but any 
materials for publication had to be cleared by the Victorian 
authorities - who had the power of veto on material they considered 
negative to the system. 
16 
discusses how the prison appears to have paramilitary tendencies based 
on the Military Model of organisations. 	It traces prison evolution from 
an autocracy to the fully fledged bureaucracy. 	The major part of the 
chapter is devoted to identifying the prison in the 'closed system' 
category. Use is made of Goff man's classes of 'total' institutions, 45 
Etzioni's typology of compliance relationships, 46 and Blau and Scott's 
identification of organisational groups47 to substantiate the first 
proposition. 	Thompson's three approaches for investigating, the closed 
system, that is Weber's classical bureaucracy, Taylor's Scientific 
Management and Fayol's adminstrative management, are discussed as 
methodological tools. 48 An American example of the use of Fayol's 
principles, adapted for the Federal Prison System but using an 'open' 
systems approach, indicates the different managerial techniques applied 
in that country . 49 Other managerial and organisation theories such as 
Gulick and Urwick's POSDCORB , 50 Management by Objectives ( MBO ) , 51 
Likert's management control systems, 52 and McGregor's theory X and Y 53 
45Goff man, E, Asylums, Harmondsworth: 1976, Pelican. 
46Etzioni , A, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations, 
Revised and Enlarged Edition, New York: 1975, The Free Press, Ch. 1 . 
47Blau, P M, Scott, W B, Fcrmal Organisations, San Francisco: 1962, 
Chandler, pp. 42-45. 
48Thompson, 1 D, Organisations in Action, New York: 1967, 
McGraw-Hill, .Ch.1. 
49Archembeault and Archembeault, op.cit., Ch.4. 
50Gulick, L & Urwick, L, Papers on the Science of Administration, 
New York: 1937, Institute of Public Admin. 
5 IDrucker, P, Management, London: 1979, Pan, Ch.6. 
52Likert, R, New Patterns of Management, New York: 1967, McGraw-Hill, 
pp.223-224. 
53 McGregor, D, "Theory X and Theory Y", in Pugh, D S (ed) 
Organisation Theory, Harmondsworth: 1971, Penguin, pp. 305-323. 
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are examined to demonstrate their hrnited applicability in the prison 
setting, thus substantiating the second and third propositions. The 
Chapter concludes by attempting to place Risdon Prison within the 
framework of the theories offered. 
Chapter II, 'E xternal Constraints on Management Practice', examines the 
changing 	prison 	philosophies 	using 	Bowker's 	typology 	of 	penal 
philosophy . 54 	It discusses the difficulties managers face in trying to 
implement policy when philosophy changes radically. 	!Management practice 
models are considered, including the Justice Model for Corrections, 55 
different types of Participative Management theories, 56 and 
Barak-Glantz's scheme for identifying management practices in the 
USA . 57 The second part of the Chapter gives a profile of American and 
English prison managers and suggests that managerial recruitment in 
Australia still seems to be based on the 'seniority' principle. The 
final part of the Chapter discusses Cohn's reasons for managerial 
failure 58 and argues that Cohn's claims are based on the prison being 
part of an 'open' system. It is suggested that Cohn's rationale is 
premised on the prison as a 'rehabilitative' system, rather than the 
54Bowker, op.cit., pp.38-55. 
55Fogel, D, "...We are the Living Proof ... " The Justice Model for  
Corrections, Cincinnati: 1975, Anderson. 
56Smullen, G J, "Recognising Inmate Groups: The Participation 
Management Model", Corrections Today, 435, 1981, pp.58-63. 
57Barak-Glantz, I L,I"Towards a Conceptual Schema of Prison 
Management Styles", Prison Journal, 61, No.2, 1981, pp.42-58. 
58Cohn, A W, "The Failure of Correctional Management", Crime an 
Delinquency, July, 1973, pp.323-331. 
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present practice of containment. 	Finally, the philosophy and practice 
of Risdon Prison are discussed comparatively. 
Chapter III, 'Internal Constraints on Management Practice', investigates 
the human variables which determine management practice. 	The first part 
of the chapter centres on the prison officer. 	It discusses his reasons 
for seeking employment in the prison setting and describes the effects 
his position has on his family. 	A review of his 'training' suggests 
that management view the officer primarily as a custodial agent. 	A 
summary of the officer's required educational qualifications indicates 
that he will not readily adapt to radical changes in practice and 
philosophy. The second part of the Chapter deals with the inmate. It 
considers managerial techniques designed to control the inmates, for 
example, classification, allocation of privileges, segregation, and 
special units. 	The third part of the Chapter deals with inmate 
programmes, their adaptation from other systems, and the problem of 
implementation. 	Staff and inmate attitudes to prison programmes are 
considered, 	and 	it 	is 	suggested 	that 	instead 	of 	aiding 	prison 
management, programmes act as a catalyst for staff and inmate 
discontent. 	A survey of prisoner programmes at Risdon demonstrates the 
gap between management and inmate perceptions. 	Palumbo's study on 
evaluating programmes suggests that further research is needed before 
programmes are implemented. The chapter concludes with an insight into 
the prison officer unions and their dealings with management. 
Chapter IV, 'I-IMP Risdon', is a description of Tasmania's one, closed, 
facility. The Chapter analyses the paramilitary structure of the prison 
service with particular reference to the disadvantages of such a 
19 
hierarchical 	structure. 	The 	views on 	penal 	philosophy of 	recent 
Tasmanian Governments are considered and the Attorney-Generals' views on 
prison policy since 1960 reveal that the prison normally has had low 
ranking in Government priorities. 	The attitudes of 	Risdon Prison 
Officers are examined. The increase in their sick leave - prevalent in 
all Australian Prison Systems - suggests that morale is low, in part, 
because of a sense of managerial lack of direction. The interaction of 
Prison Officer Unions with Senior Management suggests that they, not the 
management, are the de facto controllers of prison policy and practice. 
Chapter V, 'Evaluation of Risdon Prison Management', uses administrative 
management techniques to examine current Risdon management. The 
analysis suggests that the transition from Departmental status to Law 
Department assimilation is as yet unfinished. There also has been a 
lack of managerial initiative in developing techniques to cope with the 
reduced emphasis on the custodial function of Risdon Prison. At present 
there appears little likelihood of change and, in the present industrial 
climate, relations between management and staff give cause for concern. 
In the 'Conclusion', it is suggested that the managerial task at Risdon 
will remain in its present state of uncertainty until the Tasmanian 
Government determines the purpose of the prison, and produces a policy 
that can be implemented. 
Serious consideration must be given to improving the qualifications of 
the middle management team - the Chief Prison Officers - and a new rank 
structure should be created to bypass the 'deadwood' entrenched in the 
system. While there will always be differences between Management and 
20 
Prison Officer Unions, the R isdon Management must take the initiative 
and lead, rather than be led as at present. The concept of Unit 
Management must be introduced if Risdon is to contribute, in any sense, 
to penal development. It is finally suggested that a separate Prisons 
Division 	be 	established 	with 	the 	Senior 	Prison 	Manager 	directly 
responsible to the relevant Minister. 
Limitations of the Study  
Although there is no dearth of empirical research on prisons, 59 prison 
officers, 6° philosophies of punishment , 61 and inmates, 62 there is 
little detailed research on the management of prisons, 63 and those who 
are employed in a managerial capacity .64  The bulk of the literature is 
American in origin and the remainder tends to be drawn from the United 
59 For example, Cressey,  , D R, The Prison: Studies in Institutional  
Organisation and Change, New York: 1961, Holt, Rinehart & Winston; 
Fox, L W, The English Prison and Borstal Systems, London: 1952, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul; Hawkins, G, The Prison, Policy and  
Practice, Chicago: 1976, Uni. of Chicago Press. 
60Lombardo, L X, Guards Imprisoned, New York: 1981, Elsevier, Thomas, 
J E, The English Prison Officer since 1830, London: 1972, Routledge 
& Kegan Paul. 
61 For example, Garland, D, & Young, P (Eds) The Power to Punish, 
London: 1983, Heinemann, Emery, F E Freedom and Justice Within  
Walls, London: 1970, Tavistock. 
62For example, Sykes, G M, The Society of Captives, Princeton, NJ: 
1958, Princeton Uni Press, Prisons and the Prisoner, HMSO, 1977. 
63 For example, Archembeault & Archembeault, op.cit., Nelson, K E, 
Lovell, C H, Developing Correctional Administations, Washington 
DC: 1970, Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower and Training 
Bawker, L 	Corrections: The Art and the Science, New York: 1982, 
McMillan. 
64Nelson & Lovell, op.cit., Bowker, op.cit., especially Ch.5. 
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Kingdom. 	Australian interest has mainly been dominated by critiques of 
the prison system. 65 	There has, also, been very little substantive 
research by investigators working in a prison managerial capacity 66 
The literature is also subject to investigator bias, and is generally 
condemned by prison managers as being unrealistic and lacking in prison 
knowledge. As McCleery comments, "Is there any answer to the charge of 
the experienced official against the academic consultant that, for all 
his degrees, titles, and statistics, he knows nothing about the prison, 
the state of the prison, or the prison state". 67 
The use of organisational theory and management principles in the prison 
setting cannot be successfully evaluated in the short term. In 
jurisdictions where they are being applied, or adapted to suit the 
prison environment, insufficient data is generally available to 
ascertain success, or failure. 
Sources and Methods  
Part of the methodology chosen for the thesis is that of the case study 
approach. 	The difficulty with this technique lies in using one prison 
655ee especially, Vinson, T, Wilful Obstruction, North Ryde, Sydney: 
1982, Methuen. Tomasic, R & Dobinson, I, The Failure of  
Imprisonment, Sydney: 1979, Allen & Unwin, Zdenkowski, G, & Brown, 
D, The Prison Struggle, Ringwood: 1982, Penguin, Findley, M, 
The State of the Prison, Bathurst: 1982, Mitchellsearch. 
660ne exception being Andrew Coyle, the Governor, Greenock Prison, 
Scotland - see Coyle, A G, The Organisational Development of the  
Scottish Prison Service with Particular Reference to the Role of  
the Prison Officer, unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
Edinburgh, 1986. 
67 McCleery, R H, quoted in Hazelrigg, L (Ed) Prison within Society, 
New York: 1968, Anchor. 
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as a general indicator of prison management practice. However, Kast and 
Rosenzweig point out that when studying organisations and their 
management, "there is a continuum between uniqueness and similarity". 68 
The unique concept is demonstrated by the supposition that 
each 	organisation 	is 	distinct 	in 	the 	same sense 	that 	every 
individual is distinct. 69 
The authors maintain that where the organisation is viewed as a "unique 
social system" then the method of analysis is the case study. 70 
However, at the other end of the continuum is the similarity concept. 
This suggests that 
global 	theories 
organisations. 71 
• • • may be developed which apply to all 
Kast and Rosenzweig point out that these abstract and general models are 
inoperable 	in 	explaining 	the 	variables 	in 	an 	individual 
situation 72 
They mention that when applying comparative organisational analysis 
it is appropriate to operate somewhere between •the individual case 
study and the global theory. 73 
	
There is a public perception that all prisons are similar. 	Prisons, 
however, are as diverse in practice and operation as other• public - a-nd 
68Kast, F E & Rosenzweig, J E, Organisation and Management: A Systems  




   
73 ibid. 
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private sector organisations which operate similar technologies. 	This 
can be clearly exemplified by using the methodological tools of 'domain' 
and 'task environment'. 74 	Thompson claims that it is essential that 
"all organisations must establish ... a domain". 75 	A domain takes into 
account the type of product or service rendered and the population 
served. 76 Thus, the prison receives those people who are sentenced by 
the courts to a period of confinement, and it serves the population of 
a certain jurisdiction. However, no two organisations are identical in 
terms of domain; 
prisons may be prisons at one level of analysis, but the concept of 
domain may prevent us from making inappropriate comparisons of 
prisons with very different domains. 77 
The organisation's domain 
identifies the points at which [the prison) is dependent on inputs 
from the environment. 78 
Direct inputs may be identified as, for example, the courts, food and 
medical provisions, and indirect, as, for example, educational and 
recreation facilities. 
Thompson uses the concept of 'task environment' to refer to "everything 
else". 79 The task environment denotes 
74 'Domain' is a term formulated by Levine & White (1961), 'Task 
Environment' is a notion used by Dill (1958). For a full 
description of those separate but related functions see Thompson, 
op.cit, pp.26-29. 
75 ibid, p.26. 
76 ibid. 
77 ibid. 
78 ibid, p.27. 
79ibid. 
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these parts of the environment which are relevant or partially 
relevant to goal setting and goal attainment . 
The task environment is made up of people: "customers" ( in and out of 
the system ); "suppliers" ( labour , capital, equipment and workspace ); 
"competitors" ( resources allocation within Departments); and "regulatory 
groups" ( the various people involved in the Criminal Justice System ) 81 
Thompson makes it clear that, like domains, "no two task environments are 
identical". 82 Using 'domain' and 'task environment' for analysis, it 
becomes clear that comparisons between two or more prisons may not give 
a clear indication of specific managerial practice. Each prison 
manager, 	however, 	must 	maintain 	the three 	'C's' 	of 	institutional 
practice - custody, care and control. 83 
The techniques for investigating practice at Risdon Prison have been 
based upon principles of administrative management. 	It is argued later 
that the prison is not only a 'closed' system but, to a large extent, a 
functional bureaucracy. 	The primary assumption behind administrtaive 
management principles is that a master plan is known. 84 	By using this, 
the organisation can effect specialisation and control . 85 	However, it 
should be pointed out that use of these principles tends to emphasise 
80ibid 
81 ibid, p.28. 
82ibid. 
8 3Kalinich , D B, Pitcher, T, Surviving in Corrections, Springfield, 
Illinois: 1984,  Thomas, p.35. 
84Thpmpson, op . cit  . , p. 5. 
85 ibid. 
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the 	weaknesses 	rather 	than 	the 	strengths 	of 	the 	system 	under 
investigation. 
Although access to Law Department and Prison Division files was•
unrestricted, they contained little relevant information, or were 
deficient in detail. 
Interviews were conducted with former Attorneys-General and Senior 
Prison Managers; 	of these, some provided considerable insights, and 
others 	were 	unproductive. 	Some 	requested 	interviews failed 	to 
eventuate. 
CHAPTER I 
LOCATING THE PRISON IN ORGANISATION THEORY  
Commentators have claimed that, prior to the Second World War, the 
traditional orison was an autocracy. 1 	Its one purpose was to maintain 
custody of the inmate. 2 	To accomplish this the prison developed a 
rigid and highly stratified hierarchy based on the lines of a military 
organisation. 3 	Indeed, the history of the development of the modern 
prison 	system 	is 	inextricably 	linked 	to 	the 	bureaucratic 	military 
modelJ 	Both staff and inmates wear uniforms and are subject to rules 
and regulations. 5 	Prior to the centralisation of the English Prison 
System in 1877 6 those charged with administering the various prisons 
tended to promote this militaristic mode. 7 Recruits for prison work 
were, by and large, "NCO's and half-pay army officers" selected on the 
assumption that their service training enabled them to accept and 
enforce discipline. 8 As Thomas has pointed out, a 
paramilitary staff structure [based on the Military Model] had been 
the backbone of the convict service since its inception in 1850. 9 
'For example, see Bowker, op.cit., and Barak-Glantz, op.cit. 
2 ibid. 
3Thomas, op.cit, Ch.3. 
4 ibid. 
50n admission inmates are usually given a list of 'do's' and 
'dont's'. Likewise, the officer recruit receives his standing 
orders. 
6Thomas, op.cit . , Ch .4. 
7 ibid, Ch. 3. 
8Ignatieff, M, A Just Measure of Pain, London: 1978, Macmillan, 
p.104. 
9Thomas, op.cit., p.40. 
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It 	logically 	followed that 	on centralising the English Prison 	Service 
the paramilitary practice continued, and 
it has persisted; substantially unchanged ... [and] is found in 
its essentials, in every prison service in the world. 10 
Concomitant with the paramilitary nature and development of the prison 
has 	been 	its 	evolution 	from 	an 	autocracy 	to 	a 	fully-fledged 
bureaucracy. 11 	Many of the reasons for this are to be found in the 
post World War II era. 12 	Openness and accountability suddenly became 
the cornerstones of prison philosophy. 	Further, the move to assimilate 
prisons into other government agencies added to this bureaucratisation 
by placing decision-making in a central body. Another factor in this 
process was the introduction into the prison system of the 'specialist' 
who, in the post-Second World War emphasis on rehabilitation, devised 
and ran the inmate programmes designed to effect inmate behavioural 
change. As most of these specialists e.g. psychiatrists, 
psychologists, social welfare workers, etc - were the products of other 
government medical bureaucracies, they brought with them into the system 
a penchant for bureaucratic ritual which the fledgling prison 
bureaucracy . observed and ref ined for its own use. 	Any investigative 
research 	on 	government 	agencies 	highlights 	the 	attempts 	by 	the 
hierarchical heads to achieve a superior form of bureaucracy. 	In his 
investigation of regulatory bodies Loevinger commented 
10 ibid, p.41. 
11 See discussion by Barak-Glantz, op.cit. , pp.45-46; Coyle, op.cit  . , 
p. 326. 
12 Barak-Glantz, op.cit. , p.44. 
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[t]here are bureaucracies which are engaged in tasks other than 
regulation; 	but 	it 	is 	impossible 	to 	imagine 	regulation 
operating without a bureaucracy. Typically bureaucracy is the 
structure and regulation is the function and each implies the 
other. 13 
Again, as Thomas succinctly argues to change management and staff 
notions of the prison operation 
would mean reversing a trend which has been in evidence for some 
time ... the evolution of a classic Weberian bureaucracy. 14 
The Prison in Organisational literature 1.1 
There are few expositions of the prison which examine the prison from an 
organisational approach. 	Indeed, little attempt has been made to 'fit' 
the prison into organisational theory. 	Most prison studies label the 
institution as a bureaucracy and then move on to another variable such 
as staff and inmate interaction or prison conditions.. 	One recent work, 
however, has addressed the issue albeit in a limited form. 15 
A rchembeault and A rchmebeault claim that the prison must be investigated 
within an 'open-systems' framework. Simply, the open-system strategy 
views the organisation as "a set of interdependent parts which together 
make up a whole because each contributes something and receives 
- something from the whole, which in turn is interdependent with some 
13Loevinger, L, quoted in Mintzberg, H, The Structuring of  
Organisations, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 1979, Prentice Hall, 
pp. 331-332.. 
14Thomas, J E, "Managing the Prison Service" in King, R D, & Morgan, 
R, The Future of Prisons, Farnborough: 1980, Gower, pp. 134-159, 
p.138. 
I 5 Archembeault and Archembeault, op.cit. 
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larger 	environment". 16 	This 	investigative 	strategy 	presupposes 	the 
prison to be part of an overall criminal justice system comprising the 
police, 	prosecution, 	courts 	and 	corrections 	( prisons, 	probation 	and 
parole departments). 17 It is argued . here, however, that an 
investigation of the prison per se must be undertaken from a 'closed 
systems' perspective. 
With 	a 	closed-systems 	strategy 	the 	organisation 	seeks 	to 	avoid 
uncertainty and achieve determinateness. 18 	The manner in which this 
will 	be achieved depends on 	first, 	the particular organisation, 	and 
second, the measures used to effect closure. The prison - as a - single 
institution and as a system - must be considered closed as its very 
nature epitomises this. A view of the maximum security prison plainly 
shows a closed environment in terms of walls, concrete balustrades, 
perimeter towers, and perimeter fencing. The 'core technology' of 
prisons - the inmates - have very little interaction with the outside 
world and any such interaction is subject to scrutiny and control. 
Prisons attempt to keep their particular environment in a state of 
prediction, that is, measures are taken to clarify all known variables - 
inmate movement and receiving of inmates, custody and control - and 
contingency plans promulgated to combat uncertainty. Prisons may only 
be considered open-systems at the apex of the managerial level (see 
Introduction, P.11, Fig 2') and at Ministerial level where outside 
forces such as other Government Agencies and interest groups impinge. 
16Thompsoin, op.cit, p.6. 
l 7For a good account of this system, see Newman, D J, Introduction to  
Criminal- Justice (2nd edn) New York: 1975, Lippincott. 
I 8Thompson, op.cit., p.4. 
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The argument for a closed-systems approach is strengthened by a 
consideration 	of 	Gof f man's 	analysis 	of 	the 	prison 	as 	a 	total 
institution. 19 Gof f man lists organisations into five 'rough groupings'. 
These are, first,  homes for persons felt to be incapable and harmless, 
for example, "homes for the blind, the aged, the orphaned and the 
indigent"; 20 second, places such as mental hospitals and sanitariums; 
third, 	jails, 	penitentiaries, 	POW 	camps 	and 	concentration 	camps; 
fourth, institutions 
purportedly established the better to pursue some worklike task and 
justifying 	themselves 	only 	on 	instrumental 	grounds. 	Such 
institutions include army barracks, 	ships, 	boarding schools, work 
camps .. 21 
Gof f man's 	final 	category 	is 	establishments 	designed 	as 	retreats, 
"abbeys, 	monasteries, 	convents, 	and 	other 	cloisters". 22 	Goff man's 
description of the prison is quite explicit: 
First; 	all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and 
under the same single authority. 	Second, each phase of the 
member's daily activity will be carried out in the immediate 
company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike 
and require to do the same thing together. 	Third, all phases of 
the day's activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity 
leading at a pre-arranged time into the next, the whole circle of 
activities being imposed from above through a system of explicit 
formal rulings and a body of officials. Finally, the contents of 
the various enforced activities are brought together as part of a 
single overall rational plan purpOrtedly designed to fulfil the 
official aims of the institution. 23 
Goffman's perception of the prison as a total institution has been 
supported by others who have described it as a "self sufficient social 




23Goffman, E, "The Characteristics of Total Institutions", in 
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island"24 and a "total social system". 25 According to Eaton, 
Prisons are islands of social interaction in which administrative 
planning aims to exercise what approximates absolute control of 
inmates in order to accomplish several socially sanctioned 
purposes. 26 
These include segregation from society for a particular period, the 
protection of society, and, hopefully, change in the criminal's 
behaviour. If the latter is true then prisons may be regarded as 
members of a more general class of organisations which are called 
socio-psychological or people-changing institutions. 27 
These types of institutions 
work directly on people 	... their primary tasks are formally 
defined in terms of controlling and changing social status and 
behaviour of human beings. 28 
Like Williams, 	Emery classifies prisons into the social psychological 
changing category. 29 	He, however, claims they differ in respect to all 
other types in that the prison 
Etzioni, A, A Sociological Reader on Complex Organisations,  New 
York: 1969, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, p.314. 
24 Korn, R R, and McCorkle, L W, Criminology and Penology, New York: 
1967, Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
25Eaton, J W Stone Walls Not A Prison Make, Springfield, Illinois, 
1962, Thomas. 
26 ibid, p.vii. 
27Williams, T A,  Custody and Conflict: an organisational study of  
role problems and related attitudes among prison officers in  
Western Australia, unpublished PhD Thesis, Uni. of .Western 
Australia, 1974, p.14. 
28ibid . 
29Emery, F E, Freedom and Justice Within Walls, The Bristol Prison  
Experiment, London: 1970, Tavistock, p.2. 
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is based on the premise of doing something against the wishes of 
inmates, and usually against their interests. 30 
Further, Sykes views the prison as representing a social system which 
attempts to exercise 
total 	social 	control 	through 	the 	use 	of 	a 	bureaucratically 
organised administrative staff ... 31 
The 	prison 	falls 	within 	Etzioni's 	coercive/alienative 	typology 	(see 
Figure I). In this typology compliance refers both to the relationship 
in which one individual behaves in accordance with a directive supported 
by another's power or authority and the reaction of the individual to 
the power applied. Etzioni posits three types of organisational power 
affecting subordinates: 	purely coercive power; 	utilitarian power, 
based on control over resources and rewards; 	normative power, 
comprising praise, esteem and acceptance. 
Figure I 	TYPOLOGY OF COMPLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS: POWER, INVOLVEMENT  
AND THE CONGRUENT RELATIONSHIPS  
TYPES OF INVOLVEMENT 	 TYPES OF POWER 
COERCIVE UTILITARIAN NORMATIVE 
ALIENATIVE 	 1 	 4 	 7 
CALCULATIVE 	 2 	 5 	 8__ 
MORAL 	 3 	 6 	 9  
31 
According to Etzioni, organisations which are coercive include prisons 
and custodial mental hopsitals: 	Utilitarian organisation examples are 
30 ibid. 
31 Sykes, op.cit., p.xv. 
32 Adapted from Etzioni, A, A Comparative Analysis of Complex  
Organisations, Glencoe, Illinois: 1961, p.12, by Hrebiniak, L G, 
Complex Organisations, St Paul: 1978, West, p.334. 
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business 	firms. 	Normative organisations include religious 	institutions. 
As . with power relationships, 	there are three types of involvement: 
alienative, 	calculative, 	and 	moral. 	Alienative, 	indicates a 	strong 
negative orientation of the subordinate; 	calculative is based upon 
balancing the rewards of the organisation; 	and moral suggests a 
positive, highly intensive orientation. 33 	By combining the power and 
involvement elements a typology can be formulated, based on the 
compliance relationships in which nine types are possible. 
Etzioni suggests, however, that the probability of occurence is not 
equal to all nine types. 	He argues that the type of involvement depends 
on the type of power used by the organisation. 	He does point out that 
there is a tendency for organisations to group in certain cells - 1,5,9. 
This is a direct result of the congruence between types of power and 
involvement. 	Etzioni points out that where coercive power is used 
alienation is the 	most 	likely response of those remaining in the 
organisation. Where utilitarian power is used, those within the 
organisation will judge whether their work equates with the rewards 
offered. Where* normative power is used those in the organisation will 
identify specifically with it and fully accept the standards set, by 
it.34 
Etzioni claims that there is an association between the compliance 
relationships and the organisation's stated goals 35 
33Hrebiniak, op.cit., p.333. 
34Etzioni, A, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations, 
Revised and Enlarged edition, New York: 1975, Th Free Press, Ch.l.. 
35 ibid, Ch.5 
34 
Organisations with order goals at tempt to control actors who are 
deviant in the eves of some social unit the oreanisation is ser vine 
( frequently society ) while segregating them from society and by 
blocking them from further deviant activities. This is a negative 
goal in the sense that such oreanisations attempt to prevent the 
occurence of certain events rather than producing an objective or a 
service. Order-centred organisations differ according to the 
techniques and means they use to obtain their goals. 	Some merely 
segregate deviants; 	others segregate and punish; 	and still others 
eliminate 	deviants 	altogether. 	But 	all 	are 	predominantly 
order-oriented. 36 
Another view is that organisations can be categorised according to the 
membership. 37 Blau and Scott point out that four basic groups of 
persons can be identified in relation to any formal organisation: 
1. the members or rank-and- file participants 
2. the owners or managers of the organisation 
3. the clients or, more generally, the 'public-in-contact' that is the 
people who are technically 'outside' the organisation yet have 
regular, direct contact with it, under whatever label - patient, 
customer, law violator, prisoner, enemy soldier, student; and 
4. the public-at-large, that is, the members of the society in which 
the organisation operates. 38 
Blau and Scott posit a typology to classify organisations on the 
principle of CU! BONO - who benefits. 	In each of the types of 
organisation there is a prime beneficiary. 	The authors, however, are 
36ibid, pp. 104-105. 




careful 	to point out that 	the prime beneficiary is not the only 
beneficiary, 
for each of the various groups who make contributions to an 
organisation does so only in return for certain benefits 
received. 39 
There are four 'pure' types of organisation according to this analysis: 
1. Mutual benefit associations: Cu! BONO - membership 
2. Business concerns: CUT BONO - owners 
3. Service organisations: CU! BONO - client in contract 
4. Commonweal organisations: CU! BONO - public at large 4 ° 
Prisons are placed in the fourth category - Commonweal organisations. 
It is suggested that the real purpose of the Blau-Scott typology is the 
identification not of the prime beneficiary, but of problems and the 
contingencies undertaken to combat these. 41 	The prison's major problem 
lies in control - external verses internal. 	External control through 
the relevant governing body is essentially democratic. 	However, the 
internal control mechanism 
•__ 
is expected to be bureaucratic, governed by the criterion 
efficiency, and not democratic. 42 
The critical issue in Commonweal organisations is one of control and 





43Hrebiniak; op.cit., p.332. 
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beneficiary in Commonweal organisations - the public - to maintain some 
of the control over management and aims of, for example, the prison, 44 
the decision-making process is abrogated by management and placed in 
the hands of a central authority. 
The triple themes of bureaucracy, power, and order have been described 
by various authors as the basic ingredients required in the prison 
setting. 45 While some have focused on one or two variables, it is 
suggested that a knowledge of all three is necessary to begin an 
investigation of any prison or prison system. 
Bureaucracy 1:2 
Classical 	Weberian 	legal-rational 	theory 	offered 	a 	number 	of 
characteristics towards which managers should strive: 
1. a clear division of labour into highly specified jobs 
2. selections and promotion on the basis of merit to • meet 
prescribed position specifications 
3. adequate technical training for all employees 
4. a set hierarchy of jobs and office 
5. formal rules and regulations which define how the organisation 
is to operate and how authority is allocated 
6. the design and implementation of an adequate control system 
7. a clear separation between personal and business lives of all 
employees 
8. a clearly defined career structure 
9. set salaries and benefits 
44ibid . 
45See, for example, Thomas, op.cit.; Coyle, op.cit.; Etzioni, op.cit. 
. 	Sykes, op.cit. 
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10. obedience to authority vested in specific positions. 46 
Weber investigated bureaucracy as part of the role of authority in 
society. 	His pure model cannot give an accurate reflection of the 
modern prison. 	The rise of the prison officer unions, for example, 
which question both Government and managerial motives, and actively call 
for management's dismissa1 47 makes this typology only useful to compare 
the theory with the practice. 	However, the notion of order links 
directly with formal theories of bureaucracy. 	Prisons run on order and 
routine. 	Routine is explicitly defined by bureaucratic fiat. 	As Coyle 
points out 
All prisons are structured on a hierarchical system of custodial 
ranks and any innovation which cannot be achieved within this 
hierarchy must either modify or evade this rank structure. 48 
But evading this rank structure, based on Weber's legal-rational form of 
bureaucracy, could throw the system into a state of uncertainty; and, 
as organisations using a closed system approach attempt to reduce 
uncertainty by reducing the number of variables operating on its 
technical core, it would appear unlikely that this would be the case. 	A 
corollary of order and routine is stability. 	Organisations which seek 
to 	achieve 	relatively 	stable 	conditions 	have 	been 	labelled 	as 
'mechanistic'. 49 	A mechanistic management system appropriate to stable 
conditions is characterised by 
46Stoner,  , 3 A F, Collins, R R, Yetton, P W, Management in Australia, 
Sydney: 1985, Prentice-Hall, p.49. 
47For example, after the Parklea riot in NSW, the Prison Officers 
Association called for the management to stand aside as they "no 
longer had any confidence in them", media broadcast, 14 .11.87. 
48c4le, op.cit. , p.134. 
49Burns, T, "Mechanistic and organismic Structures" in Pugh, D S, (ed) 
Organisation Theory, Harmondsworth: 1971, Penguin, pp. 43-55. 
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1. The specialised differentiation of functional tasks into which 
the problems and tasks facing the concern as a whole are 
broken down. 
2. The abstract nature of each individual task, which is pursued 
with techniques and purposes more or less distinct from those 
of the concern as a whole. 
3. The reconciliation, for each level in the hierarchy, of these 
distinct performances by the immediate superiors. 
4 • 	The 	precise 	definition 	of 	rights 	and 	obligations 	and 
technical methods attached to each functional role. 
5. The translation of rights and obligations and methods into the 
responsibilities of a functional position. 
6. Hierarchic structure of control, authority and communication. 
7. A reinforcement of the hierarchic structure by the location of 
knowledge 	of 	actualities 	exclusively 	at 	the 	top 	of 	the 
hierarchy. 
8. A tendency for vertical interaction between members of the 
concern i.e. between superior and subordinate. 
9. A tendency for operations and working behaviour to be governed 
by superiors. 
10. Insistence on 	loyalty to the concern and 	obedience to 
superiors as a condition of membership. 
11. A greater importance on prestige attaching to internal (local) 
than to general (cosmopolitan) knowledge, experience and 
skill. 50 
Although 	Burns and 	Stalker 	based 	their 	mechanistic 	typology on 
investigations into the electronic industry in Britain its assumptions 
are parallel with formal theories of bureaucracy. In fact, the authors' 
claim that mechanistic sytems are the rational bureaucracy of an earlier 
generation. 51 The application of this typology to the present 
50 ibid, pp. 49-50. 
51 ibid, p.48. 
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Australian Prison System would be a useful analytic tool, Derhaps with 
more validity than a straight rational -legal approach. The difficulty 
in determining a precise approach is that all prisons are different. 52 
Does the investigator examine one particular orison and generalise from 
that result to the rest of the system of which his focus is part? Or, 
does he attempt to survey the entire system and make generalisations 
hoping that these will help explain the individual institution? These 
difficulties are compounded by the movement of the English and Welsh, 
Scottish and Australian systems to centralise decision-making in head 
office. By taking the major decision-making process away from the 
specific prison environment, those charged with overseeing policy, are 
cementing what Mintzberg labels 'machine bureaucracy'. 53 
According to Mintzberg , machine bureaucracy applies where there is 
routinisation, 	repetitiveness, 	and 	standardisation. 54 	It 	is 	typified 
by 	a 	proliferation 	of 	rules 	and 	regulations, 	and 	an 	elaborate 
administrative 	structur.e. 55 . 	Among 	several 	groups of 	organisations 
which exhibit common structural characteristics 	all 	definitive of 
machine bureaucracy - is the custodial prison. 56 There are arguments, 
however, that prisons cannot be placed into such a determinate category. 
As Cressey has pointed ' out, prisons cannot be labelled as either purely 
52 R inaldi , op. cit  . 
53 Mintzberg, H, The Structuring of Organisations, Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: 1979, Prentice-Hall, Ch. 18 . 
56 i bid. 
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custodial or purely treatment. 	They can only be custodially 'oriented' 
or treatment 'oriented 1 . 57 	Perhaps the May Report sums up the present 
state of most prisons when, on investigating the English Prison System, 
it recommended that "Positive Custody" be the dominant philosophical 
mode and the hoped for practice. 58 	This concept has also been termed 
'Humane Containment'. 59 	That containment is clearly the task of the 
prison has been argued by Coyle. 6 ° 	Another view is that prisons do 
little more than confine inmates. 61 	Whatever views are held on the 
purpose of prisons, the major task by Governments is managing them. The 
difficulty in achieving this is clearly summed up by Maguire et al, 
prison administration is a much more _pragmatic business than any 
discussion of abstract models can portray.b 2 
The 	authors 	emphasise 	that 	prisons 	are 	"closed 	and 	total 
institutions". 63 
In 	the 	course 	of 	his 	analysis 	Etzioni 	defined 	three 	specific 
characteristics which are intrinsic to all organisations. They are: 
57Cressey, D R, "Prison Organisations" in March, J G (ed), Handbook  
of Organisations, Chicago: 1965, Rand McNally, p.1032. 
58Vagg, J, Morgan, R, & Maguire, M, "Introduction: Accountability and 
Prisons", in Maguire, M, Vagg, J, & Morgan R (Eds) Accountability  
adn Prisons, London: 1985, Tavistock, p.9. 
59Richardson, G, "The Case for Prisoner's Rights" in Maguire et al, 
op.cit., p.24. 
60c 0-1- y e op.cit. pp.110-134. 
61 Gostin, L, Staunton, M, "The case for prison standards: conditions 
of confinement, segregattion, and medical treatment", in Maguire 
et al, op.cit., pp.82-96. 
62 vagg et al, op.cit., p.9. 
63 ibid, p.5. 
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Divisions 	of 	labour, 	of 	power, 	and 	of 	communication 
responsibilities, 	such 	divisions 	being 	deliberately 	planned 	to 
achieve certain goals. The pressure of power-centres which control 
the concerted efforts of the organisation and continually review 
its performance and re-pattern its structure, where necessary, so 
as to increase its eficiency. The substitution of personnel, that 
is, unsatisfactory persons can be removed and others assigned their 
tasks, and people can be transferred and promoted. 64 
All these characteristics can be applied to the prison, indeed to any 
organisation as Etzioni has pointed out, but do they really help to 
determine a prison managerial practice typology? 
Authors 	surveyed 	so 	far 	have 	all 	stressed 	characteristics 	of 
organisations in which the prison can be placed - the notion of a 
bureaucratic, 	control-oriented, 	mechanistic, 	closed-system. 	A major 
difficulty arises when organistion theorists are used • to investigate 
prison managment practice despite their contribution to our general 
understanding of organisations. Pugh has pointed out that theorists 
such as Weber, Gouldner, Etzioni (structure) Fayol, Barnard, Cyert and 
March (functioning) Taylor, Simon, Drucker (management) Mayo, Argyris, 
Herzberg (people in organisations) and Whyte, Boulding and Galbraith 
(the organisation in society) have attempted to bring together 
information about how organisations function, and how this should be 
managed, 65 that is 
they 	have tried to discover generalisations applicable to all 
organisations. 66 
The prison, however, is unlike any other organisation - except other 
prisons, and even this has been questioned by Fiori. 67 	Not only are 
64Etzioni (1964) op.cit., Ch.3. 
65Pugh, op.cit., p.9. 
67Fiori, op.cit. 
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most 	residents 	of 	prisons 	incarcerated 	against 	their 	will 	but 	the 
categorisation of most prison inmates into different holding 
establishments may mean that a generalised view of prison management 
practice may not be methodologically sound enough to posit a typology 
for a specific institution. However, as with any organisation some 
general managerial traits are mandatory. 
As this study of prison managerial theories and practices views the 
prison as a closed-system, the works of some closed-system theorists 
will be used as analytical tools to determine necessary prison 
managerial traits. 
Thompson describes three schools of thought which can be used as 
analytical tools into closed-system organisations. 68 First is 
Scientific Management - which eliminates uncertainty and effects closure 
of the organisation by assuming all goals are known, tasks are 
repetitive, and resources are available in uniform qualities. 69 Second 
is Administrative Management - which involves economic efficiency and 
achieves closure by assuming a master plan is known. 70 	Third, 
Bureaucracy - in which the ultimate criterion is efficiency. 	This 
approach assumes closure of the organisation -by clearly defining tasks, 
a set of rules and regulations which are strictly applied and rigidly 
followed, 	and 	a 	formalised 	authority structure 	depersonalising the 
position incumbents. 71 	As Bureaucracy has been described earlier, . a 





review 	of 	Scientific Management 	and 	Administrtive 	Management 	is 
necessary to determine the applicability of each to managerial practice. 
Administrative Management principles derived from Fayol have been 
adapted for prison use by Archernbeault and Archembeault, and it is this 
typology which will be presented later. 
Scientific  Management 1:3 
Taylor's management principles were designed with standardisation as the 
focal 	point 	of 	the organisation. 	His 	system, 	which 	he labelled 
'functional management', laid down four underlying tenets: 	management 
should 
a) develop a scientific analysis for each element of a man's 
work; 
b) scientifically 	select, 	train, 	teach, 	and 	develop 	workers; 
c) cooperate with the men to insure adherence to the principles 
of scientific management; and 
d) guarantee 	a 	division 	of 	work 	and 	responsibility 	with 
management and subordinates assuming these duties for which 
they are best qualified. 72 
The use of Scientific Management principles in the prison setting may 
have been useful in the early American Penitentiary system and its 
English counterpart at the Pentonville Model Prison. 	These early 
institutions were based on repetition; silence and order. The 
'congregate' system allowed no deviations from the established order. 
The modern prison system, however, has become increasingly complex. The 
rapid changing power structure - away from management and towards prison 
officer Unions and inmates - combined with an environment where all 
elements of prison philosophical modes are in operation in the same 
72Taylor, F W, in Pugh, D S, Hickson, D 3, Hinings, C R (eds), 
Writers on Organisation (2nd edn) Harmondsworth: 1964, Penguin, 
pp.97-192. 
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institution 	in 	varying 	degrees 	(restraint, 	revenge, 	reform, 	and 
reintegration) has meant 	that Scientific Management principles have 
little validity in the contemporary prison. 
Administrative Management 73 1:4 
(1) Division of Work: Specialisation 
Prison work is complex, and, no one person can perform all tasks nor 
make all necessary decisions. 	Specialised training for specialised work 
must be given, and is the responsibility of management. 	Services should 
be broken down into functional units. 
(2) Delegation of Authority  
Each subordinate in the prison must be delegated the authority necessary 
to carry out his functions. 	Subordinates are accountable but the 
superior never relinquishes responsibility. 	A subordinate's failure 	is 
the supervisor's failure for which the supervisor is also accountable. 
(3) Discipline  
All employees of the prison must be governed by a uniform set of rules 
and conformity to these must be expected if order is to prevail. 
Positive discipline is a healthy characteristic of the prison, negative 
discipline is not. 
(4) Unity of Command  
Subordinates are responsible to one and only one . superior. 	When 
subordinates receive orders from multiple superiors,' it often leads to 
73These principles were adapted from Fayol, H, General and Industrial  
Management, London: 1949, Pitman & Sons, pp. 19-20, by Archembeault 
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confusion, resentment, and ineff icency , amongst others. 	According to 
this principle, the legal authority of the prison is vested in the top 
administrator (e. g. Governor or Warden ). He delegates lawful authority 
through the chain of command to his subordinates - managers and staff - 
and eventually to inmates. Hence, the authority exercised by the prison 
officer is that of the top administrator. 
The authors claims that two other related concepts of organisation are 
relevant to Unity of Command: a) Span of Control and b) Levels of 
organisation . 
a) Span of Control holds that no supervisor should be responsible 
for more subordinates than he can effectively manage. 	The 
ratio should be determined by complexity of work, frequency of 
supervisor -to-subordinate contact, competency of subordinates, 
personal characteristics and competency of the supervisor, 
types and number of inmates. The authors suggest that, 
ideally the supervisor should control no less than five or more 
than twelve subordinates. 
b) Levels of Organisation 	There is a close relationship between 
span and number of levels of organisation. 	The narrower the 
span, the greater number of supervisors required. 	Thus, unity 
of command makes it necessary to create a higher level of 
supervision to whom a group of supervisors must report. 
( 5) Unity of Direction  
and Archembeault, op .cit  . , pp.70-80. 
46 
This principle means that the s prison must totally commit its resources 
towards the accomplishment of its goal. 
(6) Subordination of Individual Interests 
This means that every individual in the prison must surrender a certain 
amount of individual self-interest to the overall good of the prison. 
It also holds that prison employees should receive salaries and benefits 
commensurate with those granted in the private sector requiring similar 
education, training, and responsibility. 
(7) Centralised decision-making  and communication  through channels  
Centralisation means that power should be vested in a centralised point. 
Decision-making is retained at higher levels and orders are communicated 
downward. Information regarding feedback on these decisions should flow 
back up to the centralised point. 
(8) Order  
Everything has a place. 	Rules, regulations, procedures, mannerisms and 
personal appearances of staff are important. 
(9) Equity within the Prison  
All members of staff, and all units should be treated equally. 	To be 
effective, management must enforce this principle. 
(10) Retention of personnel  
It is to the prisons advantage to retain staff with training and 
experience. It is also mandatory that further training be given to make 
the job as varied and interesting as possible. 
47 
(11) Management and Initiative 
Management has a duty to motivate subordinates to perform to the best of 
their ability. Recognition must be given to these subordinates who 
exercise personal initiative. 
(12) Esprit de corps  
Management must build a high degree of morale in the prison. 	The 
quality of the prison's leadership is reflected in the morale of its 
staff. 74 (These principles will be referred to in Chapter V 
'Evaluation of Risdon Prison Management'). 
Of 	the 	three 	theories 	for 	investigating 	closed-system 	organistions 
proposed by Thompson, it would appear that Bureaucracy and 
Administrative Management can be used to ascertain specific prison 
managerial practices, but only in the light of the requirements laid 
down by Weber and Fayol. The framework offered by both theorists was 
formulated from study of organisations where members were willing  
participants. The prison has two elements in the managerial direction 
process - the willing (the staff ) and the unwilling (the inmate). 	Does 	' 
this mean that the prison manager must have two separate strategies to 
deal with each element? 	It should be noted that Archembeault and 
Archembeault's 	adaptation 	of 	Fayol's 	principles 	was 	particularly 
oriented towards staff. Are there any principles or theories which may 
be applied to the prison and can be used to manage both staff and 
inmates? A review of contemporary prison literature may indicate 
whether any of the propositions offered have merit. 
74 1bid. 
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A rchernbeault 	and 	A rchembeault 	in 	their 	discussion 	of 	correctional 
supervisory management make a distinction between organisational and 
management theories. 75 They maintain that 
The distinctions between organisation and management theories are 
more a matter of emphasis and scope than of anything else. 
Organisational theories , emphasise structure and concern the total 
organisation, whereas management theories emphasise specific 
processes within the larger organisation . 76 
T hey 	begin their 	analysis by a survey of 	Weberian 	organisational 
principles claiming that they are 
alive and well today and are being used . . . especially in adult 
custody institutions. 77 
They suggest that Weber's propositions can easily be recognised by 
looking at any prison organisation chart . 78 Folllowing on from this, 
the authors' use Fayol's administrative management principles and apply 
them to the Prison set ting ( see Section 14 this Chapter ) . 
rchembeault 	and 	A rchembeault 	follow 	their • adaptation 	of 	Fayol's 
principles by giving a description of all the other organisational 
theories they see as relevant to prison management although oriented to 
the open-systems framework. These include scientific management , 79 
Gulick and Ur wick's POSDCORB - planning, organising, staffing, directing, 
75 Archembeault and Archembeault , op .cit  . , Ch . 4 . 
761bid  , p.68. 
77 ibid  , p. 69 . 
78 ibid, p.70. 
79Taylor,  , op .cit  . 
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coordinating, reporting and budgeting. 80 	PPBS - programme, planning 
and budgeting system," Zero-Based Budgeting, 82  M BO - management by 
objectives," among others. 	a primer for prison managers in 
America, Keating" surveys most of what .Archembeault and .Archembeault 
have covered but adds Ouchi's theory Z, Herzberg's motivation - hygiene 
theory, Maslow's hierarchy of needs, and McGregor's theory of X and 
Y. 85 	Whilst it is clear that most, if not all, of these theories have 
relevance to the prison setting, and, again, most can be used as indices 
of managerial practice, 	the choice of approach depends upon the 
particular investigator's bias. 	It could be that the prison management 
function does not need a theoretical approach applied to it. 	Indeed, it 
may well be that prison administration may prove that management does 
not require a particular approach. As Waldo points out, in some 
organisations 
Things somehow run themselves without the interventions indicated by 
such terms as organisation, administration, management. 86 
Additionally, 	Waldo maintains there are doubts about the 'scientific' 
status of management knowledge. 	He claims there are those who see 
management 
"Gulick, L (lc Urwick, L, Papers on the Science of Administration 
New York: 1937, Institute of Public Administration. 
"Quoted in Archembeault dc Archembeault, op.cit., pp.84-86. 
82Phyrr, P A, Zero Based Budgeting, New York: 1973, Wiley. 
83Drucker, P, Management, London: 1979, Pan, Ch.26. 
84 Keating, J M, Handbook for Special Masters, 1985, unpublished. 
85 ibid. 
86Waldo, D, M "The Prospects of Public Organisations" in Bozeman, B, 
Straussman, J (eds) New Directions in Public Administration, 
Monterey: 1984, Brooks/Cole, pp.7-14, p.7. 
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as a practical skill only, a combination of personal attributes and 
experience. 87 
Among the relatively few writings on prison management practice there 
appears to be three commonly acknowledged approaches. These are Fayol's 
model (already discussed), Gulick and Urwick's POSDCORB and MBO. 
Gulick and Urwick's POSDCORB 1:5 
Used as an acronym for the various functions a manager should perform: 
Planning - the long-term mapping out of goals and methods and authority 
structures necessary to achieve the goals. 
Organising - facilitating men, material and resources in a determinate 
fashion. 
Staffing 	recruiting, 	training, 	appraising 	individuals and 	providing 
the necessary instructions, or delegating authority, which enables 
subordinates to view the office holder in a leadership role. 
Coordinating - bringing together all the components of the organisation 
in a disciplined manner. 
Reporting - keeping superiors and subordinates alike apprised with the 
organisation's situation, its problems and progress of operation. 
Also includes such functions as research, record keeping, and 
inspection. 
Budgeting - refers to fiscal planning, allocating, accounting, control 
and acquisition. 88 
87 ibid, pp.8-9. 
88From Archembeault and Archembeault, pp.84-86. 
89 
51 
Archembeault and Archembeault claim that each prison manager should 
possess these attributes and have the ability to place equal emphasis on 
all of these variables (see figure 2). 	This, of course, is somewhat 
idealistic and conforms to a Weberian 'ideal type'. 	However, with the 
growing complexity of managing prisons, the prison manager should at 
least have competence in a majority of these tasks. 
Figure 	2 	: 	Management 	Functions of the Correctional Supervisor 
89 ibid. 
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Management of Objectives (.4B0) 1:6 
This managerial approach was formulated in the nineteen fifties by 
Drucker." Basically, MBO can be viewed as a process made up of four 
major elements: goal setting, action planning, self-control, and 
periodic reviews. 	At the apex, the organisation establishes goals and 
devises measures and plans to achieve these goals. 	The goal setting 
activity is then communicated to all levels of the organisation and the 
top management ensure that the lower levels understand the concepts, 
accept the directives and channel their efforts towards accomplishing 
the higher level goals. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal  
Justice Standards and Goals adapted MBO for application in American 
Prisons. 91 
The Commission suggested that seven steps be followed for the concept's 
success: 
1. An ongoing system capable of accurately identifying and predicting 
changes in the environment in which the organisation functions. 
2. Administrative capability through a management information system to 
provide data quickly to appropriate organisational members, work 
groups, or organisational units for their consideration and possible 
utilisation. 
3. Clearly 	established 	and 	articulated 	organisational 	and 	individual 
goals, mutually accepted through a •-. of continuous interaction 
between management and workers and between various levels of 
management. Unilateral imposition of correctional goals on lower 
echelon participants will not result in an MBO system but another 
bureaucracy. 
4. An ongoing evaluation of the organistional and individual goals in 
light of feedback of the system. 	Such feedback and evaluation may 
result in the resetting of goals. 
90 Drucker,  , op .cit  . 
91 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and  
Goals, quoted in Bowker,  , op. cit , pp. 212-213. 
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5. A 	properly 	designed 	and 	functioning 	organisational 	system 	for 
effective 	and 	efficient 	service 	delivery. 	In 	such 	a 	system, 
goal-oriented 	collaboration 	and 	cooperation 	are 	organistionally 
facilitated, 	and 	administrative 	services 	fully 	support 	efforts 	at 
goal accomplishment. 
6. A 	managerial and work climate highly conducive to employee 
motivation 	and 	self -actualisation 	towards 	organisational 	goal 
accomplishments. 	Such a climate should be developed and nurtured 
through the application of a participative style of management. 
7. A properly functioning system for appraising organisational, work 
group and individual progress towards goal attainment . 92 
The question must now be asked, can any of the previously discussed 
organisational 
	
theory and prison 	managerial 	practices be useful to 
investigate a specific prison? 
	
It would appear that the distinguishing 
characteristics of each prison make an investigation of theory and 
practice subject to many constraints. 	For example, size of institution, 
type of classification, number of staff and inmates. 	Government policy, 
age and condition of institution, among others, could determine specific 
managerial practice. It is reasonable to suggest, however, that in the 
light of many prison systems losing their autonomy and becoming part of 
other government agencies, they are in fact part of an overall 
government bureaucracy , and as such should be investigated from that 
perspective. Managerial practice, on the one hand, may be determined 
according 	to 	the 	variables 	previously 	mentioned, 	as 	well 	as 
consideration of the individual manager's attributes. He may, perhaps 
be highly motivated, educated and adaptable to each environment and 
setting in which he is placed. On the other hand, he may have attained 




A further problem with the previously mentioned concepts is the failure 
to provide a mechanism which can be used for both staff and inmates. 
These researchers who postulate prison management theories appear to use 
only concepts which substantiate the notion of control within the prison 
and then only directed towards one element - the prison staff. Whilst 
prisons must retain control of their charges, the American practice of 
using these organisational theories must be questioned particularly in 
light of the • other school of thought which claims participative 
management appears to be the only useful mechanism to prevent overt 
reaction from inmates. 93 It is paradoxical that investigators harshly 
criticise prison management for failure to provide adequate 
leadership94  yet admit that the institution is bound by bureaucratic 
f ia t. 9 5 
 
It may be that the only answer to this is the Blau and Scott 
notion that the prison be removed from the Commonweal category 
(concerned with the protection of the public) and placed in the Service 
group (oriented primarily to the needs and interests of the prisoner 
'clients') •96 
However constrained by the edicts of bureaucracy, the prison manager 
must run his institution. His powers of operation are defined by rules 
and regulation - both external, in the mandate set out by Head -Office, 
and internal, by prison rules and standing orders. But as Coyle claims, 
93For example, see Coyle, op.cit. , Barak-Glantz, op.cit., Joplin, 
op.cit. 
94 For example, see Maguire, et al, op.cit. 
9 5 i bid. 
96Blau & Scott, op.cit. 
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a mixture of the 'charismatic' combined with a 'common sense approach 
in the use of rules and regulations may be a more realistic portrait of 
the 'successful' manager . 97 If, as Coyle claims, charismatic 
leadership styles are developing in the Scottish Prison Service , 98 an 
examination of management styles developed from studies in divergent 
organisations may help to determine whether the contemporary prison 
manager fits into any managerial format. Allen and Simonsen take the 
approach that prison management will be most effective if it is 
generally consistent . in itsview of all participants staff and 
inmates. 99 They claim 
the balancing and harmonising of these two sets of relationships ... 
creates some of the most difficult problems, perhaps because 
[managers] (consciously or unconsciously ) adapt one view of jpeople 
when dealing with staff and another when dealing with offenders. 1 u0 
These managerial problems have been recognised by Emery. 	He points out 
that 
If conditions in prison were like those in industrial organisations, 
stets could be taken to ensure that the Governor and his deputy had 
sufficient knowledge of the ... daily life of their prison to make 
judgements that were patently realistic . 101 
However,  the assumption in bureaucracy is that roles and duties are 
explicitly defined, leaving little leeway for the managerial incumbent. 
97Coyle, op.cit. 
98 ibid. 
99Allen & Simonsen, op .cit , p.358. 
100 ibid. 
10 IEmery, op.cit. , p. 17 . 
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Yet, this rigidity cannot be applied in the prison because of the two 
divergent elements - staff and inmates. 
Two studies are particularly useful in categorising managers. 	The first 
is 	by 	Likert . 102 	He 	proposed 	that organisations 	be 	viewed as 
exhibiting four types of management control systems: 
I. Exploitative authoritative 	characterised by the use of threats, 
punishment, and occasional rewards to gain member compliance. 
2. Benevolent  authoritative - characterised by the use of economic 
rewards, with actual and potential application of punishments. 
3. Participative  Consultative - which controls mainly through economic 
rewards, modest ego involvement and only occasional punishment. 
4. Participative Group - whch relies on economic rewards and strong ego 
involvement of participants. 103 
It 	has been 	suggested 	that 	aspects of all four .types appear in 
contemporary prisons. 104 	The general trend, however, is away from type 
1 to a mixture of types 3 & 4 
through a mixture of benevolently applied authority and limited 
democratisation of the management process. 105 
Allen and Simonsen claim that the general pattern of management styles in 
present 	prison practice 	is closer 	to Likert's type 	3 - benevolent 
102 Likert, op.cit. 
103 ibid, pp.223-234. 




The second study was conducted by Street , V inter and Perrow. 107 	They 
studied 	six 	institntions 	for 	delinquents 	and 	posited 	a 	typology 	for 
handling of fenders. 
I ) obedience - conformity 
2 ) re-education - development 
3) 	individual - treatment 
Additionally, administrators seemed to be 'guided by one of two major 
orientations. 	Some 	administrators 	exhibited 	'resigned 	conservatism'. 
These 	administrators 	were 	largelY 	satisfied 	with 	current 	levels 	of 
organisational achievement. 	They claimed changes could only be made if 
sufficient finance were made available. 	The other group - 'dissatisfied 
innovators' 	were far less happy with the level of achievement but 
thought that failure to secure more finance was not an excuse to 
stultify achievement. 
The authors claim that the research is significant in two ways. 	The 
first 	lies 	in 	its 	effect 	in 	distinguishing 	change - :.:apable 
administrators 	from 	system _ ..maintainers, 	and 	the 	second 	in 	its 
identification 	of 	two 	areas of 	powerful 	impediment 	to change 	in 
correctional institutions: 
those 	rooted 	in 	their 	social 	structure and 	those 	derived 	from 
106ibid . 
107 Street , D, Vinter,  , R D & Perrow, C, Organisation for Treatment:  
A Comparative Study of Institutions for Delinquents, New York: 1966 
The Free Press. 
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theoretical assumptions about the treatment of of fenders. 108 
The major di ff iculty of placing the prison manager into a reference 
framework is again highlighted by those two studies. 	There is very 
little scope for managing the innate. 	This shortfall is addressed by 
the X and Y theory of McGregor which looks at managing both the willing 
and unwilling participant. 109 McGregor examined the assumptions about 
human behaviour which underlie managerial action. 
Theory X ( the unwilling ) 1:7 
1 ) The average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will 
avoid it if he can. Thus management needs to stress productivity, 
incentive schemes, a 'fair day's work' and to denounce 'restriction 
of output'. 
2 ) Because of this human characteristic of dislike of work, most people 
must be coerced, controlled, directed or threatened with punishment 
to get them to put forth adequate effort towards the achievement of 
organisational objectives. 
3) The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid 
responsibility, has relatively little ambition, wants security above 
all. 
Theory Y (the willing ) 
108 ibid,  p. 79 . 
109 McGregor, D, "Theory X and Theory Y" in Pugh (ed) 	 
pp . 305-323. 
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1 ) The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural 
as play or rest. 	The ordinary person does not inherently dislike 
work: 	according to the conditions it may be a source of 
satisfaction or punishment. 
2) External control is not the only means for obtaining effort. 	Man 
will 	exercise 	self-direction 	and 	self-control 	in 	the 	service 	of 
objectives to which he is committed. 
3) The most significant reward that can be offered in order to obtain 
commitment 	is 	the 	satisfaction 	of 	the 	individual's 	self- 
actualising needs. 	This can be a direct product of effort directed 
towards organisational objectives. 
4) The average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only 
to accept but to seek responsibility. 
5) Many more people are able to contribute creatively to the solution 
of organisational problems then do so. 
6) At present the potentialities of the average person are not being 
fully used."° 
The significance of this work is that it offers a framework to begin an 
evaluation of the problems of managing a prison. Whilst it is •acceptd 
that the prison staff may fall into both categories, it can also be 
suggested that the 'unwilling' inmate can retain sufficient motivation to 
do his 'own time' and complete his sentence as soon as possible, without 
11 0ibid , .313-316. 
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entering into a specific anti -estabishment camp - commonly found in 
prisons. The theory, with a few modifications to suit the prison 
environment, could be a useful analytical tool to aid prison managers - 
as well as gauging managerial reaction to specific interests. As 
McGregor points out, the manager must use influence to achieve goals 
Authority is an inappropriate means for obtaining commitment to 
objectives. 111 
His claim echoes Gouldner who suggested that conventional, monocratic , 
and punishment-centred bureaucratic rules may not be so effective in 
ordering human effort in organisations as may rules based on expertise 
and consented to by all parties involved . 112 Thus, the charismatic 
traits offered by 	Coyle 113 	and 	supplemented 	by 	some 	form of 
participative 	management 	could 	determine 	future 	prison 	managerial 
practice. However, because participative management is a behaviourist 
theory applicable to open-system organisations not many of these ideas 
have penetrated prisons. Aside from some scattered and lukewarm 
gestures in America in the direction of participative management prison 
managers have, by and large, shunned behaviour-based management 
strategies. Part of the reason may be the prison's traditional image of 
itself as a paramilitary orgnisation - an image that is fading only 
slowly. Still another reason for the rejection of these theories may be 
the fact that once behavioural principles are applied to relations 
between managers and employees, there may be a further push to apply 
Illibid, p.322. 
II 2Gouldner, A W, in Pugh et al, op.cit., pp.24-29 p.27. 
113Coyle, op.cit. 
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them to relations between staff and inmates, an unwelcome prospect for 
most prison managers. 1 14 
It is still the opinion of some that the prison as a bureaucracy cannot 
fulfil any expectations of change in prison managerial practice. 115 
Cohn suggests that bureaucracy is entrenched in rigidity and associated 
with mechanical and authoritarian ways. 116 He hypothesises that prison 
managers 
tend to be inward bound organisationally and concern themselves more 
with administrative requirements the client needs ...[and] ... as a 
consequence ... tend to create organisational climates in which the 
administrative strain and role conflicts among workers and perhaps 
themselves, result in poor management and reduced efficacy of client 
delivery systems of services. 117 
The issue of participative management is a dilemma facing most prison 
systems. 	As more systems are under increasing pressure to change 
current prison practice, 	Governments, 	practitioners and experts are 
divided on the most suitable course of action. 	All maximum security 
prisons 	fit 	Goffman's 	'total 	institution' 	typology. 	They 	are, 	in 
organisational terminology, closed-systems. The bureaucratisation of 
prisons after World War 11 has left the major decision-making process 
firmly in the hands of the agencies who, in the main, have little 
knowledge of every day routine. 
I I 4 Keating, op.cit. 
I I 5Cohn, A W, "The failure of Correctional Management - Reconsidered" 
Criminal Justice Review, 6, 2, 1981, pp. 55-61. 
116ipid , p .59 . 
1 17 ib id. 
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The Federal American approach has attempted to resolve some of the 
prisons' 	problems 	by 	applying 	organisational 	theories 	and 	public 
administration and 	management principles to 	the prison setting, 	and 
asking managers to adapt these to suit a particular environment. This 
has also failed because of the inescapable fact that all the techniques 
and theories have assumed the principle that those to whom they are 
directed are willingly part of the organisation. Inmates are imprisoned 
against 	their 	will. 	Again 	most 	of 	the 	theories 	discussed 	are 
behavioural. As Keating comments: 
behavioural 	ideals and rationale have 	little 	validity in a 	prison 
setting. l 18  
Attempts to identify a particular managerial style meet with a similar 
fate. 	Prison researchers have contrasted prison managers with 'ideal 
types' but because the prison manager is a "functional bureaucrat" 119 
in a total institutionally closed environment - managing two streams of 
organisation participants - the conclusions presented by both L ikert 120 
and Street et al 121 are relatively less than significant. 	The one 
theory that looks at the willing and unwilling ( McGregor ) 122 has, 
again, been based on a different assumption of types of organisations. 
It would appear that the present methodological tools available to the 
social scientist need to be readjusted or redesigned to fit the prison 
118 Keating, op.cit. 
119Cohn (1973) op.cit. 
120Likert, op.cit. 
121 Street et al, op.cit. 
122McGregor, OP-Cit. 
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setting. 	The tools defined by management theorists have significantly 
increased 	our 	knowledge 	of 	organisational 	practice, 	but they 	are 
incapable 	of 	application 	in 	the 	contemporary 	prison, 	unless 	the 
authorities change the structure and nature of prison functioning. As 
this seems unlikely because of cost and political repercussions either 
new methodological tools need to be designed or other types of theories, 
currently available, should be applied. Concomitantly, the move to 
charismatic prison management leadership could be combined with a form 
of participative management to resolve some current problems. 
Recognised organisational experts such as Likert , Etzioni and Blake and 
Mouton .suggest that: 
Without participative management, the organisation cannot thrive, 
satisfy either organisational or worker needs, or deal effectively 
with the myriad internal or external forces impinging upon the 
organisation. 123 
Chapters IV and V deal specifically with Risdon Prison's functioning and 
management practice. It is, however, necessary to establish at this 
point whether Risdon 'fits' within the previously discussed framework. 
Like most other Western Prison Systems, Risdon Prison is a 
bureaucratically structured paramilitary organisation. It is more 
difficult to fit contemporary Risdon into Goffman's total institution 
category. The loss of Departmental status with a resulting 
centralisation of decision-making - and the movement away from the 
dominant 1960s emphasis on control and discipline, combine with other 
variables (discussed later ) to make Goffman's typology less than useful 
as a methodological tool. Etzioni's three types of organisational power 
123Quoted in Cohn (1981), op.cit., p.59. 
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- coercive, utilitarian and normative - are evident in Risdon Prison 
although Etzioni claims prison's use purely coercive power .  .124 
Additionally, Risdon Prison, under the Blau and Scott typology, would be 
placed in their 'Commonweal Organisation' category - the public at large 
being the prime beneficiary. 
It is perhaps in the area of management practice investigation that 
placement becomes more difficult. 	Risdon management practice appears to 
have changed little since its origins in the Campbell Street Gaol - the 
predecessor to Risdon Prison. 	These practices were developed during the 
pure custodial or Retributive phase of prison philosophy. 125 	The 
classic dichotomy of 'us and them' meant management ordered and both 
staff and inmates obeyed. 	Apart from a few cosmetic changes, arising 
from individual differences of style, the managerial patterns, 
established at the beginning of the 20th Century, have remained 
unaltered. The failure of management to keep pace with the changing 
nature of the prison .environment has been attributed to the isolation of 
Tasmania from overseas and mainland problems. 126 
Managers found that their training for senior positions at Risdon 
consisted of 'sitting in for a week or two' and observing how the task 
was undertaken. 127  The present senior uniformed officer at Risdon when 
replying to a question from the Federal Attorney-General's Department in 
September of last year commented: 
124 Etzioni, op.cit., Ch.5. 
125 Newman, OD.Cit. 
126Interview with H 3 Howe, former Director of Corrective Services. 
127 Interviews with several former senior staff. 
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Because of the small size of the Tasmanian Prison Service it has not 
been possible to establish a specialised training course for middle 
level and senior level personnel in the prison service. Rather, 
training is of a practical nature carried out in-service. 128 
The following Chapter discusses the various schools of penal philosophy 
and it is suggested that management is significantly affected by the 
chosen philosophical mode. In Tasmania, there appears to have been 
little impulse by Government Ministers charged with the responsibility . 
of 	the 	prison 	to 	influence 	philosophical 	change. 129 	An extensive 
search of the Government files by the author, and a series of interviews 
of Government and Senior Management staff, failed to produce a written 
prison policy. Evidently no such policy exists. Therefore, philosophy, 
management Practice and prison routine cannot be determined in the first 
instance by reference to policy, but only by .comparison with the 
theories discussed, 	and in some 	instances with other overseas and 
mainland practices. 
128 Prison Division file 1311/2A dated 7/9/87. 
129 lnterviews with Tasmanian Attorneys-General 1960-85. 
CHAPTER II 
EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON MANAGEMENT PRACTICE  
This Chapter will consider three of the major variables which affect 
daily prison management - penal philosophy, managerial practices, and 
the 	manager's 	attributes 	and 	skills. 	The 	'ideal' 	combination 	of 
philosophy, practice and attributes, however, must match the institution 
in which they are employed. 	For example, several large-scale maxi- 
maximum security prisons in Australia, such as Pentridge in Victoria, 
and Long Bay in New South Wales, are part of a large complex of 
institutions catering 	for different philosophies. 	Because the prison 
authorities have this range of institutions available, it is simpler to 
isolate those inmates, who fall under the Restraint' philosophy in a 
separte remand centre - usually having permanently rostered staff. 	The 
smaller prison systems, as in Tasmania, because of low prison numbers 
and economic constraints, are obliged to house the majority of their 
inmates in a single maximum security institution, 	such as Risdon. 
However, the co-mingling of the various philosophies within a single 
institution can lead to many unanticipated consequences. 
In HMP Risdon, for example, those inmates classified to work in outside 
gangs are all housed in the one division (see Chapter IV on HMP Risdon 
for a more detailed survey ). 	Those inmates, however, can be 'first 
timers' or recidivists - many for the fourth or fifth time. 2 	As a 
result of a more liberalised approach by the Senior Management at HMP 
'The 4 'R's' of prison philosophy - Restraint, Revenge, 
Rehabilitation and Reintegration. See, for example, Newman, 
op.cit.  
2Author's experience as a member of the Classification Committee, 
1984-1988. 
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Risdon several cells have been 'wired' for television reception. 3 	In 
such a situation demand usually outweighs supply, and the waiting list 
for 'TV cells' in E Division is lengthy. Inmates of this division 
can be said to fall into Newman's fourth philosophical category - 
Reintegration. It might logically be assumed that the prison 
authorities would hasten provision of the extra facilities. Senior 
management, however, has concentrated on refurbishing 'D' division - the 
recognised 'heavy' division which houses those who could be deemed to 
fall under the Revenge category. Inmates in this division are, 
categorised normally as high risk maximum security and, as such, are not 
allowed out of the institution. It may be that the Risdon authorities 
'pacify' those inmates in 'D' division with TV access whilst those who 
are allowed outside are deemed to be rewarded by the privilege of 
controlled freedom. The management's priority to 'D' division has not 
been generally accepted by the rest of the prison's divisions who see it 
as an appeasement of the 'standover merchants'. 4 
The second, but related, factor to be considered when applying a 
philosophical 	approach 	is the style of 	management practice 	style 
operated. Several of the recent American investigations (discussed 
later in the Chapter ) have identified several managerial practice models 
which can be used to implement the various penal philosophies. Whether 
these 'models' have any applicability in the Australian setting is a 
3Plans to wire at least 30 cells in each division are currently 
being implemented - but slowly. 
4From conversations with inmates in the author's role as Welfare 
Officer. 
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matter for separate research, but they can be used for comparison 
purposes. 
The final element considered in the Chapter is the managerial incumbent. 
American prison management has been severely criticised by Cohn, 5 who 
claims many of the contemporary managerial problems are a result of poor 
management recruiting. Research on both the English and American 
managers helps 'profile' the 'average' prison manager in these systems 
and, again, can be used comparatively with the attributes and skills of 
the Risdon senior management team - past and present. 6 
Changing Philosophies 2:1 
"[T]he 	prison 	is 	an 	American 	invention", 7 	and 	the 	changes 	in 
philosophical emphasis have, in the main, originated from the United 
States. Between the early 1960s and until the mid 1980s several studies 
have attempted to portray what they believe to be the historical 
development of prison philosophy. 8 The range, depending on the author, 
is 	from revenge9 	through 	to 	the "Just 	Deserts and 	the 	Justice 
5Cohn (1973) op.cit. 
6Bowker & Nelson & -Lovell, op.cit. 
7 Morris, N, The  Future of Imprisonment, Chicago: 1974, University of 
Chicago Press, p.4. 
8Glaser, D, (1964), & Schrag, C, (1966) mentioned in Allen, H E & 
Simenson, C E, Corrections in America: An Introduction (3rd edn) 
New York: 1981, Macmillan, p.351. O'Leary, V & Duf fee, D, 
"Correctional Policy: A Classification of Goals designed for 
Change", Crime and Delin, 17, 4 (1971): 373; Allinson, R, 
"Massachusetts Recidivism Drop Cited as Proof of Success of 
'Reintegration' Model", Criminal Justice Newsletter 11 (March 3, 
1980): 1-2. Bowker, L H, Corrections: The Art  and The Science, 
New York: 1982, Macmillan, pp.38-55. 
9Glaser, op.cit. 
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Model". 1 ° 
	
Management practices have been determined by these changing 
philosophies; 	therefore a brief overview of the changing developments 
is 	required. 	Although 	acknowledging 	the 	work 	of 	the 	earlier 
theorists, 11 the terminology used is restrictive: 	categorising changes 
into four epochs. 12 	The more recent investigation by Bowker 13 allows 
the researcher greater scope for analysis of managerial techniques. 
According to Bowker,  , there are eight major varieties of correctional 
philosophy currently in existence. 	These are Retribution, Restitution, 
Maintaining Social Solidarity, 	General Deterrence, 	Special Deterrence, 
Treatment, Incapacitation, and Just Deserts and the Justice Model. 14 
Retribution is perceived as a state mechanism derived from the ancient 
principle of LEX TALIONIS (mentioned in the Code of Hammurabi ) . 	This 
principle literally means 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth', 
and although the ancient Babylonians failed to be equitable in its use: 
Of fences against members of the upper class carried much more 
severe punishments than offences against members of groups that 
were lower in social status; 15 
by the 18th Century Kantian philosophy located authority of use in the 
state. 16 
10Bowker, op.cit. , p.49. 
''For example, Glaser op.cit. , Schrag, op .cit  . , O'Leary & Duffee, 
op.cit  . , and Allinson, op .cit. 
12See , for example, O'Leary & Duf fee , op.cit. 
13Bowker,  , op . cit  . 
14 ibid, pp. 38-55. 
15 ibid, p. 38 . 
16 ibid, p.39. 
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Restitution demands that offenders reimburse, 	or compensate, 	their 
victims to the value of what has been taken. 	A situation involving 
injury or death is somewhat less clear. 	Reimbursement should be 
limited 
to the financial consequences of the act, since there is no way 
to completely eliminate the effects of assaults and homicides. 17 
Restitution has 	recently enjoyed a revival in Australian sentencing 
practices. 	The Tasmanian innovation of the Work Order scheme has been 
adopted 	by several 	jurisdictions. 18 	This allows offenders to 	'pay 
back' the State by completing community service. 	Magistrates in 
Tasmania 	make liberal use of 	work orders, 	sometimes combining 
imprisonment with an amount of community service. 
Maintaining 	Social 	Solidarity 	is 	not 	a 	legal 	philosophy 	of 
punishment . 19 	It is based on the Durkheimian notion which presented 
crime as functional, inevitable, and valuable to society. The 
assumption is that society's notion of deviance as bad is overtly 
reinforced by incarcerating a certain percentage of deviants in 
prison. 2 ° 
General 	Deterrence 	assumes 	that 	punishment 	or 	imprisonment 	of 
lawbreakers 	will 	deter 	members of 	the 	general 	population 	from 
offending. 2 1 
17 ibid. 
18Victoria and NSW where they are known as Community Based 
Corrections (CBC). 
19Bowker, op.cit. , p.41. 
20ipid, pp. 41-42. 
21 ibid, p.42. 
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Special Deterrence, hopefully, will operate on those already guilty of 
crimes against the state through fear of further sanctions to individual 
liberty, and make them refrain from further criminal action. 22 
Treatment was promulgated in the assumption that criminals could be 
changed through some form of 'correctional' process. 23 
Incapacitation 	A certain number of lawbreakers will, of their own 
volition, continue to commit offences. 	This philosophy implies that 
little can be 	done to 	'change' 	these offenders: 	however their 
incarceration in an institution limits their criminal activites. 24 
This notion has been part of prison practice since the modern system 
began. The 'prison' within a prison has been, utilised for those 
'unmanageables' within the system and has led to concepts such as 
special units with managerial techniques designed specifically to 
operate such units. 25 
Just Deserts and the Justice Model 	The 	rationalisation 	behind 	this 
philosophy, 	and 	its 	justification, 	is 	that 	all 	other 	measures 
previously discussed 	have either failed, or that they have little 
intrinsic value. 	This approach is based upon a prison management 
technique of -'fairness' towards inmates rather than involving them in 
programmes of doubtful validity. 26 
22ibid, pp.44-45. 
23 ibid, pp.45-46. 
24 ibid, pp.48-49. 
25For example, the Special Unit in Barlinnie Prison, Glasgow set up 
in 1972 and aptly described in Boyle, 3, The Pain of Confinement, 
London: 1984, Canongate. 
26Bowker, op.cit., pp.49-50. 
•%, 
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A 	corollary to the philosophical notions affecting the managers of 
prisons, 	is the various 'models' of prison practice which have arisen 
since the Second World War. 	As with prison philosophy, an understanding 
of these models is necessary for determination of management styles and 
the reasons for using them. 
Prison Practice Models 2:2 
For nearly two centuries - up until the mid 1970s philosophy, managerial 
techniques and practices were, in the main, based upon the concept that 
crime was a social illness and that the offender was sick. 	Society, 
thus, had a duty to cure this social illness. 	Prisons could be used to 
facilitate 	this 	cure. 	Psychiatrists, 	doctors, 	psychologists, 	social 
workers, teachers and para-professionals were brought into the prison 
system somehow to change the offender, cure his illness, and aid his 
rehabilitation. 	It was hoped that these intervening techniques would 
help reduce the incidence of crime. 	Rather than place the offender in 
prison for a determinate sentence, 	officials argued that only by 
imposing indeterminate sentences could the inmate respond to treatment. 
It was assumed, as in the real world, that recovery was subject to 
individual traits rather than a specific time-frame. Inmates were 
subject 	to periodical assessment 	to determine their 	recovery and 
eventual discharge back into society. 	This era became widely known by 
the analogy, the Medical Model of crime prevention . 27 
During the mid 1970s, research by several investigators claimed that 
27For a complete exposition of this model see Flew, A, Crime or  
Disease, London: 1973, Macmillan. 
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neither were recidivism rates changing, nor did those who had received 
treatment 	appear 	to 	have 	significantly 	changed 	their 	criminal 
tendencies. 	In fact, there seemed to be little difference between those 
who had received treatment and those who had not . 28 	Largely as a 
result of this research, the Medical Model faded into oblivion . 29 This 
demise was the catalyst for an unprecedented flurry of research into 
criminal behaviour and methods to be applied in managing those sentenced 
to incarceration. 	Between the mid 1970s and the early 1980s numerous 
models were promulgated - each claiming to be the definitive concept. 
Conrad, writing in 1974, claimed that the prison 
cannot be considered as serving any rehabilitative purpose and is 
over-used for the other legitimate purposes of retribution and 
containment of the offender. 30 
He suggested that the proper approach was to use a systems view of the 
criminal justice process. 	Public agencies had to identify quantifiable 
goals which could be effectively measured. 	Basic to this concept was 
accountability: 
28For example, Lipton, D, Martinsen, R & Wilks, J, The Effectiveness  
of Correctional Treatment: A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies  
New York: 1975, Praeger. Bailey, W, "Correctional Outcomes: An 
Evaluation of 100 Reports", J of Crim Law, Criminology and Police  
Science, 57 (June, 1966) 153-157. Kasselliaum, G, Ward, D, 
Wilner, D, Parole Survival: an Empirical Assessment, New York: 1971 
Wiley, Ch.6. 
29 Archembeault, W G, & Archembeault, 8 J, Correctional Supervisory  
Management, Principles of Organisation, Policy dc Law, Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: 1982, Prentice-Hall, p.150. 
30Conrad, 3 P, "The Managerial Model of Criminal Justice", British J  
Crim, 14, 1974, pp.1977-184, p.182. 
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. good management begins with a good system's design to assure 
the efficient achievement of accepted objectives by optimal 
means. 31 
Conrad, however, was reviewing the American criminal justice system which 
incorporates police, prosecution, courts and corrections. 32 
In 1975, Fogel proposed a Justice Model for corrections. 33 	This model 
assumed that human behaviour is rational and that crime is a form of 
rational adaptation to environmental conditions. It was based on the 
following propositions: 
1. Criminal Law is the "command of the sovereign". 
2. The threat of punishment is necessary to implement the law. 
3. The powerful manipulate the chief motivators of human behaviour - 
fear and hope - through rewards and punishments to retain power. 
4. Socialisation ( the manipulation of fear and hope through rewards 
and punishments ) of individuals, 	however imperfect, occurs in 
response 	to 	the 	commands 	and 	expectations of 	the 	ruling 
social-political power. 
5. Criminal law protects the dominant prescribed morality (a system of 
rules said to be in the common and best interest of all ) reflecting 
the enforcement aspect "of the failure of socialisation". 
6. In the absence of an absolute system of Justice or a "natural law", 
no accurate etiological theory of crime is possible nor is the 
definition of crime stable. 
7. Although free will may not exist perfectly, the criminal law is 
largely based upon its presumed 	vitality and forms the early 
foundation for penal sanctions. 
31 ibid, p.179. 
32For a detailed summary of this process see Newman, D J, 
Introduction to Criminal Justice ( 2nd edn ) New York: 1978,   
Lippincott. 
33Fogel, D, "... We Are The Living Proof ..." The Justice Model for  
Corrections, Cincinnati: 1975, Anderson. 
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8 . 	A 	prison 	sentence 	represents 	a 	punishment 	sanctioned 	by 
a legislature and meted out through the official legal system 
within a process of Justice against a person adjudged responsible 
for his behaviour. Although the purpose of such a punishment may 
be deterrence, it is specifically the deprivation of liberty for a 
fixed period of time. 
9. The entire process of the criminal law must be played out in a 
milieu 	of 	Justice. 	Justice-as-fairness 	represents 	the 
superordinate goal of all agencies of the criminal law. 
10. When corrections become mixed in the dismal swamp of preaching, 
exhorting and treating ("resocialisation" ) it becomes dysfunctional 
as an agency of Justice. 	Correctional agencies should engage 
prisoners 	as 	the 	law 	otherwise 	dictates 	- 	as 	responsible, 
volitional and aspiring human beings. 
11. Justice-as- fairness is not a programme; 	it is a process that 
insists the prisons (and all agencies of the criminal law ) perform 
their assigned tasks with non-law-abiders lawfully. 	No more should 
be 	expected, 	no 	less 	should 	be 	tolerated 	by 	correctional 
administrators. 
12. William Pitt said: "where the, law ends tyranny begins"; 	so does 
the 	exercise 	of 	discretion. 	Discretion 	"may 	mean 	either 
beneficence 	or 	tyranny, 	either 	Justice 	or 	injustice, 	either 
reasonableness or arbitrariness". Discretion cannot be eliminated 
but the justice perspective seeks to narrow, control and make it 
reviewable. 34 
Fogel's 	model 	now 	meant 	that 	managerial 	difficulties with 	the 
indeterminate 	sentenced inmate 	except those under Government 
'pleasure' - were now minimised but still left open the question of how 
to manage those who had lengthy sentences with little hope for parole. 
As prisoners of varying classification and sentences in some instances 
resided in the one institution, a variety of managerial skills had to be 
used. 	Smullen proposed in 1981 that a concept .known as the 
Participative Management Model be utilised. 35 	Basic to this model is a 
34 ibid, pp.  184-185. 
35 Smullen, G J, "Recognising Inmate Groups: The Participation 
Management Model", Corrections Today, 43, 5, 1981, pp.58-63. 
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recognition by management that inmate groups exist, and, that management 
can control and direct their institutions by giving the inmates some 
role to play in policy formulation. Additionally, employees ( prison 
officers of all grades and specialists - those non-uniformed treatment 
staff ) feel that they, too, are part of the policy formulation process 
which, as Bowker claims, usually produces a higher level of morale than 
the military style of management prevalent in most prison 
organisations. 36 
Three alternate forms of participative management were presented by 
Bartollas, Clemens and Miller . 37 	These were the formal plan, the 
leadership plan and management by objectives ( MBO ) 	The formal plan  
involved joint committees of management and workers working together to 
formulate and evaluate new ideas. Those committees were designated a 
section of the institution and reported to a .central administrative 
committee which collated the data and made recommendations. The major 
factor in the leadership  model was the delegation of authority to 
middle-management or supervisors. 	Middle-managers were encouraged to 
solve problems using the base-grade staff in a team effort. 	Minor 
administrative problems could thus be resolved at this level, rather 
than be transferred to superior level, where time delays, due to other 
commitments, might find the problem exacerbated rather than diminished. 
As Bowker points out, it is difficult to promote this type of 
participative management in a traditional, hierarchical, prison. 38 	The 
36Bowker, op.cit  , p.212. 
37Bartollas, Clemens & Miller, S J, Correctional, Administration:  
Theory and Practice, New York: 1978, McGravi-Hill . 
38 Bowker, op.cit. , p.212. 
77 
final type of participative management is MBO (or Management by 
Objectives - See Chapter 1, p.52). 39 
These participative management styles were promulgated on the premise 
that managers still had the control and direction firmly in their grasp. 
Consideration was given to the demands of the lower staff that they 
should have a voice in the policy of the operation of the prison. It 
was also acknowledged that inmates had some leverage in the operation of 
institutions, as their acceptance of administrative measures determined 
the orderliness of prison functioning. Another view, however, was that 
inmates 	actually 	controlled 	institutional 	functioning 	and, 	de 	facto, 
policy formulation. As Vetter and Territo justifiably claim, from the 
early part of the nineteenth century until the dawn of the twentieth, 
most prisons built in the USA reflected the ultimate goal of 
security. 40  Managerial techniques were based purely on custody and 
control. The authors point out that maximum security institutions such 
as Alcatraz (closed in 1963) and Marion, Illinois (opened in 1963), had 
no inmate programmes thus curtailing inmate movement. 	These instituions 
reflected "discipline and punishment". 41 	With a rapidly changing 
social environment, and a belated recognition by the courts in America 
of 	inmate 	civil 	liberties, 	the 	situation 	in 	the 	1980s 	in 	some 
jurisdictions has gone to the opposite extreme. 	The abrogation of 
39 For example, see Drucker, P, Technology, Managment and Society, 
London: 1970, Heinemann, Ch i.9. 
40 Vetter, 	J, Territo, L, Crime and Justice in America - a Human  
Perspective, St Paul, Minnesota: 1984, West, p.397. 
41 ibid, p.402. 
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riots authority and control by management to inmates was highlighted by 
at Attica State (New York) in the early 1970s, New Mexico State 
Penitentiary (1980) and recently in California, where, 	to all intents 
and purposes, management relinquished control within the institution to 
concentrate instead on measures designed to stop inmates 42 escaping. 
Based on similar observations and studies, 	Barak-Glantz offered a 
profile on the types of prison management models identifiable in 
American prisons - Authoritarian, Bureaucratic-lawful, the Shared Powers  
and Inmate Contro1. 43 
The Authoritarian Model 
Barak-Glantz claims this model dominated nineteenth century penology in 
both theory and practice, and, he suggests that, because of an 
indifferent public, some contemporary prisons still reflect this type of 
management. 	The central tenet of this model is the "one man rule, and 
repressive social control". 44 	In this model inmates had virtually no 
rights and as the author points out, prison officers, being dependent on 
the manager's good favour for their position were, practically, in the 
same category. 	This system was perpetuated due to a lack of public 
accountability. 	Barak-Glantz suggests many factors brought about this 
model's 	demise 	including 	civil 	rights, 	prison 	inspection, 	and 	the 
introduction of professional services. 	Probably the catalyst was the 
"bureaucratisation' of the prison following World War II". 45 
42ibid, see especialy Ch.14. 
43 Barak-Glantz, I L, "Towards a Conceptual Schema of Prison 
Management Styles", Prison Journal, 61, No.2, 1981, pp.42-58. 
44 ibid, p.43. 
45 ibid, p.44. 
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The Bureaucratic-Lawful Model 
After the Second World War, governments began to demand accountability 
of prison services. 	The movement towards responsible government meant a 
better system of checks and balances. 	Based upon the Weberian concept 
of legal-rational bureaucracy, prisons assumed the typical hierarchical 
structure associated with public service machinery. 	This, of course, 
meant a centralisation of power, placing the ultimate decision-making in 
Government hands. 	Thus the autocratic Governor or Warden, literally, 
became a functional bureaucrat. 	A corollary of this move was the 
gaining, to some degree, of power by the officers. 	A period of 
unionisation consolidated the prison officer's position and gave him, at 
least, some of the worker's rights that his contemporaries in the 
civilian 	workforce 	enjoyed. 	Inmates, 	however, 	were 	subject 	to 
administrative rule and regulation. As Barak-Glantz points out, in the 
authoritarian model the inmate was subject to one man's whims. In this 
model, order and control 
... is dependent on the extent to which the inmate is convinced 
that the administrative response occurs within the framework of 
lawu.46 
Thus managers are contained by the prescription offered by government 
and are subject to edicts and philosophical approach espoused. 
Shared-Powers Model 
This model arose during the 'treatment' phase. 	A 	rehabilitative 
approach toward inmates, combined with the growing introduction of 
46ibid, p.47. 
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specialists 	into 	the 	prison 	system, 	forced 	authorities 	to 	cede 
entrenched power. 	The treatment-oriented professional argued that 
rehabilitative practices could only be implemented if some form of 
participation 	was 	given 	to 	in.nates. 47 	Additionally, 	the 	right 	of 
association" was granted by the courts. 	These two factors - treatment 
and association 	led to inmate group rights (for example, the Black 
Muslim Lobby in America) and a recognition of management of the 
existence of such groups. Barak-Glantz mentions a second type of group 
- differing from the political as epitomised by the Muslims - that of 
prisoner unions, and "Inmate Government Councils" (IGCs). 49 This led 
to inmates gaining power to the detriment of both management and staff, 
whose authority was rapidly erodec1. 50 
The Inmate-Control  Model 
According to Barak-Glantz, this fourth type of prison management 
represents a logical extension of the shared powers model. 	He claims 
that through formal and informal group association the inmates have 
taken the power away from management and staff. 	Not only do they, de 
facto, make policy, they enforce it. 	Examples of this model have been 
identified. in Illinois and California. 	This abrogated internal power 
leaves the management and staff although manning the institution in 
47 ibid, p.48. 
48The unrestricted intermingling of inmates for specific periods, 
formerly denied under the pure custodial regimes. 
49Barak-Glantz, op.cit, p.49. 
50 ibid, p.55. 
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control only of the prison's perimeters. 	This power reversal can only 
be returned to management through a return to custodial practices based 
purely on segregation and control which may prove both ineffective and 
damaging in the short term. 51 
Barak-Glantz's description of the four managerial models currently in 
use in America are helpful in an analysis of both the United Kingdom 52 
and 	Australian prison sytems. 53 	Although these 	models are 	'ideal 
types' in the Weberian sense, they can be used to identify similarities 
in management patterns and styles. In the Chapter on HMP Risdon, these 
four models will be applied to determine whether Tasmania's maximum 
security facility exhibits any of these managerial styles and traits. 
Once Government has determined a particular philosophy to be applied in 
the nrison setting, a statement to this effect is normally issued to the 
public. 	Whether this is voluntarily made by the Government, or as the 
result of some negative aspect reported by the media, the implementation 
of the decision is placed in the hands of the prison manager. 	The 
particular managerial style adopted may enhance or jeopardise the 
philosophy at the point of implementation. 	As Joplin and Hendricks 
report, 
There 	is 	a 	correlation 	between 	philosophy 	and 	managerial 
approaches. Managerial 	techniques 	reflect 	a 	philosophy 	of 
corrections 	as 	managerial 	techniques 	reflect 	a 	managing 
philosophy. 54 
51 ibid, p.55. 
52There are actually three separate systems in the United Kingdom: 
England and Wales; Scotland; and Northern Ireland. 
53Each State and Territory has its own prison system, although the 
ACT facility is purely for remand purposes. Sentenced offenders in 
the ACT serve imprisonment in NSW. 
54Joplin, 3 W & Hendricks, 3 E, "Correctional Management: A 
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As one author suggests, leadership style determines the character of the 
institution. 55 What characteristics should the manager have? 
Managerial Profile 2:3 
Mann has given a profile of these managers who administer Government 
decrees in the English Prison System. 56 	The managers in this system 
are designated Governors. 	The Governor grades comprise all governors of 
prisons, 	prison farms, 	low security 	institutions and Borstals 	(youth 
training centres). 	Included in the Governor grades are Assistant 
Governors. 	Each Governor is graded into one of three classes according 
to the size of institution. 	Governor I is the highest grade and those 
holding this classification are in charge of the large maximum security 
establishments. 	Entry 	to 	the Governor 	grades 	is, 	normally, 	by 
appointment to the Assistant Governor class. 	There are three methods of 
entry: 	limited competition from prison officers; 	promotion from Chief 
Prison Officer; and, direct entry from outside the service. 57 Those 
entering the Assistant Governor grades from outside the service differ 
in background and experience. Whilst some enter direct from University, 
others come from the military, police, business and public health. 58 
Again, Mann points out that a larger percentage of University graduates 
Philosophical Perspective", Corrections Today, 43, No.6, pp.85-88, 
p.85. 
55Marin, B, Inside Justice, London: 1983, Associated University 
Press, p.131. 
56 ibid, Ch.5. 
57At the time of writing, direct entry is beinereviewed. 
58 marin, op.cit. , p.131. 
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are recruited externally than from within the service. 59 	The education 
requirements 	for 	entry 	to 	the 	prison 	service 	in 	all 	the 	British 
jurisdictions have been upgraded recently. 	There is still, however, the 
acceptance that minimal educational qualifications suffice. 	Whilst it 
is accepted that these qualifications may suffice for the base-grade 
officer - on-the-job, and training college programmes cater for his 
career development - it appears that those who graduate through the 
system, by and large, tend to forego further educational training. This 
policy may have a long term deleterious effect on the management of 
British prisons. The changing philosophical climates and adaptation of 
organisational theories and management principles for the prison system 
may find managers charged with implementing concepts which they are 
intellectually incapable of understanding irrespective of implementing 
them." 
In the United States, managers are usually termed Wardens. 	Some 
evidence suggests that they, as in the British practice, rise from the 
base-grade positions. 61 Others have remarked that there is an 
increasing trend to recruit from outside the service, 
We have accepted a variety of specialists in medicine, social work, 
plumbing, psychology, teaching and other trades whose basic calling 
is not corrections... 62 
59 ibid, p.132 
60For example, see Bullard, C G, A Sociological Study of Prison 
Officers in NSW: A Stressful Occupation, unpublished PhD Thesis, 
University of NSW, especially p.235 where he describes the 
ramifications for future management by current hiring practices. 
61 Marin, op.cit. , p.150. 
62 Editorial , Keepers Voice, 7, 4, October 1986. 
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The average age of appointment to these managerial positions has ranged 
from 48 - 51 years63 and a survey of heads of adult correction agencies 
both Federal and State found 
the average number of years in office for those in office on 1 July 
1985 was 4.7 ... . 	Only 16 who were hired prior to January of 1980 
still hold their positions. 	Twenty three hired prior to 1982 still 
hold their positions. 	Twenty five hired prior to 1983 and 38 hired 
prior to 1984 remain. 	1984 saw seven new agency heads hired. Four 
more were hired through June of 1985. 64 
The definitive outline of the correctional manager must, however, come 
from the work by Nelson and Lovell who investigated the attributes of 
prison managers. 65 A survey in the early 1970s of 393 
managers found 75% of top administrators aged over 45 years with about 
one third of these being aged 55 or more. The maturity of the 
administrators was put down to the 'seniority principle' characterised 
"by a slow progression up the ladder,. 66 Managerial service in 
corrections found that 
nearly two-thirds of the top administrators and half of the 
second-level administrators had been in corrections for over ten 
years and 39 percent and 15 percent respectively for over 15 
years. 67 
The educational background of the managers found all but five of those 
surveyed 
63 Marin, op .cit. , p.151. 
64The Corrections Yearbook, New York: 1985, Criminal Justice 
Institute, p.41. 
65Nelson, E K ( Jr ), & Lovell, C H, Developing Correctional  
Administrators, (Washington DC: Joint Commission on Correctional 
Manpower and Training, 1970). 
66ibid . 
67 ibid, pp. 25-26 
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had high school diplomas. 	About 13 percent of the top and ,20 
percent of the middle managers held no higher formal degrees. 	More 
than three-fourths of the total had college degrees, a third had 
Master's degrees and nearly ten percent held degrees beyond the 
Master's. 68 
The survey determined the areas of formal study taken by these managers 
and found social work was the most common field of research. Education 
and Sociology 	ranked 	second with Psychology following in 	third 
place. 69 	A particularly poignant 	factor was that only one top 
administrator and 	four second-line managers held degrees in public 
administration. 	Additionally, only eleven managers in all held degrees 
in Criminology or Corrections. 70 	The survey also noted that very few 
of these managers attended in-service training for management. 	Those 
who did, normally, had a 'one-shot' at coursework. 	In summing up, the 
report concluded, 
The findings about formal education indicated that very few of the 
administrators had taken formal training either in the field of 
corrections or in the generic field of management. 7 I 
Further, 
The average correctional executive has at least a college degree in 
a discipline not directly related to his work ... • 72 
Apart from the well documented lack of either practical or theoretical 
management training in these American managers, an important fact 
, p.26. 68ibid 
69 ibid, p.27. 
71 ibid, p.29. 
72 ibid• 
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highlighted - by the research was the distinctively short tenure of those 
in 	managerial positions. 	Irrespective of philosophy and policy, 	the 
constant 	changing of those 	in top positions means that no real 
continuity exists. 	Changing of personnel always brings changes in style 
and approach. 	The fact that a new manager takes position means that 
staff and inmates have got to discover his idiosyncracies and pattern of 
work. 	Even if he adheres to the official practices he will find that 
informal changes have taken place. 	Given this short tenure any policy 
approach 	is 	subject 	to 	individual 	interpretation 	and 	expediency 
management. 
Management  Failure Reasons 2:4 
Arguing 	in 	1973 	about 	the 	failure 	of 	rehabilitation or treatment 
techniques 	in 	operation, 	Cohn73 	dismissed 	the 	custody/treatment 
dichotomy as "more myth than reality" and claimed the failure was 
attributable in part to inadequate and incompetent management and 
leadership by correctional executives. 74 
He posited 10 reasons for management failure: 
1. Security conscious. 
2. Lack of distinct body of professional knowledge. 
3. Unable 	or 	unwilling 	to 	see 	that 	organisational 	policies 	and 
managerial requirements may actually contribute to the inmate's 
treatment failure. 
4. Not strong or forceful enough to shape his beliefs into some 
tangible programme. 	May also be unwilling to try because of fear 
73Cohn, A W, "The Failure of Correctional Management", Crime and  
Delinquency, July, 1973, pp.323-331. 
74 ibid, p.323. 
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of 	rejection 	by 	contemporaries, 	peers, 	or 	superior 	and/or 
subordinate staff. 
5. 	He is a functional bureaucrat. 
6. 	His description of organisational success is 
in a good light. Usually yearly reports 
quantifiable successes, for example, amount 
Little mention is made of failure or success 
inmate policy in action. 
coloured to show him 
are targeted towards 
of prison production. 
of the particular 
7. Inadequate training in management or public administration. 
8. Because there is no professional body of knowledge to rely on, he 
falls back on 'rules, regulations, and manuals of procedure'. 
9. He cannot be viewed as a 'professional' because he needs an outside 
body to assist in standard setting. 	He thus falls back on the 
'fraternity' - those other prison managers he meets at annual 
conferences and seminars. 
10. He learns to say what is wanted. 	He operates in secrecy and keeps 
damaging information from leaking so that superiors are incapable 
of realistically judging his performance. 75 
He concluded by remarking that those entering prison management should 
be recruited from 
the ranks of public administration, 	organisational behaviour or 
management 
and that mandatory formal tuition and training should be given to 
practising managers. 76 	In 1982, it was reported that only an average 
of ten percent of prison managers received any training whatsoever. 77 
If Cohn's condemnation of prison managers is based on the perception of 
the prison as a treatment centre - irrespective of what programmes are 
75 ibid, p.326-330. 
76 ibid, p.331. 
77 Archembeault & Archembeault, op.cit., p.4. 
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involved - then his analysis may in the main, be substantiated. 	Point l  
- security conscience: As prisons are the 
final sanction of [the] penal system, the support upon which all 
other measures rest 78 
(notwithstanding 	the 	increasing 	practice 	of 	capital 	punishment 	in 
several states of the USA), 79 then its primary role is custodial - it 
exists to keep of fenders out of society. 	Managers of these institutions 
, are given a mandate to keep these people incarcerated. 	In all 
likelihood, several escapes or disturbances can cost the manager his 
position. If he is a reformer and upsets the status quo (however 
precarious) this too can cost him his position. 80 
Point 2 - Lack of distinct body of professional knowledge: 	It has been 
long recognised that managers were chosen on their ability to handle men 
- both staff and inmates. 	The normal practice up until the 1960s was 
for managers to rise up through the ranks. 81 	The justification for 
'in breeding' was that by the time he had reached his office, he would 
'know' the staff and types of inmates and be able to balance and 
harmonise the two differing sets of relationships. This balancing and 
harmonising 
78 Mott, J, Adult Prisons and Prisoners in England and Wales 1970- 
1982: A Review of the Findings-of Social Research, Home Office 
Research Study No.84. 
79 For example, Utah, Texas, Florida and Georgia. 
80For example in Arkansas, USA see Murton, T, dc Hyams, J, 
Accomplices to the Crime: The Arkansas Prison Scandal, New York: 
1967, Grove, and in NSW, Australia, see Vinson, T, Wilful  
Obstruction, Sydney: 1982, Methuen. 
81 Marin, op.cit., p.150, Nelson 3c Lovell, op.cit., p.25. 
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creates some of the most difficult problems, 	perhaps because 
[managers] (consciously or unconsciously ) adopt one view of people 
when dealing with staff and another when dealing with offenders. 62 
Additionally, it has been suggested that the work styles of managers 
reflect the assumptions that they make about people." 	Schein sets out 
four views: 	a) the first view sees people as rational and economic - 
motivated by material rewards, requiring management to have a firm 
structure of incentives and controls to carry out tasks; b) the second 
view sees the worker as social - motivated by a need for others, 
requiring management to adopt a 'human relations' approach; c) the 
third view sees the worker as self -actualising 84 - thus management's 
function is to help and guide the worker to reach this plateau; d) the 
fourth view sees the worker as complex, and it is management's task to 
develop flexibilty and skills to help maximise the worker's skills. 85 
The long-serving prison 	manager develops an 'administrative cunning' 
which only he and his contemporaries can understand. 	His contemporaries 
probably have taken the same career structured path. 	The additional 
knowledge he gains will probably have been gleaned from other managers 
at yearly conferences - set up to discuss problems and experiences. His 
attitude towards academics is well known. As Poole and Rigoli comment 
82A llen , H E, Simonsen, C E, Corrections in America: An Introduction, 
( 3rd edn) New York: 19S I , Macmillan, p.358. 
83Schein, E H, Organisational Psychology, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 1965, 
Prentice-Hall. 
84 Maslow's final step in his hierarchy of needs - see Maslow, A H, 
Motivation and Personality, New York: 1954, Harper (Sc Row. 
85 Schein, op.cit . 
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[managers] believe that given the state of specialised knowledge 
their occupation requires that they, not 'outsiders', are qualified 
to judge their work. 86 
The 	lack of 	any 	concentrated 	interaction 	with 	academia, 	insular 
recruitment with little formal education, and a 'club-membership' 
mentality combined with various types and grades of institutions (with 
differing managerial practices and problems) certainly operate against 
the attaining of a distinct body of professional knowledge by prison 
managers. 
Point 	3 	- 	organisational 	policies 	and 	managerial 	requirement 
contributing to inmate treatment failure: 	A major problem faced by 
prison 	managers 	lies 	in 	the 	conflicting 	goals 	of 	treatment 	and 
custody. 87 
	
As managers have little formal training and education, a 
trial and error form of management results. 88 	Allen and Sifrionsen point 
out that this is due, in part, to the three persuasive themes which have 
run through prison management - restraint and reformation, a gradual 
approach to programme development and change, and the syndrome of 
isolation and withdrawal. 89  These three themes have combined to create 
a general, non-scientific, rule of thumb approach by management, leading 
86 Poole, E D, & Rigoli , R M, "Professionalism, Role Conflict, Work 
Alienation and America: A Look at Prison Management", Social  
Science Journal, 20, 1983, pp.63-70, p.67. 
87 Weinberg, R B, Evans, J H, Otten, C A, & Marlowe, H A Jr, 
"Managerial Stress in Corrections Personnel", Corrective and  




89 AIlen & Simonsen, op.cit., pp.353-355. 
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to "tokenism and faddism" in the launching of new measures." 	Because 
The isolation and withdrawal of the prison culture 'lave helped 
conceal the realities of institutional life and have thus acted to 
perpetuate stereotypes and rnyths. 91 
Bowker suggests that the outstanding characteristic of the manager's 
role is its double-bind nature. 	He claims managers are often put in the 
position 	of 	making 	decisions 	in 	which 	there 	are 	"unresolvable 
dilemmas"92 	For example, Mott claims that the manager's task is two- 
fold: to hold those committed to custody 
and to provide conditions for their detention which are currently 
acceptable to society. 
Secondly, when dealing with convicted inmates 
there is an obligation on the service to do all that may be 
possible within the currency of the service to encourage them to 
lead a good and useful life." 
Walker, however, is more emphatic. 	He maintains the need to make .a 
clear distinction between the provision of treatment and the management 
of prisoners. 94 The inmate thus is susceptible to whatever approach 
the manager takes but because of his primarily custodial function 
commitment to treat-ment may be arbitrary. 95 
90 ibid, p.354. 
91 ibid, pp.354-355. 
92Bowker, op.cit., p.208. 
93Mott, op.cit., p.l. 
94Walker, quoted in Mott, op.cit. 
95AIlen & Simonsen, op.cit., p.354. 
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Point 4 - not strong or forceful  enough and unwilling because  of  fear of 
rejection: 	Managers do not make policy. 	They carry out Government 
edict. 	They may institute measures to facilitate the smooth running of 
the particular programme but they are just as much 'captive' of the 
system as the inmate. 	In the main, Western prisons are directed by 
legislatures, 	courts and bureaucracy. 	Managerial 	initiative may be 
taken as an 	admission, 	albeit covert, 	that 	those dictating policy 
are 	misguided. 	Again, 	the 	average 	manager, 	because 	of 	his 
'institutional-climb' up the hierarchy of the prison system will have 
attained a political second-sense. 	He will know how far he can go,' and 
who not to upset, to further his career. 	By the time he reaches the 
pinnacle of managing a prison, his outlook is purely functional. 
Further, if, as Nelson & Lovell suggest, his training and education are 
not directed explicitly to managing 96 his credibility may be 
questioned. 	Another factor could be the lack of research available to 
help him make some sort of programme decision. 97 	During his 
investigations, Bowker found that less than one third of the agencies he 
surveyed had research facilities available for managers. 98 
A major factor in the lack of initiative by managers is the divergence 
between order and stability in their prisons. Cerrato points out that 
stability has become subordinate to a stagnating form of order in 
which placation rather than reformulation is the guiding policy in 
reform of [prison] instability. 99 
96Nelson & Lovell, op.cit., pp.25-26. 
97 See Bowker, op.cit., p.2091 . 
98 ibid. 
99Cerrato, S, "Reform of Correctional Instability: Order or 
Stability", Crime and Justice, VII, 1984, pp.87-99, p.87. 
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Order, on the other hand 
is 	a 	temporary 	condition 	of 	functional 	operation 	created 	by 
administrative 	placation 	and characterised 	by 	inconsistent policy 
decisions, 	weak philosophical principles, and the absence of a 
long-range plan for implementation. I" 
Where both social change and new philosophy develops, managerial 
problems of control are exacerbated and this, in itself, abrogates the 
possibility 	of 	bringing 	in 	further 	change. 1 ° 1 	Again, 	the 
Practicalities 	of 	implementing 	new 	philosophies are 	dependent 	upon 
resources and the physical structure of the establishment. 102 Finally, 
managers may not wish to bring about new initiatives because of the 
problems of getting them accepted by staff and inmates alike. As 
Weinberg et al point out, the major areas of perceived stress in prisons 
lie in the managerial aspects of the job and intra-organisational 
relations. 	Their study found that managers of prisons reported "more 
tension involving relations with subordinates". 103 
Point 	5 	- 	manager as functional bureaucrat: 	that 	prisons are 
bureaucracies is a well documented fact. 104 	Any argument to the 
contrary is dispelled by Coyle. 
-- 
... arguments which are often used in an attempt to demonstrate 
that the prison service is unique and not similar to other 
bureaucratic organisations are precisely those which in fact prove 
that it is bureaucratic; there are clear divisions of labour 
within the system, each of which is aimed at achieving the primary 
1 °0 ibid, p.87. 
101ibid , 0. 91 . 
102thid . 
103Weinberg et al, op .cit. , p. 39. 
104see , for example, Barak-Glantz, op.cit. , Cressey, D R, 'Prison 
Organisations" in March, J G ( ed ) Handbook of Organisations, 
Chicago: 1965, Rand McNally, Kassebaum, G, Ward, D A, & Wilner, D 
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aim of the system, which is secure custody in one form or another: 
it has a strongly hierarchical structure; each member of staff is 
subject to a particular form of disciplinary control. [05 
Further, Archembeault and ;rchembeault point out that prisons may 
considered as public service organisations, and as such 
must 	be 	operated 	consistent 	with 	principles 	of 	public 
administration rather than private business administration. 106 
Therefore, 	the manager is constrained by the legal-rational system 
prevalent in this type of organisation and can only operate under its 
prescribed rules. 
Point 6 - coloured reports and quantifiable successors: 	Managers have 
to make some sort of yearly report whether it be in the form of a year 
book 	presented 	to 	the 	legislature 	or 	destined 	simply 	for 	the 
bureaucratic files in head office. The contents of such a report may 
depend on whether the manager is employed in a system encompassing 
prisons with probation and parole, a large prison system, or part • of the 
criminal justice network. His individual establishment report may be 
encapsulated under a specific grouping, for example, prisons. Whilst 
acknowledging Cohn's assertion that managers tend to highlight 
tangibles, 	the mechanism for determining success or failure of a 
programme has not yet been agreed upon by professional analysts, let 
M, Prison Treatment and Parole Survival, New York: 1971, Wiley. 
105Coyle, A G, The Organisational Development of the Scottish Prison  
Service with Particular Reference to the Role and Influence of the  
Prison Officer, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 1986, University of 
Edinburgh, p.113. 
106Archembeault & Archembeault, op.cit., p.41. 
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alone a prison manager. 107 	It may be that the prison manager has to 
follow a specific format which leaves little individual discretion. 
Further, if we accept the notion that the prison is a bureaucracy, then 
Governments wish facts and figures which, show them in good light - 
negative prison reports create a bad public image. 
Point 7 - inadequate training in management and public administration: 
The standard practice in most prison services of managers reaching their 
position by rising from base-grade level has already been documented. 
It was noted that most managers gained their experience from on-the-job 
training. 	The catalyst for Wardens and Governors to 'manage' rather 
than rule the prison, came after World War II. 	Public demand meant the 
autocracy had to change to be accountable . . 	The prison had to be run 
like a private corporation and be cost effective. 	With formal chains of 
command being set up, the Warden's position changed from that of a 
ruler to a prison manager. 108  Even with a changing perception 
managing role, jurisdictions were reticent to employ trained 
Instead, 	they 	recruited 	from a variety of academic 
for 	example, 	law, 	criminology, 	welfare, 	sociology, 
and psychiatry. 	Few, if any, had any formal aualifications 
in management or organisation. 	As Mainzer comments on those who 
eventually become administrators, 
People who have specialised training and education find that they 
can 'succeed' only by giving up work for which they are trained and 
entering 'management' - work for which they have no specialised 
107 Martinson, R, "What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison 









Thus the trend to recruit , rather than train; has continued. 	There 
appears to be a misguided conception that those who reach management 
positions have the necessary prerequisites, 	and once ensconced, 	the 
routine 	day-to-day 	management 	tasks 	will 	be 	sufficient 	to 	gain 
experience - a fact noted by Nelson and Lovell. 110 
Point 8 - falls back on rules, regulations etc: 	As Cohn has pointed 
out, the lack of a professional body of knowledge in the prison field 
means that the manager must refer elsewhere. It may be that the root 
cause of this lack of professional knowledge lies with the managers 
themselves. If the recruiting patterns for managers are examined (see 
Nelson & Lovell ) it can be noted that academic inclination prior to the 
1960s apoeared to be secondary to that of the 'hard' agent of control. 
Recruits, whether professional or academic, had little or no history of 
prison involvement. 	Their views were based on scanty knowledge or a 
modicum of prison service. 	Those who submitted papers to academia 
usually 	shaped 	the 	topic 	to 	suit 	their particular 	field of 	interest. 
The knowledge built up was fragmented. 	Those 'old style' managers still 
within 	the 	system, 	in 	the 	main, 	refused 	to 	subscribe 	to 	the 
'professional' prison manager view. 	Morris goes straight to the point 
[the prison] has attracted too many second-class minds who • have 
provided timorous and vacelating leadership. 111 
109 Mainzer, L C, "The Scientist as Public Administrator", Western  
Political Quarterly, 1963, 16, pp.8114-829, D.819. 
110Nelson & Lovell, op.cit. 
11 'Morris, N, "From the outside looking in: Or the snail's pace of 
penal reform", in Outside Looking In, .Washington, DC: 1970, US 
Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. 
97 
The lack of a distinct body of knowledge and the acceptance of the 
prison as a bureaucracy have meant that the manager has little 
alternative but to act the 'functional bureaucrat' and rely on the only 
resource he has left - rules and regulations. 
Point 	9 	- 	no outside 	reference 	body, 	reliance on the  'fraternity': 
Poole and Rigoli conducted research in 1933 to determine whether there 
was a link between nrofes ,i011.:!:.;,!• and formalisation. 112 They 
concluded, 
	
• formalisation 	is 	an 	organisationally 	induced 	process 	for 
centralising 	behaviour 	while 	nrofessionalisation 	is 	a 	non- 
organisationally derived one. 113 
In other words, there was an incompatibility between bureaucracy and 
professionalism. If we accept the twin notions that prisons are 
bureaucracies and the manager a functional bureaucrat, accountable to 
superiors in central office or Government, who then can he turn to for . 
advice but those holding similar positions in other prison 
establishments? 	The distinct problem here, 	of course, 	is that the 
primary attributes of such others may be only service experience. They, 
through this seniority principle, advise on the basis of problems they 
have encountered and of solutions used. The new manager may then try to 
adopt these ideas to suit his particular institution - with varying 
results. 	Finally, 	through natural attrition 	he, in turn , assumes the 
mantle of experienced prison manager offering advice. 
112 Poole and Rigali, op.cit. 
113 ibid, o.63. 
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Point t0 - secrecy aspects: 	for many years the orison was a closed 
envi-onment - 	erhaps in part due to an apathetic public, negative media 
covera, and the lack of political kudos. 	Since the 1960s there has 
been a gradual opening of the system and public interest has demanded 
that prisons help resolve the crime epidemic. 	Because of this growing 
public awareness, managers have had to defend the excesses of their 
predecessors. 	Antiquated institutions, bereft of sanitary services and 
built, 	in the main, during the prison expansion programme of the 
Victorian era, house many more inmates than originally intended. 	Any 
public expoe of brutality by staff, riots by inmates, escapes or death 
in - custody 	immediately 	forces any manager on to the defensive. 
Additionally, he is normally constrained by public service regulation 
from talking to the media and must reply through either Departmental 
Head, Minister or relevant Agency spokesman. With a greater public 
awareness and media accountability, and a recognition of prisoners' 
rights by the American Courts, it becomes increasingly difficult for the 
manager to operate in secrecy. Realistically, his managerial 
performance will be judged on his capacity to control his institution 
and prevent staff discontent. His effectiveness in keeping costs to a 
prescribed budgetary allocation will further determine the success or 
failure of his managerial approach. 
Cohn's ten reasons for prison management failure were based upon the 
then view that the prison could help re-educate and/or change the 
inmate. 	The 'rehabilitative' value of prisons has been questioned, 114 
114Lipton et al, op.cit. 
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and evaluation techniques used to determine success or failure rates are 
still the subject of debate. 115 	However, many of Cohn's reasons are 
still valid as the 1980s draw to a close. 	Prison managers are bound by 
bureaucracy. 	They are largely controlled from Head Offices. 	Their 
managerial training is practically . non-existent. Prison manager 
conferences have now become political arenas, with the relevant Minister 
in charge of prisons also attending. 116 Currently a theme being 
considered in many jurisdictions is 'Humane Containment' ( discussed in 
the Conclusion ). This concept places considerable emphasis on 
'normalising' the internal prison environment as far as possible. 
Whilst the primary concern is to keep inmates segregated from society, 
this new concept, with its policy of minimal interference of inmates, 
could mark the beginning of a new era in prison management. 
The problem is that Governments and the public are unsure of the 
essential purpose of the prison. 	One recent 	survey in Australia 
elicited a newspaper headline "Jail not seen as deterrent". 117 A po ll 
conducted nationally in Australia found 34 percent thought the main 
purpose of sending someone to prison was to punish them, 25 percent 
thought rehabilitation was the aim, and 19 percent thought it would stop 
them committing other offences. 118 
115 Palumbo, D J, "Evaluating Policy Implementation: Central Issues in 
Comparative Analysis", paper presented to the International 
Political Science Association Meetings in Paris, France, July, 
1985. 
116Interviews with the former Controller of Prisons of Tasmania, 
and the former Director of Corrective Services for Tasmania 6.11.87 
and 19.11.87. 
117 Sydney Morning Herald, 8.12.87, p.8. 
11 8 ibid. 
100 
Prison management is only directly affected by public opinion when 
something goes wrong. 	Until some crisis occurs, most Governments are 
quite happy to leave prisons to the adminisirators. 	Whenever a riot or 
death 	receives 	media 	exposure, 	governments 	issue 	directives 	and 
management concur. 	Governments act instinctively to negative prison 
media publicity. 	The 	oft-quoted maxim 	'there are no votes in 
prisons' 119  is a truism which is conveniently put forward as a 
justification for the on-going apathy by those with the mandate to act. 
Academia has been of little assistance, as it prefers to harass rather 
than help. Hawkins lumps these critics into four categories: a) the 
abolitionist, b) the rigorist ( who proposes even severer conditions for 
prisons ), c) the reformer, and d) the reductivist ( who wishes to curtail 
prison programmes ). 120 Thus, the combination of public apathy, 
political expediency, and academic critique help shape contemporary 
managerial practice. Mainly it is shaped by political means, although 
as Hawkins comments, it 
... 	should to some extent reflect what the majority of the 
community wants ..." 121 
The managerial role can only be understood in the context of the prison 
environment. 	There is no similar position outside equivalent purpose 
Government agencies, such as youth centres. 	The few researchers who 
have examined prisons over a period of time have been governed by 
119Interview with the former Attorney-General of Tasmania, 19.11.87. 
120For a full account see Hawkins, op.cit, po. 5-29 . 
121 ibid, D. 14 . 
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academic inclination, and thus little is known about the managerial 
position apart from only the ramifications of his actions. 122 
Risdon Penal  Philosophy,  Management Practice Model and Managerial 
Profile 	2:5 
Tracing penal philosophical development at Risdon prison is a difficult 
task. 	To the casual observer the prison has changed little over the 
past two decades. 	The dominant 1940s philosophy of Retribution carried 
on in the Tasmanian system even after the new prison at Risdon opened in 
1960. According to a recently retired middle management officer, 
conditions for both staff and inmates were much better, and cells, 
workshops and recreational facilities were "far superior" to those of 
the condemned Campbell Street gaol - Risdon's predecessor. 123 It was 
noted in the previous Chapter that there appears to be no written prison 
policy,  ,. and that each successive Attorney-General has had little input 
into prison philosophy - with one notable exception. 124 	Tasmanian 
Penal philosophy (or lack of it ) was mainly 'custom and practice': 
continuing 	on 	the 	retributive 	mode 	in 	operation 	during 	the 
Departmentalisation of the prison system in 1936. 125 	The prison riots 
at Risdon ( discussed in detail in - Chapter IV) during the late 1960s and 
122see , for example, Sykes, op.cit  . 
123Interview with R C Barwick, retired Principal Prison Officer, 
November 1987.   
124E M Bingham, the Liberal Attorney-General who devised the present 
Law Department structure which incorporates Risdon Prison. 
1255ee Wettenhall , R L, A Guide to Tasmanian Government Administration  
Hobart: 1968, Platypus, pp . 88-91 . 
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early 	1970s 	forced 	the 	authorities 	to 	'liberalise' 	the 	prison 	to 	a 
certain extent, 	and this 'policy' has continued until present. 	The 
current situation cannot be pigeonholed into any of the categories 
described by BoN.yker. 	Rather, elements of 	major varieties can be 
identified. 	The lack nf a dominant philosophical mode leaves both staff 
and inmates confused. 	As Mathiesen points cut staff and inmates would 
rather suffer deplorable conditions as long as the philosophy is known: 
One 	setting, 	Botsfengslet [Norway] is damp, 	stark and ugly. 
	
Inmates 	reside 	in 	dungeons, 	receive 	lukewarm 	meals through 
trapdoors, share no contact, and get almost no attention from the 
staff. 	The second setting, Ila [Norway], is attractive, modern and 
well staffed. 	The walls are pastel-coloured, the living areas are 
individualised 	and 	attractive, 	dining 	rooms 	are 	small, 	and 
supervision is unobtrusive. No ecologist worth his . salt would 
consider living in Bosfengslet, but inmates prefer it by a heavy 
margin. They prefer it because it has clear criteria, known rules, 
and an unambiguous (non-rehabilitative philosophy. 126 
Prison management practice, 	similarly, 	has been conditional on the 
custodial oriented nature of Risdon's functioning. 	It is best described 
as 	resembling 	Barak-Glantz' 	Bureaucratic-Lawful 	model, 	but 	still 
retaining elements from the Authoritative model. Management training is 
non-existent (as noted in the previous Chapter ) and 'experience on-the 
-job' is the necessary prescription. Observation (see how it's done) 
techniques, commonsense approaches, and lack of procedural reference - 
all employed by past and present Risdon senior management staff - are 
the "primary factors in mismanagement". 127 
I 26 Mathiesen, T, quoted in Tech, H, Living in Prison: The Ecology of  
Survival, New York: 1977, Free Press, p.7. 
127Interview with Dr K Kerte, Managing Editor, American Jail 
Association, 2.2.88, Hobart. 
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Senior Risdon Prison management during the period from 1960 to 1986 has 
been stable with only a few men - after the retirement of the original•
Controller of Prisons at Risdon in 1961 holding the three top 
positions (see Figure I). 
Figure 1 : RISDON SENIOR MANAGEMENT 1960-1987  


































Until 1970 the Controller of Prisons was also the Superintendent of 
Risdon Prison,the Deputy Superintendent was also Deputy Controller. 
* * 	Acting capacity. 
* * * Since 	Howe's 	retirement, 	the 	position 	has 	not 	been 	filled. 
Harvey had been acting DOCS as well as being Chief Superintendent. 
**** Since resigned. 
Of the nine who have held, or are holding, senior management positions, 
six have a military background - two having received .commissions. 	Two 
104 
have been career public servants moving uo to the top positions after  
serving for a number of years as the Prison's Executive Officer - a 
non-uniformed position responsible for finance and supplies. The final 
incumbent began as a base-grade officer in another Australian Prison 
system, was promoted through the ranks, and subsequently transferred to 
Risdon Prison as the Deputy Superintendent. 	Only one of the nine had 
formal tertiary qualifications, and these were in agriculture. 	He had 
previously managed the Prison Farm, and supervised the Royal Der went 
Hospital's market gardens prior to joining the prison service. Three  
had reached senior positions by working their way up through the ranks. 
Two others were laterally recruited, and had no previous prison 
experience. 128 Only two of the senior managers were under 40 on 
reaching the substantive rank, the majority beingover 50 years of 
age . 129 None of the nine had any formal qualifications in 
management . 130 
According to CohnI 31 the lack of training in management and public 
administration by prison managers deprives them of techniques and 
comparable practices to compare their situations. It is argued in the 
next Chapter that the prison manager must be cognisant of all the 
variables in the prison environment if he is to have any measure of 
1280ne came from Probation and Parole, the other from Head Office 
having previously held a commissioned rank in the Army and prior 
service in a senior capacity with the State Emergency Services 
129 From interviews and Departmental files. 
130Two, however, were members of a professional association 
Australian Institute of Management. 
13 ICohn, op.cit.  
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success. 	More importantly, 	his dealings wtih the prison's captives, 
both staff and inmates, 	will have a direct bearing on the prison's 
stable functioning . . 
CHAPTER III 
INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON MANAGEMENT PRACTICE  
The discussion on prison management has concentrated on some of the 
problems 	faced 	with 	competing 	philosophies, 	managerial 	models, 
management failure reasons, and some suggested organisational theories 
and principles which can be used. 	Two of the dependent variables which 
determine the manager's success are staff and inmates. 	His relationship 
with each group, and the harmonising of the interaction between them are 
normally used as indicators of successful prison functioning. While the 
Larger systems mainly determine who will be employed, the manager has 
little choice of inmate clientele. 
Upon transfer or promotion the manager must begin to create an 
atmosphere of trust with his subordinate staff and inmates. 	Each side 
will watch carefully for signs of partisanship. 	He may have all the 
latest managerial techniques available to him, but as Jagger comments 
knowing [them] is not sufficient in itself. 	The important factor 
is understanding when and how to apply them and being able to 
appreciate their limitations. I 
He points out that failures among managers largely occur not because of 
these techniques, 
but 	from an 	inability 	to 	deal 	with and 	understand people 
effectively. 2 
The majority of the staff under his control are base-grade prison 
officers. 	His directives are implemented by this group. 	Inmate 
'Jagger, R, "A Principal Officer's View", Prison Service Journal, 
57, 1985, pp.I5-16, p.15. 
2ibid. 
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perceptions 	of 	managerial 	directives 	largely 	result 	from base-grade 
officer application. 	An understanding of these groups is, therefore, 
necessary 	as 	the 	prison 	manager's 	role 	cannot 	be 	considered 	in 
isolation. 
The movement of prison philosophy from punishment, deterrence and 
custodial 	practice 	to 	contemporary 	theories 	of 	rehabilitation 	and 
reintegration places the prison of ficer in a frustrating position. 	He 
has the 'front-line' role in prison and is 
maybe 	the 	most 	influential 	[person] 	in 	institutions 	simply 	by 
virtue 	of [his] 	numberc 	and [his] daily 	intimate 	contact 	with 
of fenders. 3 
Yet his deployment has also been the subject of much bitter debate. 	As 
Hawkins 	suggests, 	his role is "clearly of 	critical 	importance". 4 
There are dimensions of this key role which are common to all prison 
officers. 	The primary task is the prevention of escape and closely 
related is the maintenance of internal order and security . 5 	Apart from 
these 	primary 	goals 	the 	prison 	as 	a 	total 	institution 	necessarily 
generates several 	subsidiary goals connected with people-processing. 6 
In any 	large scale prison there is a multiplicity of duties to be 
3 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice, Task Force Report, Corrections. Washington DC, US 
Government Printing Office, 1967, p.96. 
4 Hawkins, G, The  Prison: Policy and Practice, Chicago: 1976, 
University of Chicago Press, p.85. 
5 Jacobs, 3 B, Retsky, H G, "Prison Guard",Urban  Life, it 	1975, 
pp. 5-28. 
6Goffman, E, Asylums, Harmondssvorth:1961, Penguin, p.15. 
108 
performed. 	Food must be prepared, laundry must be cleaned, medicine has 
to be distributed, 	maintenance carried out, new inmates processed, 
others 	sent 	to 	courts 	and 	hospitals, 	transfers 	made 	to 	other 
institutions - in sum, the prison must keep functioning. The various 
duties required to keep this process in action are normally carried out 
by the prison officers, although some outside expertise may be required 
for a particular mechanical function. The role the officer plays will 
consequently depend on where he is posted and on the type of institution 
and its specific ideology. 	If, for example, he works in a maximum 
security establishment, 	his perception of his role and his attitude 
towards the prisoner will differ to those of an officer posted to an 
open prison. There are, of course, different rules and regulations for 
each type of institution. 
Why Become a Prison Officer? 3:1 
What makes a person become a prison officer? Is it just for employment 
and why does he enter into an environment that is so different from the 
society of which he has been part? How does he adjust from being a 
'face in the crowd' to an immediately recognisable arm of the State? 
Can he cope with the constant pressures of being enclosed with a great 
number of men who have had their freedom taken from them? How does he 
and his family cope with the accusations, innuendoes and sometimes open 
hostility of those who see the prison officer as both degraded and 
degrading? How influential is his union? Is his training purely for 
custodial purposes? 
Several studies have shown that the prime reason for seeking employment 
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in the prison environment is job security. 7 	Some men, however, have 
been attracted 	to 	the 	prison 	service 	because 	of 	its 	similarity 	to 
military 	service. 	The 	Prison 	Service 	has traditionally 	recruited a 
large number of ex-servicemen, 8 perhaps, because the prison's custodial 
hierarchical 	chain 	of 	command 	is 	paramilitaristic 	by 	nature 	and 
practice. 	However, this trend appears to be diminishing. 	The English 
Prison Service, during the past decade, has tended to hire people with 
industrial rather than services experience. 9 	Depending on the Prison 
Service 	the 	recruit 	joins, 	his 	period 	of 	training 	consists 	of 	an 
introduction to a job where experience overshadows practically all other 
prerequisites. 	Most Prison training courses consist of basic principles 
and 	skills 	of 	security, 	inmate 	management, 	physical 	fitness, 
self-defence, 	report writing, rules and regulations, 	some basic goals 
and aims of the individual organisation, and first aid. Most systems 
run recruit training courses of between four weeks and three months. 
This initial period, however, does not prepare him for daily prison 
life. 
The officer finds himself - once he has finished his period of training 
- allocated to some particular post in the prison. 	Although he has 
7Lombardo, LX, Guards Imprisoned, New York, 1981, Elsevier, Jacobs & 
Retsky, op.cit., Williams, T A, Custody and Conflict: An  
Organisational Study of Role Problems and related attitudes among  
Prison Officers in Western Australia, unpublished PhD Thesis, 
University of WA, Bullard, op.cit., & Emery, F E, Freedom and  
Justice Within Walls: The Bristol Prison Experiment, London: 1970, 
Tavistock. 
8Thomas, J E, the English Prison Officer Since 1850: A Study in  
Conflict, London: 1972,. Routledge & Keegan Paul . , pp.47-48. 
9Thomas, in Morgan & King, op.cit., 
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probably taken note of the proper procedures in relation to managing 
each allocated task, his introduction to the task ' in real life' may 
come as a surprise. 	He may find that the experienced of ficer explains 
that what he 	the new officer - has been taught is just theory and he 
will show him how the job is done in practice. 	The new recruit has 
therefore been exposed to the alternative structure - the informal 
network. Krech et al believe that this informal organization develops 
when there is "a lack of congruence between the norms of the 
members". 10 It also may arise if the formal organization 
proves 	to 	be 	inefficient 	in 	achieving 	the 	goals 	of 	the 
organization. 11 
The new officer finds a conflict in what he has been trained to do and 
what the experienced man expects him to do. In order to be accepted the 
recruit will probably accept and follow the advice of the senior 
officer. Is there any way to reconcile the formal and informal 
networks? 	Bahke claims that they cannot be separated. 	He suggests the 
social system to which participants in an organization react 
and which is an effective determinant of their behaviour, is a 
synthesis 	of 	both 	formal 	and 	informal 	elements. 12 
It has been claimed that every institution captures something of the 
time and interest of its members and provides something of a world for 
10Krech, D, Crutchfield, R S & Ballackey, E L, Individual in Society  
New York: 1962, McGraw-Hill, p.69. 
I libid. 
12Bahke, E W, in Krech, et al, op.cit, p.419. 
them 13 - in other words that a prison is what each man brings to it. 14 
The prison officer confronts the inmate with the knowledge that he has 
authority on his side and that the inmate should obey when called on by 
the officer. 	The inmate may regard the officer as just another arm of 
the legal process which put him inside. 	He may find his detention 
unjustified and could strike out, either verbally or physically, at the 
orison officer whom he sees as representative of the loss of liberty - 
first by confinement to the institution and second by confinement 
within the institution. 15— 
The officer, when faced by a threatening action for the first time can, 
if there are other officers around, look to the experienced men for 
advice. In the outside world, the officer may encounter threatening 
situations, but very rarely will they be of the intensity and volume 
exhibited in a maximum security prison.. The management of conflict may 
not be a skill yet attained by the new officer and his expectations of 
what he could do, outside the prison, are at odds with the approach he 
must take within it. If he were outside, he might decide to match 
aggression with aggression; however, the prison rules and regulations 
state what measures may be taken. The normal officer - until he becomes 
case-hardened - will probably feet some sort of anguish, be it mental or 
emotional, when involved in this sort of situation. While there are 
some types of officers who relish this type of occurrence, the average 
I 3Goffman, op.cit., p.15. 
'Sykes, G M, The Social Captives, a Study of a Maximum Security  
Prison, Princeton: 1970, Princeton University Press, p.63. 
15ibid.  
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man tends to look upon the job, and the hazards that go with it, not as 
a vocation, but as a means to an end. 	His employment at the prison 
provides his family with an income. 	However, the officer and his family 
are affected in subtler and non-monetary, ways by his work. 
The possible stigma attached to working in a prison becomes apparent 
when officers meet people from outside their immediate environment. 
Officers tend to become defensive when asked where they are employed. 
If the officer tells the truth about his place of employment he can 
expect either to be questioned on the happenings of the prison, or he 
may be asked why and how he could work 'in a place like that'. Most 
of ficers in three Canadian samples explained their work as "government 
service". 16 Wilkins interviewed officers in Ontario, Canada, who 
claimed 
people in the community did not understand the role of the 
correctional officer. 17 
He found particularly at Toronto Jail and at Mimico, 
staff spoke of social difficulties arising from the ignorance, or 
sometimes the hostility of neighbours and other persons they met 
socially. When meeting new people, some officers concealed their 
occupation behind generalities about working for the government. 
Some reported losing the friendship of neighbours or acquaintances 
when their occupation was discovered. 18 
Willett reported in his study on the Canadian prison service that the 
officers and their wives were 
16 Wilkins, M L, "Correctional Officers: Roles, Attitudes, and 




very sensitive about the implications of prison work that set them 
apart from relatives and friends. 19 
Duffee claims this outside 'pressure' may force the officers to form a 
subculture of their own. 	He says that this is not a radical suggestion 
and gives as an analogy the police - 'the blue minority'. 20 
	
Further, 
Burke and Weir found that spouses of correctional personnel, when 
compared to spouses of probation/parole officers, reported significantly 
more negative effects of the spouse's job on personal, home and family 
life, 
lower life satisfaction and more intense and pervasive negative 
feelings or mood states. 21 
Finally, Boshier and McDonald studied the children of officers who lived 
at the prison and measured their attitudes towards the inmates. They 
found that prison children rated the inmates more negatively than 
non-prison children. They hypothesised that this was caused by 
communication from their fathers and that because the children had 
little chance to meet non-prison children their perception was biased in 
that they were unable to obtain information to refute parental 
attitudes. 22 
19 willett, T C, "The 'Fish Screw' in theCanadian Penitentiary 
Service", Queens Law Journal, Summer, 1977, pp.424-449, p.426. 
20 Duffee, D, "The Correctional Officer Subculture and Organisational 
Change", Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency,  July 1984, 
pp.155-172, p162. 
2 IBurke, R J, Weir, T, "Is Managing a Correctional Institution a 
Demanding Occupation", unpublished paper, York University, Toronto, 
1980. 
22 Boshier, R, McDonald, D, "Living Alongside a Prison: How Does it 
Affect Children?" ANZ 3 Crim, 6, 3, 1973, pp.182-188. 
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Thomas, in his seminal work on the English prison officer comments: 
generally 	the 	staff 	( prison 	officers) 	are 	seen as agents 	of 
punishment, and are categorized as impediments to reformation. 23 
Both he and 	Williams24 	maintain the role of the prison-of ficer 	is 
custodial. 	However, what do the of ficers themselves think of this 
claim? 
Peretti and Hooker found that guards at the Indiana State Prison placed 
the custodial function at the bottom of a list of self-perceptions. 
They placed integration, defined as effective behavioural performance, 
at the top of the list. They perceived themselves as showing care and 
concern for the inmates and being able to interact with relative 
closeness although not intimately. The authors concluded that the 
guards tended to fit the role rather than modify the position to fit 
their own characteristics. The more knowledge the guard has about the 
role then the easier it was to 
fulfil the expectations of his role as determined by the social 
institution . 25 
Thomas claims that people in organizations display a "very ambivalent 
attitude towards training". 26 	He goes on to say that it is generally 
23Thomas, (1972 ) op.cit. , p.2. 
	 p:6, Williams, op.cit. , p. 5. 
25peretti, P 0, Hooker, M, "Social Role Self Perception of State 
Prison Guards", Criminal Justice and Behaviour, 3 June, 1976, 
187-196, p.193. 
26Thomas, ( 1972 ) op.cit  . , p.2. 
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expected 	that 	training 	will 	be 	"either 	harmless or 	miraculous, 	an 
interlude or a orelude". 27 Further, that staff who have been on courses 
go to polar extremes in that they will have changed completely or not at 
all. The hierarchy sometimes look upon training courses as a cosmetic 
exercise and that once the staff have got rid of their idealism they can 
concentrate on the priority of making sure the inmates do not escape. 
Another problem facing the base-line officer is the 'old-guard' 
hierarchy. In some instances through the retirement and death of 
previous senior officers the 'old guard' have progressed up the ladder 
of ineptitude and maintained their positions supinely . 28 Thomas sums 
up 
in institutions the immature and unstable are to be found in 
positions of control and the result 	is that they mask their 
insecurity 	and 	insufficiency 	with 	rigid 	rules 	and 	authoritative 
discipline. 29 
As a result, according to Cohn, too little change has been inaugurated 
by top management to reconcile the differences between them and the 
base-line officer, with the result that these issues have become 
problems 
primarily because correctional managers have failed to lead their 
organizations; instead they have been mere caretakers, if not 
sinecures. . 30 
27 ibid. 
28Lombardo, op .cit  . , p.73. 
29Thomas ( 1972 ), op. cit . , p. 9 . 
30Cohn, A W, "The Failure of Correctional Management Revisited", 
Crime and Delinquency, July 1973, p. 10. 
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Qualifications, Training and Role of  the Prison Officer 3:2 
If Government agencies and management staff were sincere in applying new 
philosophical changes in prison inmate handling and organisational 
practice this should issue in new training routines and an educationally 
better qualified recruit. A study, however, of most Australian and 
other Western Prison systems' training programmes and recruiting 
criteria suggests that the onus is largely on the custodial aspects of 
the job. A major difficulty to overcome in any, prison system is the 
mentality of the 'old guard' who being recruited in the old 'us and 
them' period challenge any innovative practice. Additionally, the 
avenue for promotion in most prison systems is through the medium of 
in-service training and/or promotional examination and/or interview. 
Though 	many 	prison 	systems, 	until recently, 	used the 	well 	tried 
'seniority principle', several jurisdictions areusing 'fast-track' 
schemes to promote on the basis of merit rather than seniority. 31 
Again, 'there are problems associated with training - the methods used, 
the calibre of instructors, finance and, most importantly, the 
willingness of staff members to participate. 
The new training methods are looked upon with scepticism by the 
'old-time guards'. These long-serving officers are extremely suspicious 
of new ideas as these seem to usurp, and denigrate, the rule-of-thumb 
methods which were the practice for so long. Jacobs and Retsky report 
that the newly recruited guard's 
31 Scotland, England and in Australia - Victoria. 
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first 	orientation 	to 	prison 	invariably 	includes 	the 	warning 	to 
remain aloof from the inmates lest the cycle of corruption and 
blackmail destroys a guard's career. 32 
No man is born a prison officer, indeed 
there is little if any empirical knowledge of what makes a good 
correctional officer. 33 
Further, contemporary prison management view the base-grade officer in 
the purely custodial role. Current training procedures are designed to 
emphasise those aspects which reflect dominant managerial principles - 
custody, security and prevention of escape. This view is supported by 
the growing movement into prisons of the specialist in the field of 
behaviour modification such as the psychiatrist, psychologist and social 
worker an admission on the part of prison management that the 
base-grade officer has little to offer as an agent of change. 
One of the reasons why base-grade prison officers are purely custodial 
is 	the 	traditional 	recruitment practice based on philosophical penal 
views of the day. 	Prisons, prior to World War II were basically 
retributive - the offender came to prison as punishment. 	Although penal 
philosophy has changed recruiting practices have varied little. 	There 
is still the general tendency to recruit someone with a basic education 
on the expectation that he can apply rules and regulations, and little 
else. 	When penal philosophy changed, 	and different policies and 
practices 	were introduced, 	governments and management had little 
32 Jacobs & Retsky, op. cit. , p.17. 
33Homant, R J, "Correlates of Satisfactory Relations between 
Correctional Officers and Prisoners", Journal of Offender  
Counselling Services and Rehabilitation, 4, ( 1 ), 1979, p.54. 
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compulsion to use the staff they had at their disposal; 	instead they 
invited the specialist 	into the prison 	to implement the 	changing 
philosophical goal. 	The base-grade of ficer was ignored. 	His role has 
become narrower until it has reached the position ‘vhere his duties are 
purely custodial. 34 	Remarkably, some prison systems in Australia are 
demanding a higher qualified entrant to the base-grade ranks. 	Tasmania, 
for example, has raised the educational entrance level for recruits from 
grade 6 to grade 	Q•35  Tertiary-educated applicants are entering the 
base-grade levels in the Western Australian system. 36 	Will these 
better-educated recruits be satisfied with a single role - custody - or, 
will they be held captive, as are most of their contemporaries, by the 
better-than-average . salary. In purely economic terms, those charged 
with running the nation's prisons are wasting a valuable resource in the 
base-grade officer. 
Harding reports that it takes an average $26,67.5 to keep an inmate in 
the Australian prison system. 37 	The cost to each government authority 
for 	the 	base-grade 	officer's 	services 	is 	in 	excess of 	this. 	In 
Tasmania, 	for 	example, 	during the 	1984/85 financial year, 	it cost 
$26 , 771 to keep an inmate. 38 	Compare this cost with the salaries for 
34Thomas ( 1972 ), op.cit  . , p. 199 . 
35A uthor's discussions with Deputy-Chief Superintendent and Prison 
School Teacher, H NAP Risdon , Tasmania. 
36 Author's discussion with David Biles, Assistant-Director, 
Australian Institute of Criminology. 
37Harding, R, "Prison Overcrowding: Correctional Policies and 
Political Constraints", 	NZ J Crim, 20. 1. 87, pp. 16-33, p.21. 
38ibid. 
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staff employed in the Tasmanian prison service during the 	1983/84 
financial 	year. 	The prisons division of the Law Department was 
allocated $5,660,925. 	Of this, 	$4,791,800 was used for salaries, 
payments for allowances and overtime for staff. 39 	Approximately 70% of 
the 	total 	staff 	- 	including administration, 	nursing, 	trade instructors 
and maintenance personnel - are base-grade prison officers. 	At 
conservative estimate, the base-grade prison officers average salary was 
in the region of $30,000. 	The Office of Corrections in Victoria, in the 
1984/85 	report, 	budgeted 	$36,810.901 	for 	salaries 	and 	associated 
costs. 4 ° 	The system in this period, employed a total of 1,806 males 
and females - both full and part-tirne. 4 I 	Again, the majority of these 
would be base-grade prison of ficers earning on average in excess, of the 
$29,588 42 it cost to keep the Victorian inmate. Why do governments 
invest so much finance for so little return? 
It is by no means certain that all prison-officers wish to participate 
in the rehabilitation process-. 	Many are quite happy to 'keep their 
distance'. 	In fact, many are actively encouraged not to interact with 
inmates unless in the course of their duty. 	Their relationship with the 
inmates is one of 'acceptance': ' . .. they are here, I am here, let's do 
it as easily as possible' . 43 	In some institutions, officers become 
39 A ppropriation Bill 1983/84 LawDepartment Division II, Explanatory  
Notes. 
40Off ice of Corrections Annual Report Victoria, 1984-85, p.76. 
4 libid, p.44. 
42Harding, op .cit , p. 21. 
43Fitzgerald, M, Prisoners in Revolt, Middlesex, 1977, Penguin, 
p.162. 
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used to the idiosyncracies of certain inmates and a type of relationship 
grows over a period of time. There are, of course, studies which 
indicate that both prison officers and prisoners have a similar identity 
with shared socio-economic status, 44 work experience45 and 
aggression. 46 	There is also what Homant notes as a need for "more 
clarification of the officer's role by his supervisors". 47 	The officer 
is often put into the paradoxical position of being expected to use 
authority to maintain control, yet with his ability to do so depending 
more on his personality than on his supposed power. 	He has to appear to 
his workmates to be in control of the situation at all times, 	yet' 
reconcile this with a 'soft' approach when interacting with a prisoner; 
in consequence the prisoner could well construe the officer as being a 
'weak bastard' who can only get acquiescence by appealing to the inmate. 
However, the authorities may be inclined to think that the officer is 
spending an inordinate time with the inmate and could draw the 
conclusion that the officer may be involved in some illegal association 
with the inmate. 
Some studies, however, have shown that the base-grade officer is not the 
stereotype some make him out to be. 	Motivans commenting on an Illinois 
institution found no evidence to suggest the common stereotype applied 
44 McGurk, B 3, McGurk, R E, "Personality Types Among Prisoners and 
Prison Officers", British Journal of Criminology, 19, 1, 1979. 
pp.31-49 and Thomas, op.cit.  
45Lombardo, op.cit. 
46mcGurk & McGurk, op.cit. 
47Homant, op.cit., p.53. 
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to "even a small number of officers in this particular institution". 48 
Further, the Morrises investigating the Pentonville prison in London 
remarked that the staff 
[were] characterized 	not 	by hostility or dislike but rather by 
despair and disappointment ... 49 
that the inmates recidivated. 	As Hawkins succinctly points out, this 
particular evidence by the Morrises 
is of significance not only because it runs counter to the popular 
stereotype of the prison guard or custodial officer, but also 
because it reflects a type of interest which relates to a quite 
different standard of reference from those of discipline, custody 
and security with which the guard is commonly supposed to be 
exclusively concerned. 5 ° 
He claims, 
If guards were devoted unambiguously to securing and maintaining 
dominance and control, then recidivism would be either a matter of 
indifference to them or, conceivably, something_ to be welcomed as 
representing an extension of control over inmates. ) 1 
Another 	factor to be considered 	when investigating prison officer 
attitude is the level of education attained. 	Braithwaite and Cass, 52 
in a demographic study of Australian prison officers, found less than 
0.4% had tertiary qualifications, 	and a significant percentage had 
48 Motivans, J, quoted in Hawkins, op. cit .  , p.86. 
49 Morris, T & Morris P, Pentonville: A Sociological Study of an  
English Prison, London, 1963, Routeledge (Sc Kegan Paul, pp. 255-6. 
50Hawkins, op.cit.  , p.87. 
5 'ibid .  
52Braithwaite, J, & Cass, M, "Note on the demographic composition 
of Australian police forces and prison services", ANZ 3 Crim, 1979, 
12, pp.132-138. 
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little formal skills. 	An investigation by Bullard 53 in New South Wales 
found that some prospective trainees were being refused entry to the 
service because they had high scores in a psychological test. The 
barring of these applicants was justified by claiming they would become 
bored with the work. 54 Bullard points out the folly of this decision 
and claims that enhancing mediocracy will have long-term ramifications 
for the service - at both base-grade and managerial level." 
In most large systems prison officers tend to remain in the same 
institution 	during 	their 	service career . 56 	They become extremely 
suspicious when a change of management occurs. 	In a situation 
where the staff and procedures have become entrenched, managerial 
practices can only change incrementally. 	If sudden change occurs, overt 
reaction by prison staff may result . 57 	Managers must also be aware of 
the difficulties faced by prison staff in performance of their duties. 
Some officers, because of the inflated salaries 	due to overtime 
cannot 	leave 	but, 	equally, 	cannot 	face 	working 	in 	the 	prison 
environment. 
Some attempt suicide, 58 whilst others abuse sick leave. 	Management not 
only have to be aware of the interaction between staff and inmates, but 
53Bullard, op.cit  . 
5 4 ibid. 
55 ibid 
56 Jagger,  , op. cit  
57Changing managerial practices in Scotland resulted in strike action 
by prison staff during the early 1980s. 
58Three deaths and 77 attempted sui 'eides reported among staff at 
Pentridge Prison, Victoria. "A Jail that's Killing Its Staff", 
Sunday Press, 19.4.87. 
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should have complete background knowledge of the other group they are 
responsible for - the inmate. 
The Inmate and Managerial Techniques 3:3 
Managers in all prison systems direct not only the willing - prison 
staff - but are charged with the responsibility of controlling those who 
are unwilling - the inmates. 	It was shown earlier that the manager is 
subject 	to 	many 	constraints, 	including 	philosophy, 	policy, 	staff, 
programmes and implementation. 	All these variables - human and 
theoretical - are linked together somehow to manage the institution and 
ensure it functions smoothly. 	The smooth running of the prison is 
dependent largely on how the inmate accepts his imprisonment. 	Most 
inmates wish to 'do their time' and return to society as soon as 
possible. 	There are very few management problems with this type of 
inmate. 	It is the small percentage of inmates who, for one reason or 
another, fight against the system, that create managerial difficulties. 
In many cases, the prison atmosphere is dependent upon their actions. 
They can, by threat or force, make other inmates follow their disturbing 
practices. 	Managerial strategies have to be designed to cater for this 
kind of situation. 	Some prisons separate these troublemakers from the 
main 	stream 	in 	small 	segregation 	units, 59 	making 	prisons 	within 
prisons. 	Other prisons are specifically set up to handle this type of 
inmate . 60 	The manager must, therefore, be aware of personality types 
and traits and design his operating procedures to accommodate them. 
59 For example, Jika Jika (presently closed after inmate deaths) in 
Pentridge Prison, Victoria, Katingal (presently closed), Long Bay, 
NSW, and the Special Unit, Barlinnie Prison, Glasgow Scotland. 
60For example, Peterhead Prison, Scotland. 
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A 
In the last two decades, there has been a noticeable change away from 
the strictly authoritarian 	typology 	of 	imprisonment. 	Prior to this, 
inmates accepted that this was the established order. 	This is not to 
suggest that they acquiesced with it as the various disturbances 	nd 
riots, too numerous to detail here, show otherwise. 	The movement 
towards philosophical change has allowed the inmate a greater say in his 
institutional stay. 	With the implementation of various programmes 
educational, 	therapeutic, 	hobby and technical - the inmate, 	within 
reason, can determine his activity during his sentence. This, combined 
with a 'humane' approach by management, has tended to shift the balance 
of power in the institution to the inmate. 61 
The prison has no control over the number or characteristics of inmates 
sentenced by the courts, and must command a variety of techniques to 
meet particular challenges (these are included later). Can a 
demographic survey of crime predict what types and categories of inmates 
the prison will receive? Certain types of crime are endemic in society 
and it can be taken that most prison systems contain all, or most of the 
following elements: traffic offenders, fine defaulters, petty theft, 
burglary and stealing, assaults, robbery with violence, rape and 
attempted rape, homicide, manslaughter, murder and attempted murder. 
Whilst this list is not exclusive, it generalises types of crimes most 
likely to have been committed by serving inmates. There are, of course, 
inmates who have committed offences which have political motives, for 
example, the IRA and Paramilitary Protestant Organisations held in 
61 Clifford, W, Rights and Obligations in a Prison,  Canberra: 1982, 
Australian Institute of Criminology, p.58. 
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Northern Irish Prisons. 62 
In Australia, the only group represented in prisons disproportionate to 
their numbers are the Aboriginals. 	Most of these appear to be held in 
the 	Northern 	Territory 	Prison 	System 	with 	of fences 	being 	mainly 
drunkenness and disturbing the peace. 63 In the last decade the 
proportion of offenders being sentenced for drug-related crimes has 
become more significant. Managers must consider these trends and make 
arrangements to house these various groups so that the functioning of 
the prison is not disturbed by their Dresenc 	- as a result of an 
in-group power struggle. 	This in turn leads to a consideration of 
managerial techniques used to facilitate the prison's smooth running. 
Managerial Techniques 3:4 
The first, and probably best known, managerial technique for the inmate 
is the classification process. Each inmate soon after his arrival is 
assessed and classified to a particular category depending on his age, 
crime, biography, and potential for violence. 	He may be classified as 
minimum, maximum, or extremely high risk. 	Where he is placed to serve 
his sentence will depend largely upon the number of institutions the 
particular prison system has available. Victoria, for example, had 12 
institutions in 1985 ranging from prison farms - for minimum security 
inmates - to the State's maximum security facility, Pentridge Prison, 
1 
62The Maze Prison in Belfast being probably the most famous, or 
infamous, of these. 
63Australian Prison Trends, Australian Institute of Criminology, 
1987 Statistics. 
126 
Melbourne. 64 	The English system had 66 establishments in 1976 for 
adult males. 65 	Scotland, on the other hand, had 12 prisons of varying 
categories for adult males in 1982. 66 	At the other end of the scale 
is, for example, the Tasmanian prison system which, at present, operates 
a prison farm and a maximum security prison at Risdon, Hobart (see 
Chapter IV) for adult mates. 
It 	has 	been 	claimed 	that 	the 	first 	aim 	of 	classification 	is 	the 
identification of high risk prisoners. 67 Surveys of Australian prisons 
show a disproportionate bias towards maximum security institutions. 68 
The New South Wales prison system, for example, 
is heavily weighted in favour of maximum security in terms both of 
the number of maximum security institutions in existence, and the 
high number of prisoners who are incarcerated under a maximum-
security regime. 69 
The second major objective of the classification system, it has been 
argued, 	is the rehabilitation of prisoners. 70 	Classification should be 
an instrument whereby rehabilitative programmes can be tailored for 
64Office of Corrections, Annual Reports, Victoria, 1984-85. 
65Prisons and the Prisoner: The work of the Prison Service in England  
and Wales, London: 1977, HMSO, pp.145-150. 
66The Scottish Penal System, Factsheet 18, 1982, Scottish Information 
Office, pp.14-15. 
67 Tomasic, R, Dobinson, I, The Failure of Imprisonment, Sydney: 1979, 
Allen & Unwin, pp. 122-124. 
68 ibid, p.41. 
69 ibid. 
70 ibid, p.42. 
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specific individuals. 7 	However, 	Tomasic and Dobinson suggest that 
where the emphasis is on maximum security this comes into 
direct conflict with the professed concern for the 'rehabilitative' 
needs of orisoners. 72 
They claim "minimum security prisons would be more suitable". 73 	Given 
the Australian emphasis there is little evidence of rehabilitation in 
the classification process. 74 
A second managerial technique directed towards the inmate is the 
allocation of work within the prison. 	Again, the size and type of 
institution will determine prison labour. Some prisons offer a 
wide-ranging choice whilst others are curtailed because of number of 
jobs available compared with the number of inmates held. 75 If given a 
choice, most managers would prefer that all inmates - apart from those 
segregated for some reason or other from the main prison population - 
work. The rationale behind this is that 'idle time makes for mischief'. 
Some jurisdictions in America and Australia make working an option for • 
inmates. 	The inmate is encouraged to work with a quid-pro-quo reduction 
in sentence. 76 	Other systems place primary emphasis on inmate labour, 




75For example, the Pentridge Prison in Victoria has many inmates 
sitting in prison divisions on a daily basis because of the lack of 
• suitable work. Again, the somewhat altruistically named Central 
Industrial Prison (CIP ) in the Long Bay Complex, Sydney has no 
prison labour except for daily cleaning chores. 
76 For example, NSW. 
128 
and a refusal to work on the inmates part can result in loss of 
remission and/or privileges. 77 
A third technique is the allocation of privileges and the allotment or • 
removal of remission on sentence. This pattern of management action 
does not affect those inmates who have short sentences or life sentences 
as far as remission is concerned. Most short sentence inmates have no 
remission to gain and those sentenced to life, likewise, do not qualify 
for remission. 	Privileges may be increased visiting rights, telephone 
calls, 	radios or televisions in cells, canteen purchasing facilities, or 
they may be as simple as extra letter writing, permission to wear track 
shoes instead of prison-issue footwear, or even a 'late-night' for study 
purposes. 	The astute manager can grade these privileges according to 
inmate behaviour. 	He, however, must be wary about removing these 
privileges as "yesterday's privileges become today's rights". 78 
Concomitantly, the arbitrary granting or removal of inmate remission may 
cause discontent amongst both staff and inmates - for differing reasons 
- thereby, adding to managerial tension. 
A fourth, and more increasingly used, practice is the segregation of 
types of inmates into small self-contained units. 	These units have been 
developed 	to 	cater 	for, 	in 	some 	instances, 	uncontrollable 	and 
unmanageable inmates. 79 	Others have been created to keep inmates 
77 For example, Tasmania. 
78Clifford, op.cit. , pp. 3-4. 
79For example, the special unit in Barlinnie Prison, Glasgow. See 
Boyle, OP.Cit. 	for a full description. 
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segregated for other reasons." 	Some have grown from single rooms into 
separate divisions. 81 	The establishment of these sections within the 
prison has led to a practice known as 'unit management'. 	Basically, the 
staff designated to participate in this section are chosen on the basis 
of their skills and expertise. Normally, they are seconded in a 
semi-permanent basis so that the inmates get used to the same faces and, 
hopefully, some kind of reciprocity is set up between staff and inmates. 
In the Scottish system, volunteers manned these units with the exception 
being the Governor in charge of the unit. 82 The staffing and 
functioning of these types of units have created further managerial 
problems. 
In some jurisdictions, staff working in the units have been labelled 
'crim lovers' 83 and ostracised by their fellow workmates. 84 Inmates, 
too, have had serious doubts regarding the 'human approach' by staff 
and, sometimes, request to return to the main prison where they 
understand the system with its age old 'us and them' dichotomy. 85 Some 
staff associations disagree with a permanent rostering system preferring 
to see all staff work each post in the prison on a rotational basis. 
There may, however, be ulterior motives behind these association 
80For example, the AlDs units set up in both Pentridge and Long Bay. 
81 Mainly prison hospitals encompassing all medical services and 
ancillary functions. 
82See Coyle., op.cit., pp.20I-208. 
83See Boyle, op.cit. 
85ibid. 
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actions. 86 	It 	would 	seem perhaps that the mechanics of prison 
management tQchniques are simply a response to the individual 
environment and that any consideration must take into account the myriad 
variables impinging on the manager's incumbency. His interaction with 
staff and inmate alike, and the methods he uses to facilitate prison 
functioning, are increasingly subject to outside pressure. It may be as 
Coyle comments on the Scottish Prison System, that managers are no 
longer managing their institutions. The trinity of centralised head 
of fices, prison officer unions, and inmate power may have forced 
managers into a more participative form of management than they are 
willing to admit . 87 
A result of the overcrowding problem in Australian prisons has been the 
movement to keep inmates occupied and alleviate the boredom caused by 
the lack of prison labour. Some States are drawing upon concepts 
approved in other systems, 88 for example, 'humane containment' - or as 
normal an environment as possible. 
When introducing a concept such as. 'societal normalisation' into prison, 
one of the compounded difficulties lies in deciding what is the most apt 
form of 'normalisation' to be implemented. 	What is normal practice for 
86For example, the Tasmanian Prison Officers' association 
successfully lobbied the Prison Management to introduce rotating 
rosters in 'N' division - the punishment and protection wing in 
Risdon Prison - simply because the permanent staff in 'N' Division 
belonged to the Tasmanian Public Service Association - the minor 
union within the prison. This change by management has created 
further problems. See Chapter V. 
"Coyle, OD . Cit  
88Victoria, for example, has contracted the Director of Prisons 
position to a high ranking English Prison Governor. His mandate is 
for three years. He is attempting to introduce concepts to 
Victoria from England. Conversation with T Abbot, Director of 
Prisons, 23.8.87. 
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one segment of society may be deviant to another. 	When pressure groups 
lobby for change in prisons, they present some formula which they claim 
will help the inmate cope with imprisonment and help him ad just to life 
outside. 	These ideas are considered by representatives of those with an 
interest in the prison system. 	Since many of these suggestions conflict 
with actual practice some compromise is usually reached. The 
implementation, however, remains in the hands of bureaucrats who see the 
normalisation process as being on their middle class terms. The inmate 
and his lobbyists perceive it quite differently. 
Programmes, Problems of Implementation and Evaluation 3:5 
The practicalities of operating any programme are determined by many 
factors. 	Most importantly, the concept it self has to have a sound 
theoretical base, and a proven record of success, before 	it can be 
transposed to another situation. 	Additionally, those policy !makers who 
seek to implement such a programme must fully understand, not only the 
programme ," 	but 	the 	unintended 	consequences 	which 	flow 	from 
implementation. 	Further, the structure of the prison system - both 
hierarchical and physical - has to be amenable to such a policy. 	The 
old cliche about a square peg in a round hole applies 	in such a 
situation. 	Those 	who 	control 	the 	running of pr isons 	must 	first 
determine the primary purpose of the prison: 	is it for 	custody or 
treatment? 	Also, there are inherent difficulties in translating general 
goals into specific prison-level activities. 
Programme adaptation suffers similarly. 	A prescribed philosophy must 
take into account various factors such as staff, c liente le, 	physical 
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surroundings, funding and equipment. 	If a programme has found a modicum 
of success in one institution this does not necessarily guarantee the 
same rate of success at another. It does appear, however, that 
'successful' programmes have a 'trickle-down' effect into other prisons. 
Administrators and managers meet at various conferences and report the 
success of a particular programme. The rudiments are brought back to 
the individual manager's system and are then applied - albeit in a 
modified fashion to suit the different requirements of the institution.. 
As Palumbo has pointed out, the result is usually negligible. 89 
There are many problems associated with the implementation of any 
programme. 	Apart from the common staffIfinance shortages so frequently 
found in the prison setting, there is the basic difficulty of 
introducing a programme into circumstances which may be fundamentally 
antipathetic. Very few prison programmes are original. As a concept, 
rehabilitation was designed to help 're-educate' the inmate to the error 
of his ways and, hopefully, prepare him to be a 'normal' member of 
society upon his release. However, the setting of his re-education 
the prison 	is by definition a place for isolating him from the 
'normal' society. 	The structure and surroundings are a constant 
reminder of what he is, and why he is there. 	The programme's potential 
for success may therefore founder at the point of its implementation in 
the prison environment. 
Of prime importance in getting a desired programme implemented is its 
acceptance by both staff and inmates. 	This is particularly true where 
89 Palumbo, op.cit.  
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either side suspects that implementation will bring a change in the 
pattern of established interaction. 	When faced by innovation, each 
group will try 	to assert 	its influence to 	maintain the status quo 
enjoyed prior to policy change. If one group gains added power the 
other may provoke trouble for management in the form of disturbances by 
inmates or industrial behaviour by staff. The traditional pattern of 
interaction between officer and inmate prior to World War II was of 
keeper and kept, watcher and watched. 	Each side had its own set of 
rules - formal and informal. 	No deviations from this pattern were 
offered or expected. 	Officers were recruited mainly on their ability to 
maintain order and discipline. 	Inmates who failed to obey, or created a 
disturbance, could thus be coerced by brute force into submission. 
Prison rules and regulations were to be strictly obeyed by both officers 
and inmates. Thus, interactions between staff and inmates and all 
movements within the prison were guided by official legislation. 
However, when rehabilitation was newly promoted, no. provision was made 
in the rules and regulations to guide those within the prison and help 
them adapt to the changing philosophy. A 'humanitarian' approach was 
suddenly the order of the day, but the expected focus of change was 
handicapped by rigid staff procedural practice. 	Staff training was 
based on custody and control. 	The officer recruit had to display a 
proficiency in the prison's primary task of achieving order and avoiding 
conflict. If the recruit failed in this, then, no matter what he was 
worth, he was judged unsuitable for prison work. 
The implementation of new concepts or programmes in prisons suffer from 
lack of understanding or trust by both staff and inmates in the 
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institution. 	Staff are extremely conservative by nature. 	They view new 
and changing practices as a further diminution of their authority. 
Their bureaucratic 'bible' - rules and regulations - guides them during 
their tour of duty. When a new practice is introduced, unless it is 
catered for by the 'bible', the officer is at a loss as how to approach 
the situation. 	Invariably, he falls back on his customary position of 
management being 'all for the inmate'. 	He suspects management of 
providing 	funds 	for 	inmate 	programmes 	to 	the 	detriment 	of 	his 
'professional' development, for example, training. Normal prison 
officer recruiting requirements (see Bullard) mean that his potential 
for understanding . the practice, . yet alone implementing it, is 
questionable. 
A second barrier to implementation is prisoner attitude. 	The basic _ 
problem 	here 	lies 	in 	infiltrating 	the 	informal 	system 	of 	inmate 
subculture which determines the actions and reaction of those who are 
imprisoned. 	Berk90 identified two types of informal organisation among 
inmates. 	One was supportive of the official structure and the other was 
antagonistic to it. Berk suggested that the goal of treatment 
encourages the development of the former and the goal of custody the 
latter. However, this is questionable. 91 The problems faced - by 
inmates in the custodial institution tend to be more severe and, in 
addition, inmates perceive the custodial institution itself to be 
90Berk, B B, "Organisational goals and inmate organisation", 
,Amer.J Soc., 71, 1966, pp.522-535. 
91 For example, Martinson's argument does not support Berk's claim. 
Martinsen(1974) op.cit. 
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responsible for their problems. 	As a result, they band together in 
opposition to the prison and its administration, which they see as the 
source of their frustrations. 92 Berk goes on to say that, 
consequently, inmate subcultures tend to be dominated by 'professional' 
criminals who impose their values on the rest of the inmates, thereby 
further emphasising the strict demarcation between the officers and the 
inmates, 
since these groups 'are seen as fundamentally in opposition to one 
another .3 
The difficulty in appraising the benefits of this system to the inmates 
are several. The new inmate will evaluate the programmes in ignorance 
of prevailing practice and fail to recognise their innovative quality. 
The recidivist may regard the change as purely cosmetic - a sufficient 
concession but no more. The short-sentenced prisoner because of 
remission and partly suspended sentence may serve only a little time, 
and therefore be excluded from the available programmes. Some will not 
wish to participate for a variety of reasons. 
What do Tasmanian inmates regard as normalisation programmes or 
techniques? In a survey conducted by staff, and this author, in the 
education section of HMP Risdon, inmates' choices were initially grouped 
into five categories: education (E); vocational training (VT); 
recreation (R ); counselling (C) and religion (RN). 94 	A broadsheet then 
92Berk, op.cit, p.527 
93 ibid. 
94 Adapted from correctional models and programmes by Joplin, J W, 
and Hendricks, J E, 'Correctional Management: A Philosophical 
Perspective', Corrections Today, 1981, pp.85-88, 43, 6. 
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listed these five categories, and inmates were asked to order their 
preference from I to 5 - with I representing high priority and 5 low 
priority. Table I gives the results of the survey. 
T.NBLE I 
VT R C 
HIGH 1 25 0 11 4 
2 9 15 9 4 
3 4 14 8 13 
4 2 10 8 15 
LOW 5 0 1 4 4 
Inmate Category Choices N 	40 
Over 50% favoured education courses as their first choice, while 75% put 
religion at the bottom of their list. 	None of the surveyed listed 
vocational 	training as 	their 	first 	choice 	but 	over 25% preferred 
recreational 	activities 	over 	anything 	else. 	While 	the 	results 
themselves 	are 	not 	significant 	in 	a 	statistical 	sense, 	the 	sample 
indicates how one fifth of H MP Risdon inmates list their priorities. It 
may be, however, that these inmates' voting patterns are representative 
neither of the prison as a whole, nor of Australian prisons in general. 
The choices of categories determined by Risdon inmates may also be a 
reflection on the programmes offered in this system. However, it may be 
suggested that education does hold a prominent position in most prison 
establishments, and that this programme could be pivotal in the supply 
of other programmes or introduction of changing rehabilitative 
techniques. 	The measurement of educational practices is far more 
advanced 	than 	the 	measurement 	of, 	for 	example, 	an 	elusive 
rehabilitation. 	The 	increasing 	trend 	by 	Australian 	prison 








programmes for prisoners ( DPP ) may indicate that they are now searching 
for a concept which can be quantitatively measured . 95 
A third problem for prison managers wishing to implement new programmes 
is the 'specialist' who arranges or takes part in the specific format. 
He could be from a variety of disciplines, for example, psychiatry, 
psychology, social work, teaching, or medical. 	Staff and inmates 
perceive him differently. 	The officer may think that he - the 
specialist - is another 'do-gooder' and comes to prison to help the 
inmate make life easier. 	The officer will maintain that the inmates are 
'only pulling the wool over their eyes' and that he - the officer 	is 
better placed to judge inmate behaviour due to his day-to-day contact. 
The inmate, on the other hand, may see the specialist - especially 
psychiatrists and psychologists as being part of the legal process 
whch sentenced them and that their major mandate is not to cure, but to 
substantiate the decision to incarcerate. 
The evaluation of policy implementation is complicated by two major 
problerns. 96 One is the question of whether programmes should be 
essentially the same in each location where they are implemented or 
changed so as to be able to fit into the local embedding context. 97 
How far can the adaptation of a programme go before it is no longer a 
"faithful rendition" of the original policy or programme. 98 The 
95Noad, B M (ed) Developmental Programmes for Prisons, Seminar 
Proceedings, No. 5, October, 1984, AIC, Canberra. 




difficulty 	in formulating a specific programme for an institution lies 
in the area of programme origin. 	Most programmes have elements from 
other systems or institutions whilst some are borrowed en bloc. 	What is 
successful in another location may fail as a transplant. 	Successful 
implementation, therefore, is contingent upon the specific circumstances 
in which the programme is being implemented. What is successful in one 
context may not be in another . 99 
Palumbo has suggested the second major problem to be 
the question of what the research purpose is in evaluating the 
implementation of programmes. 100 
So, 
Is the purpose to reach generalisations about the implementation 
process or is it to improve implementation in the specific location 
where it is being evaluated. 101 
When 	introducing 	policies, 	Palumbo has 	suggested that there are 
generalisations 	which 	are 	close 	to 	being 	laws. 	Among 	these 
generalisations, 102  the most salient are that 
Government policies are bound to be general in character and tend 
to be incomprehensible except by reference to practice: 	In the 
world of 	politics, 	all policies (even those that 	involve hard 
technologies) 	have 	multiple objectives: 	Those who implement 
government policies have values of their own and will give meanings 
that they prefer to the policy; 	Conflict is an unavoidable part of 
policy 	formulation 	and 	implementation; 	Implementation 	is 
intrinsically an interactive process based on give-and-take and on 
99 ibid, p.19 
100ibid , p . 1 . 
101ibid . 
102For a full list of generalisations see pp. 6-7. 
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trial-and-error". 1 ° 3 
The conclusion reached by Palumbo is that an adaptive implementation 
strategy is the "most appropriate one in all government programmes". 104 
Programmes will not be the same in each location but will be adapted 
and modified to fit into specific needs and circumstances. 
PRISON OFFICERS UNIONS 3:6 
Whilst 	it 	is 	recognized 	that 	prisons are a 	'necessary 	evil', 	it 	is 
erroneous to believe that it is only prison administrators who make 
policy. The management of prisons is determined by several conflicting 
elements including social and political philosophies, and the emergence 
of pressure groups such as prisoner action groups and women behind bars. 
In recent times a further lobby has arrived - the prison officers union. 
This .group now seems to have a major input into determining whether 
policy will be implemented, or rejected. Also it is the union hierarchy 
.which can be influential in formulating the future role of the prison 
officer. If, as in England, the union leaders push for a more useful 
role for the front-line officer, then management must consider what 
implications this will have on the overall running of prisons. On the 
other hand, if, as in Australia and America, unions see management as-
encroaching on the customary practice of 'keeping and watching' then any 
statements to the contrary by the union executive on the role of the 
base-grade officer are only meaningless diatribes. 
10 3 pa idm bo, op.cit. , p. 7 . 
104ibid . 
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Union hierarchies are 	usually 	composed of 	the 	'long-serving' 	officer 
element who are, in the main, survivors of the 'us and them' mentality. 
The 	'us 	and 	them' 	has 	two 	components 	officer/inmate 	and 
of ficer/management . Traditionally, officers have been recruited from 
working class backgrounds and the 'us and them' mentality has been 
carried into the prison and enhanced by the duality of inmate and 
management interaction. Thus, any movement to break down the customary 
antagonisms is met with scepticism and suspicion by union leaders who 
see their role as protecting the custodial authority once implicit in 
the prison officer. Therefore, any approach by management to 'humanise' 
inmate conditions is met with claims that prison authorities are more 
concerned with those who have broken the law than those who are employed 
to keep the lawbreakers locked away from society. It appears 
paradoxical that union leaders wish to 'professionalise' the service yet 
resist any attempts to involve their membership in any interaction 
with inmates that calls for a more humanitarian approach. 
CONCLUSION 37 
It has been argued that the prison manager's position is subject to many 
constraints - both simple and complex - and his role within the prison 
organisation is not one of directing, but rather one of conciliation. 
He becomes victim to philosophical change and like his charges - both 
staff and inmates - he has to adapt to the Changing climate. Whereas 
the staff and inmates have avenues for redress - prison management in 
the first instance, visiting dignitaries, central authority and, 
finally, Government - his channels are few. 	His support by peers will 
depend upon their view on how the situation arose, what steps he took to 
14 1 
counter it and the subsequent results. 	He is subject to pressures n o t 
only from the staff and inmates but from his contemporaries and his 
peers. He is also indirectly subject to pressure groups advocating 
penal reform and changes of Government which issue in the denunciation 
of previous Government prison policy. He is at the mercy of the media 
because, as a public servant, he cannot comment individually, but only 
through the medium of his union or association - if one exists. He wins 
no 	sympathy 	from 	the 	public, 	staff, 	or 	inmates, 	if 	his 	actions 
precipitate a strike or disturbance which reduces normal servicing of 
• 
prisoners. 	Many managers fail for a variety of reasons: 	psychosomatic 
and 	nervous 	illness, 	dependency 	on 	alcohol 	and 	drugs, 	growing 
frustration with the system or fear of physical attack. 	Many are held 
captive by the system because of age, qualification and expertise. 	It 
is fair comment that once found wanting in one system, the ex-manager's 
chance for re-employment in another are minimal. 
CHAPTER IV 
HMP RISDON 
HMP Risdon is the Tasmanian Prison System's single maximum security 
facility for male inmates. 	It is situated on a 37- hectare block on 
Hobart's eastern shore. 	HMP Risdon (hereafter known as Risdon Prison) 
was opened on 23 November 1960 1 to replace the Campbell Street Goal 
which was closed by Government decree - being dilapidated, insecure and 
costly to maintain. Upon opening, Risdon Prison was the only prison in 
the Commonwealth which accommodated its inmates in single cells 
connected to the sewerage system. Originally built to house 342 
inmates, the prison has a present capability of providing bed space for 
354. 2 
Until September 1985, the prison was part of the then Prisons Department 
- a separate Department within the Tasmanian Government Public Service. 
However, a rationalisation of legal agencies - Attorney-General, 
Corporate Affairs, Crown Law, Prison, and Register-General - saw the 
creation of the Law Department. 3 The Division of the Law Department 
known as Corrective Services came into being officially on Sunday 1 
September 1985, with the proclamation of the commencement of the Prison 
Amendment Act and the Corrective Services (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 
of 1985. 4 The creation of the Division had brought together under one 
'See Controller of Prisons submission to the Grubb Enquiry, op.cit., 
appendix N, p.2. 
21ncludes the Prison Hospital 28 beds, and a new section of N 
division creating an extra 20 beds. However, S Division, 4 beds, 
is now closed, and A-F Divisions lost two cells each for staff 
offices and toilets. 
3 See The Mercury (Hobart) 13.11.82. -- 
4Law Department, Corrective Services Division Staff Newsletter, 
undated, 1985. 
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Head - the Director of Corrective Services - the Prisons Service and the 
Probation and Parole Service and, according to the Secretary of the Law 
Department, this amalgamation would 
permit the development of a unified approach to corrections 
philosophy, training of officers, and the treatment of offenders. ) 
The Tasmanian Prison System consists of Risdon Prison; 	a separate 
female institution which can accommodate 24 inmates, and is situated on 
the main Risdon property; 	a prison farm at Hayes, in the Den.vent 
Valley, which has bed space for 70 male inmates; 	a. prison at the Police 
Headquarters building in Launceston which is a temporary holding centre 
where prisoners are held prior to being transferred to Risdon; and 
finally, a medium security prison - again situated on the main Risdon 
property which can house 36 inmates, but is presently closed. 
Additionally, under Sections 4 & 5 (1A) of the Prison Act (1977) along 
with Statutory Rules 1986, prisons were proclaimed in Devonport (No.146) 
Launceston (No. 147 ) and Burnie (No.148 ). 6 These prisons are actually 
police lockups but the proclamation brings their operation and manning 
under the ambit of the Director of Corrective Services. 
The Prison System is staffed by both uniformed and custodial staff and 
civilians (See Figure 1) who are employed under the Public Service Award 
- mainly in the General Officer category. 	At the apex of the uniformed 
hierarchy is the Chief Superintendent. 	This is a recently created 
position ( 1985 ) and replaced the former senior uniformed office of 
5 ibid. 
6Law Department file, 9/1/1. 
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Superintendent - previously known as Governor. 	After the Legislative 
Council in Tasmania had passed all stages of the Prisons Amendment Bill, 
Figure 1: 	Details of 	Prison Service Staffing: 
17 Administration staff, 	drivers and storekeepers 
Education Officer 
Recreation and Amenities Officer 
Welfare Officer 
Fire Officer 
Risdon Prison Dept Chief Supt 1 
Principal PO 1 
Chief PO 9 
Senior PO 17 
Trade Instructors 14 
Prison Officers 112 154 
Maintenance and Service Staff 5 
Nursing Staff Nursing Officer-in-Charge 1 
Nurses 6 7 
Female Prison Supt 1 
Dept Supt 1 
Prison Officers 5 7 
Farm 	Supt 1 
Chief PO 
Senior PO 2 
Prison Officers 10 
Drivers Sc Service Staff 3 17 
211 
7 
1984, and the Corrective Services Amendment Bill, 1984, the way was 
cleared for the appointment of a Director of Corrective Service, 
(replacing the former position of Controller of Prisons), a Chief 
Superintendent (replacing the Superintendent), and a Deputy Chief 
Super intendent. 8 This last position did not replace the position of 
7Law Department. Consolidated Fund. Appropriation Bilk 1986-87, 
Division 17, Explanatory Notes, p.1827. 
8Law Department file 20/23/1. 
145 
Deputy 	Superintendent 	which 	remains 	as 	such, 	although 	presently 
unfilled. 	Senior managerial positions at Risdon were to have been the 
Chief Superintendent, 	Deputy-Chief Superintendent, and an Assistant 
Superintendent of Prisons . 9 	But, by 9 June 1985, the Secretary of the 
Law Department indicated to a meeting of the Correctional Services 
Implementation Committee that the Assistant Superintendent position had 
been deleted from the 1985/86 Estimates. 10 Therefore, at present, the 
senior uniformed management staff consist of the chief and Deputy-Chief 
Superintendents. 
Prison staff are arranged hierarchically in a typical Weberian Legal 
Rational Bureaucratic authority structure ( see Figure 2). At the top is 
the Chief Superintendent whose function is to be "responsible for the 
daily management of the Prison Service"." 
Figure 2: H MP Risdon Hobart, Tasmania, Formal Authority Structure  
CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT 
DEPUTY CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT 
PRINCIPAL PRISON OFFICER 
1  
CHIEF PRISON OFFICERS 
SENIOR PRISON OFFICERS 
PRISON OFFICERS 
9 Minutes of la meeting of Corrective Services Division Implementation 
Committee, 29. 3.85. 
10 ibid , 21.6.85. 
1 lLaw Department Corrective Services Division Prison Standing Orders, 
ODI ( I ). 
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Next 	in 	the 	hierarchy, 	and 	directly 	responsible 	to 	the 	Chief 
Superintendent is the Deputy-Chief Superintendent. 	This position is 
responsible 
for the due order, management and discipline of the prison under 
his charge. 12 
The third ranking uniformed position is the Deputy Superintendent 
(presently unfilled). 	Apart from taking over the role of Deputy-Chief 
Superintendent during his absence, the Deputy, among others, is 
responsible to the Deputy-Chief Superintendent "for the due order and 
discipline of the prison". 13 Under the Deputy Superintendent is the 
position of Principal Prison Officer. His role is to 
perform such duties as may be allotted to him by the Chief 
Superintendent and, in the absence of the Deputy Superintendent, 
or, where there is no Deputy Superintendent, he shall perform the 
duties pertaining to the office of Deputy Superintendent. 14 
Below this level the hierarchy of uniformed custodial staff begins to 
flatten out. Although there is no mention of direct responsibility to 
the Principal Prison Officer, the next ranking level is Chief Prison 
Officer (CPO). At Risdon Prison there are nine 'CPO' positions. CPOs 
are in charge of the daily work shifts, for example, 6am - 2pm and 2pm - 
I 2 ibid, 002 (1)(A) 
13 ibid, OD3( I ). 
14 ibid, 3D4( I ). 
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10 pm, while the night shift, 10 pm - 6 am, is controlled by a Senior 
Prison Officer. 	There is a 9am - 5pm 'spare' CPO who looks after 
prisoner sports at the weekends and assists the Principal Prison Officer 
during weekdays. 	CPOs also man the prison surveillance system from 7 am 
- 5pm (two CPOs normally share this duty, working 2 hours apiece). One 
final CPO position is that of fulltime security officer. 	All CPOs work 
on a 7 day roster. 	The Chief, in the absence of the Principal Prison 
Officer, 
may perform duties pertaining to the office of Principal Prison 
Officer. 15 
The Principal Prison Officer and the Chief Prison Officers are the 
equivalent of 'foremen' or 'middle management' in the prison. 
The last ranking officer before the base-grade level custodial staff is 
the Senior Prison Officer (SPO). 	There are 17 gazetted positions for 
this rank. 	His role is to 
perform such duties as may be allocated to him ... and in the 
absence of a Chief Prison Officer may perform the duties pertaining 
to the office of Chief Prison Officer. 16 
The lowest rank in the hierarchy is the base-grade prison officer. 
_ 
There are approximately 115 men working in this position although 
numbers sometime reach 126 and as low as 100, depending on resignations 
and retirements. The base-grade officer carries out his allotted duties 
under the direction of the Chief Prison Officer in charge of the daily 
shift. 
15 ibid, 0D4(2). 
16 ib id, 0D4(3). 
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The 	prison 	contains 	several 	discrete, 	hut 	not 	mutually 	exclusive 
elements: 	the administration block, situated just outside the main gaol 
fence perimeter; 	the education section and library, which - are separate 
units but housed together in the education block; 	the machinery plant; 
the 	prison 	workshops 	- 	laundry, 	woodwork, 	Da i n t sh op , 	tinsmiths, 
tailorshop, kitchen and bakehouse; 	the prison hospital - attached to 
the rear wall of the prison; 	reception area for processing inmates; 
the 	cell 	blocks 	(called 	divisions): 	and a 	separate punishment and 
isolation unit (see Figure 3). Apart from the administration block and 
machinery plant, prison officers are rostered to all of these areas as 
well as the surveillance towers at the corners of the prison (there are 
four towers but two are presently closed). They are rostered on a 7 day 
cycle working a variety of shifts, for example, 6am - 2pm, 7am - 3pm, 
7.30am - 4.30pm, Sam - 5pm, 9am - 5pm, 9.30am - 5.30pm, 2pm - lOpm, and 
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Risdon Prison houses all classes and categories of inmates. 	There is a 
separate remand section called H division (see Figure 3) where those who 
are awaiting trial, have filed to secure bail, or are appealing against 
conviction or severity of sentence are held. 	Their daily routine is 
similar to other inmates with one exception - they do not work. 
remandee, however, may elect to work and 'signs over'. 	If he is 
allocated to a workshop, he will be moved to a sentenced inmate-, 
division. 	Whilst on remand he is allowed two visits per week whereas 
the sentenced inmate has one half hour visit per fortnight. 	By 'signing 
over' the remandee forfeits the two visits per week and has the same 
visiting privileges as a sentenced inmate. 	Once the inmate has been 
sentenced, 	he 	appears 	before 	the 	prison 	classification 	committee. 
Members 	of 	the committee include the Chief Superintendent, 	the 
Deputy-Chief Superintendent, the Principal Prison Officer, a Chief 
Prison Officer, the Welfare Officer and the Nursing Officer in Charge. 
This committee determines the prisoner's security rating and progress in 
the system. The classification process includes interviews to determine 
the age of the offender (see Figure 4), the type of crime committed (see 
Figure 5'), whether a first timer or recidivist (see Figure 6), medical 
history and/or psychiatric prognosis, and the length of sentence (see 
Figure 7). These details all enable the classification committee to 
allocate him a position within the prison system - unless he needs 
protection. 
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Figure 4: 	Number of Prisoners Received by Age, Tasmania, 1984-35. 
Age 	 Prisoners Received 
(Years) 	 Males 	 Females 
	
Under 19 	 84 	 4 
19 - 20 79 3 
21 - 24 	 146 	 3 
24 - 29 110 5 
— 30 - 34 	 74 	 2 
35 - 39 46 2 
Not Known 	 2 	 0 _ 
. TOTAL 
	
619* 	 22 
17 
Figure 5: 	Imprisonments by Most Serious Offence, Tasmania, 1984-85. 
Imprisonments 
Most serious offence (a ) 
Number 	Percent 
Offences against the person 	 71 	 10.2 
Robbery and extortion 	 5 0.7 
Breaking and entering fraud and other 
offences involving theft 	 232 	 33.3 
Property damage and environmental offences 	25 3.6 
Offences against good order 	 135 	 19.4 
Drug of fences 	 29 4.2 
Motor vehicle, traffic and related offences 	198 	 28.4 
Other of fences 	 1 0. 1 
Not known 	 1 	 0.1 
Total 
	
697 	 100.0 
(a ) Where a prisoner is sentenced for more than one offence, the most 
serious of fence has been counted. 	This is the offence resulting 
in the longest sentence. 	
18 
I 7Tasmanian Year Book, No. 20: 1986, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
Tasmanian Office, p.92.* 
18 ibid. 
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Figure 6: Number of Prisoners received 
Number of Imprisonments in previous years 
Age 0 1 2 3+ 	Not known 	Total 
Under 	19 49 22 9 8 	- 	88 
19 	- 	20 42 28 14 9 	- 	82 
21 	- 	24 57 33 17 47 	- 	149 
25 - 29 43 16 10 46 	- 	115 
30 - 	34 28 9 1 38 	- 	76 
35 - 	39 18 3 7 20 	- 	48 
40 - 44 15 2 4 12 	- 	33 
45 - 49 7 3 2 4 	- 	16 
50 - 	59 12 1 - 6 	- 	19 
60+ 5 4 - 4 	- 	13 
Not known 1 
TOTAL 277 110 59 194 	1 	641 
(a) by 	age and number of imprisonments 	in 	previous years 
1986, and 
(b) convicted prisoners received twice or more in a year are 
counted only once in that year. 	
19 
19 Pocket Year Book of Tasmania, 1987, ABS. 
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Figure 7: Length of Sentences, Tasmania, 1984-85  
Percentage of 
Length of Sentence 	 imprisonments  
Life 	 1.0 
10. years or more 	 0.1 
2 to under 5 years 	 2.7 
1 to under 2 years 	 8.0 
6 months to under 1 year 	 19.5 
3 months to under 6 months 21.2 
1 month to under 3 months 
	
22.0 
8 days to under 1 month 
	
18.2 
7 days or less 
	
7.2 




July 229 January 244 
August 238 February 750 
September 243 March 267 
October 246 April 279 
November 251 May 293 




20Tasmanian Year Book, op.cit. 
2 ILaw Department explanatory notes, op.cit. , p.1836. 
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The number of inmates held in Risdon has fluctuated from a daily average 
high of 380 in the early 1970s and 1980s to a minimum of 203 in the 
early 1980s. Reasons for this drop included better parole facilities, 
greater use of probation, and the Tasmanian innovation of work orders, 
as well as greater leniency in sentencing by the courts. However, in 
the past two years, the daily average prison population has again risen 
(see Figure 8). Since Risdon Prison has opened there has been virtually 
no change in the daily routine of the average inmate, average, that is, 
in the sense that he is not hospitalised or separated for his own 
protection. The inmate's weekday begins at 7 am when he is unlocked and 
he is marched to breakfast. 	Hours of work - in his allotted workplace 
run from Sam to 12 noon in the morning and lpm - 4pm in the afternoon. 
He is locked in his cell at 5 pm. 
For the first three years, the new prison at Risdon maintained a purely 
custodial function. 	Then, in 1963, the first prison education officer 
was appointed, 22 to be followed by a welfare officer. 23 	In the late 
1970s, the prison hospital was completed and opened with both general 
and psychiatric nursing staff. 	This gradual diversification of internal 
function has materially affected inmate life. 	Before 1960, the only 
facility offered to inmates at Campbell Street gaol was toymaking for a 
four month period before Christmas each year. 	This contrasts with the 
amenities now available educational courses, recreational pursuits 
like art and metal work, chess and debating, television and sporting 
facilities. 
22see Grubb Report, op.cit., Appendix N. 
23ibid. 
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The progression of change in Risdon has been slow but steady. 	In 1975, 
after his evening meal, the Tasmanian inmate returned to his cell around 
5 pm, unless he was enrolled in a hobby group. When his cell was locked 
he could read, write letters, listen to the inbuilt radio until 10 pm or 
sleep. If the inmate applied to join a hobby group the restriction on 
group members and large waiting lists meant that he would probably not 
be enrolled quickly. 	Access to these groups were limited for a number 
of reasons. 	The inmate considered to be a risk had practically no 
chance of selection. 	Short-time sentenced prisoners were excluded on 
the grounds that these would derive too little benefit as they would 
soon be back in society. Others, because of infirmity or handicap, were 
passed over for selection on the basis that they would be unable to cope 
with the specific craftwork. 
Surprisingly enough, the physical structure of the prison was a catalyst 
in the offering of new services intended to aid inmates. Numerous 
complaints by the inmates about the poor quality of sound and static of 
cell inbuilt radios led the authorities to grant inmates who could 
purchase 	a 	transistor 	radio, 	the 	right 	to have one in his cell. 
owever,  , in order to prevent the practice of transferring these radios 
from inmate to inmate, the authorities issued a voucher recording the 
inmate's name and radio number. If the inmate had an unauthorised radio 
in his cell, or a radio without a 'licence' he would be charged and most 
probably lose the privilege of the radio. For those who could not 
purchase a radio or have one brought in by relatives or friends the 
Prisoner's Aid society and City Mission donated some secondhand 
transistors. Privately owned transistors resolved some proble‘ms but 
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created a new one - the rapid exhaustion of batteries. 	Eventually the 
prison management decided that batteries could be purchased from the 
prisoner's earnings. 	As the prison inmates had no legal access to 
outside toiletries or confectionery, 	the provision of a 'canteen' was 
introduced by the sporting and recreation officer. 	Inmates could 
'spend' half of their monthly earnings (normally 50 	per day) on a 
variety of goods approved by the management. This proved a popular 
innovation although limited to prisoners serving longer than 3 months. 
During the late 1970s a number of better educated inmates began to 
demand further education courses. 	The normal courses available were 
remedial to help the poorly educated inmate. 	Correspondence courses 
from South Australia and Queensland were initiated, and, various courses 
were undertaken. One inmate enrolled for tertiary study at the 
University of Tasmania and has now passed several units towards a BA. 
The role of education has expanded to the extent that another education 
officer has been added to the staff - albeit on a part-time basis. 
The prison has had an alcoholics anonymous group for a number of years 
with outside, visitors coming in to address the group members. 	Numbers 
and attendance have fluctuated. 	The club ha S been in recess largely 
because of the relative youthfulness of the present inmates. 	Another 
possible reason for its decline could be that the time has been changed 
from 6 pm, when inmates were released from cells to participate, to a 
weekend afternoon when most people play some sort of sport or watch TV. 
Chess and debating groups have flourished with outside teams competing 
against the inmates. Probably the most successful innovation has been 
the 	mini-football 	competition 	between 	the 	prison 	divisions. 	This 
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competition has fostered a group-cohesiveness previously lacking. 	The 
success of the football has led to outside teams being invited to 
participate against the prison-all-stars. One inmate was considered to 
be such a good prospect that a leading T FL club obtained his signature 
prior to the expiration of his sentence. 
In the early 1980s, several programmes on alcohol abuse were presented 
in the prison hospital. 	These were formulated in conjunction with the 
alcohol units of the John Edis Hospital - the government centre in 
Hobart specialising in alcohol and drug abuse. 	Courses ran for four 
weeks with the inmate attending the hospital on a daily basis. 	This 
exercise . has been judged to be a positive step in prisoner programming 
although there has been a lack of information as to its practical 
success. 	By far the most intensive course introduced for the inmate has 
been the pre-release Scheme formulated by the school teacher. 	This 
course runs for a week prior to the inmate's release. 	Here a number of 
outside agencies inform the inmate of the various benefits he can 
obtain, the skills he can learn and the people to approach on a variety 
of needs. Although most of the old- timers amongst the inmates see the 
programme as a waste of time, the young of fender may glean some 
information of use in his later adjustment to the outside world. 
One of the major difficulties that the Prison System in Tasmania has 
faced since the opening of Risdon Prison in 1960 is the apparent lack of 
Government philosophical commitment. Interviews with several former 
Attorneys-General  who held of f ice between 1969 and 1986 produced little 
evidence of philosophical goals applicable to Risdon, or awareness of 
inheriting any such programme . 24 Thus, prison management has, by and 
24E M Bingham, QC, 3.11.87. 
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large, 	had discretionary power from the prison's opening until 	the 
absorption of the former Prisons Department into the newly created Law 
Department in 1984• 25 An interview with the former Controller of 
Prisons - who held senior management positions from before the Risdon 
opening until his retirement in 1981 - confirmed that he had never 
consciously been given a philosophical mandate to use in Risdon Prison 
by any of his former Ministers. 26 It may well have been that as one 
former Attorney-General commented, "Prisons were not exactly at the top 
of the list" . 27 
The Liberal/Centre Party coalition won Government in 1969 from Labor 
who had held office for the previous thirty-four years. The incoming 
Attorney-General was committed to the concept of an overall Criminal 
Justice System for Tasmania. 28 His view was that prisons should be part 
of a total system and that the Risdon Prison could be used as a measure 
towards the secondary goal of rehabilitation or treatment. 29 He 
formulated his proposal after studying similar concepts in the USA . 30 
His government, however, was defeated in 1972 when Labor again took 
office and his proposal never took effect. 
G A Pearsall, MHA, 11.11.87 
M C Everett, 19.11.87. 
25See footnote 4. 






The Liberal Party gained government in its own right in 1982 and he 
again took the portfolio of A ttorney-General . 	Prior to his retirement 
from politics in 9g4, elements of his original proposal were 
implemented with the creation of a Corrective Services Division of the 
Law Department through the amalgamation of the former Prisons Department 
with the Division of Probation and Parole. However, by this time the 
general commitment to a solid philosophical base had been weakened by 
the decade on the Opposition benches "the government's not rocking the 
boat philosophy", 31 probably the disillusionment of Western Prisons 
Systems with the concept of rehabilitation, and "a priority emphasis on 
the creation of a single state legal set-up". 32 
It was mentioned at the end of the previous Chapter that the Senior 
Management Staff at Risdon had been particularly stable for Risdon's 
first decade. During the seventies and early eighties several changes 
in senior management have occurred ( see Chapter III ) . 
On the other hand, the Head of the Department (COP) and head of Division 
( DOCS ) have had ten Ministers ( Attorneys-General ) to deal with ( see 
Figure 9). 
3 'ibid. 
32 ibid. He was the only Minister to have previously held a portfolio. 
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Figure 9: Tasmanian Attorneys-General 1960-1987  
Attorneys-General 	Government 	Premier 	 Service 
R F Fagan 	 Labor 	 Reece 	 1960-69 - 
E M Bingham 	 Liberal/Centre 	Bethune 	 10.5.69 
M G Everett 	 Labor 	 Reece 	 22.4.72 
W A Neilson 	 Labor 	 Reece 	 18.5.74 
B K Miller 	 Labor 	 Neilson 	 31.3.75 
B K Miller 	 Labor 	 Lowe 	 1.12.77 
B K Miller 	 Labor 	 Holgate 	 11.11.81 
E M Bingham 	 Liberal 	 Gray 	 26.5.82 
G A Pearsall 	 Liberal 	 Gray 	 12.3.86 
J M Bennett 	 Liberal 	 Gray 	 12.3.86 
33 
Whilst these Ministerial changes have not materially affected the prison 
management function, it has meant that the Tasmanian Prison Officers 
Association (TPOA ) has become suspicious of Liberal Government Policy 
towards the Prison. The Staff Association's reaction to several Liberal 
initiatives - when in Government and Opposition - flowed on to the 
relationships previously nurtured between Prison Management and staff. 
.(The Liberal initiatives will be covered later in this Chapter - as will 
the reactions by the TPOA ) 
Like many Prison Systems, Tasmania has had its share of escapes and 
riots which add to the complex task of Prison Management. 	When the 
33adapted from the various Tasmanian Year Books, op.cit  . 
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Risdon Prison was opened it was described as "the most modern in the 
world" and "as near escape-proof as could possibly be achieved. 34 	This 
myth, 	however, 	was shattered in 	April 	1964 when three prisoners 
escaped. 35 	In April, 	1967 a deliberately lit fire destroyed the prison 
workshops with the exception of the laundry which had only superficial 
damage. 36 	This caused considerable managerial problems as most of the 
inmates worked in the now-destroyed workshops. 	It meant they had to 
remain in the Divisions during the period that they would normally have 
been at labour. The problem of having a large number of inmates with 
nothing to do except play cards, etc, normally , leads to unrest through 
boredom, with a concomitant upsurge in discipline and security 
breakdown. The reduced security situation was exacerbated by the 
delayed rebuilding of the Prison workshops, which were not completed 
until 1970. 37 However, in 1969, another three inmates escaped, 
exploding once and for all, the myth of impregnability. 38 
Alarmed at the thoughts of future escape, the Controller of Prisons 
contacted the new Liberal/Country Party Attorney-General to arrange for 
added security. 39 	The resulting discussions issued in 	a perimeter 
fence 	proposal." 	Unfortunately, 	before 	its 	installation, 	a 	mass 








breakout occured of inmates from the Remand Yard, or H Division ( see 
Figure 3 ) by climbing up on to the Division roof - the enclosed wire 
recreation yard in the Division had no meshed roof - and escaping over 
the perimeter walls of the prison to freedom . 4 I The wire perimeter 
fence was completed in 1971 and proved insurmountable, until the escape 
of an inmate, in the back of a laundry vehicle, in 1986. 42 
A series of riots in other Australian States in the early 1970s 43 may 
have been the catalyst for the outbreak of violence which occurred at 
R isdon Prison on 22 October 1972. 44 This lasted about four days and 
was purportedly caused by minimal payments to inmates. 45 In his Annual 
Report ( 1972-73 ) the Controller explained that 
• serious rioting [had] broken[n] out 	... 	and continued 
varying degrees of intensity over a period of some weeks ( sic). 46 
in 
He maintained that the trouble began ,vhen an inmate spokesman 
▪ . presented .. 	a list of grievances and demands for additional 
privileges. 47 
The Controller was adamant that 
4 IGrubb Report, op.cit., Appendix N. 
42See various Mercury (Hobart) articles, 3 - 12 October, 1986 
4 3Fiori, op.cit., Ch.9. 
44Grubb Report, op.cit., Appendix N. 
45See The Mercury (Hobart) 23.10.72. 
46Controller of Prisons Report for Year Ended 30 June 1973. 
47 ibid. 
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There was no justification whatsoever for the action taken by the 
rioters and there as no substanc:,‘. in complaints of alleged poor 
food and other conditions at the prison. 48 
Almost 	100 inmates were charged with disciplinary of fences in a 
specially convened magistrate's court set up at Risdon Prison. 	Extra 
prison sentences of from one week to one year were imposed on 62 of the 
of fenders. 49 Many of the current staff who were present during the 
riot blame the administrative decision to allocate television sets to 
the best behaved prison Divisions as the catalyst for the riot. 50 
Another small disturbance, reported in A Division ( see Figure 3 ) after 
lockup in 1974, resulted in the use of tear gas and a .varning shot fired 
up through the Division front entrance. 51 The latest insurrection took 
place in 1980 at . the Medium Security Institution - for selected short 
term inmates - situated outside the main perimeter fence. A number of 
inmates who worked in the prison grounds smuggled a quantity of alcohol 
inside the building and became riotous after consuming the contraband. 
Again, tear gas was used and the institution was subsequently closed as 
a result of the disturbance. 52 
Of more serious concern to the Risdon management was the Commission of 
Enquiry in 1975 ordered-- by the Neilson Labor Government, into - amongst 
other things - "The Administration of Prisons in Tasmania". 53 	The 
4 8 thid. 
49Grubb Report, op .cit  . , Appendix N. 
50 From conversations with several CP0s. 
5 'Grubb Report, op .cit  . 
52 See various articles, The MerciTry (Hobart) ) March 1982. 
53Grubb Report. 
Attorney-General selected an Acting Judge of the Local and District 
Criminal Court of South Australia to report to the Government. Grubb's 
commission was to report 
what improvements might reasonably be made - 
( i ) 	in 	the 	selection, 	training, 	conditions 	of 	employment, 
discipline and morale of 	prison officers and 	other 	staff 
engaged 	in 	training, 	correctional 	and 	rehabilitative 
programmes for prisoners; 
(ii) in the facilities, supervision, security and other procedures 
relating 	to 	the 	privacy 	and 	educational, 	social 	and 
recreational activities of prisoners: 
(iii) • in relation to any matter incidental thereto. 54 
Grubb spent two periods of time in Hobart conducting the enquiry - 27 
June till 2 July and 15 August till 28 August. During these periods he 
Conferred with prison management, staff and inmates, interested parties 
and legal agencies. His conclusions, which covered a scant thirty 
pages, provided little that was not already known. He claimed that many 
of the prison management problems emanated from the physical structure 
of the building. 55 The "design and siting of the prison is 
disastrous". 56 	Grubb 	proceeded 	to 	explain 	that 	since the prison's 
opening the Government of the day 
had been continually obliged to spend substantial sums of money to 
overcome, as far as possible, the defects of the bad design. 57 
The difficulty with the prison is that it was not designed for Tasmanian 
climatic conditions. 	Apart from the sheltered workshops, administrative 
r54 ibid, Appendix A. 




buildings and cells, all parts of the prison are open. 	As the former 
Controller of Prisons has noted, 
if the prison had been situated in Queensland, it would have been 
ideal . 58 
The retiring Director of Corrective Services was more adamant. He would 
have pulled it down and started from scratch . 59 
Turning his attention to the recruitment of prison officers, Grubb noted 
that the present prescription was "far too low". 60 The mandatory 
requirement for prison officer applicants was age - between 21 years and 
45 years, physically fitness and no heal th problems, and Grade 6 
educational qualifications. 	Grubb recommended that the standard of 
entry be upgraded to Grade 9. 
In my view, the minimum standard for all officers should be, at 
least, the successful completion of third year secondary, schooling 
if the applicant has not successfully undertaken some other form of 
education or training or successfully followed some appropriate 
vocation. 61 
Prison management, however, successfully argued that this entry level 
(grade 6 ) was sufficient for the prison's purpose. 	They claimed that a 
significant amount of officers had the necessary educatiOnal standard 
required to provide "a sufficient pool to meet 	future promotional 
requirements". 62 	In fact, it was not until 1986 that the educational 
58Hornibrook , op . cit. 
59H I Howe, interview 6.11.87. 
60Grubb Report, op.cit. , p.7. 
6 1 ibid. 
62ibid 
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requirements were upgraded to grade 10. Even then, the TPOA fought this 
move but settled for the Grade 10 standard as the Secretary of the Law 
Department wanted the prescription to be grade 19. 63 The ramifications 
of these mini:nal educational requirements for the New South Wales 
Department of Corrections have already been noted by Bullard. 64 	He 
claimed the Department was enhancing . rnediocracy . 65 	The ramifications 
for the Tasmanian Prison Service will be discussed later. 
Grubb next investigated prison officer training and praised the Prison 
Management on their achievement 	in 	upgrading training and 	the 
establishing a Chief Prison Officer Training.66 	The recruit intake of  
October, 1975 was the first occasion that a body of recruits had any 
'extensive' training prior to being posted to a function within the 
prison. 67 	Grubb noted the 	Management plans for of fering 
and refresher courses and 
urge[d] that 	the government 	do everything  in its  power 	to 
encourage and facilitate these important aspects of training. 68 
Ironically, the promised changes never eventuated. 	The Chief Prison 
Officer Training is a normal shift boss who only acts as CPO training 
whenever a new officer school is recruited, and this is contingent upon 
63Interview with Law Department Secretary, 9.11.87. 
64 Bullard, op.cit. 
65 ibid. 
66Grubb Report, op.cit  . , p.4. 
67The author was a member of this recruit intake. 
68Grubb Report, op .cit  . , p.4. 
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finance being available and staff retirement or resignation. 	It may be 
that 	because 	of 	the 	economic 	climate, 	and 	the 	relatively 	safe 
environment of the prison officers' work in Tasmania, that there is an 
extremely low turnover. 	At Risdon Prison, the average base-grade prison 
officer is aged 49 years, and has served 22 years 6 rrionths. 69 	Prison 
officer recruit training has changed very little since the author was a 
recruit (for training schedule, see Appendix A). It could he argued 
that inservice training is provided to these prison officers who are 
eligible to sit the Senior Prison Officer promotion examination but a 
glance at this schedule will note the similarities of both courses . (for 
SP° training schedule, see Appendix B). The basic difference between 
both courses is that 	the 	SPO 	participants are given elementary 
instruction in working out prisoner remissions. This can be said to be 
surperfluous as they will probably never use this information in the 
course of their duties. 
Grubb noted that sick leave presented a "considerable problem to 
management". 70 The literature on prison staff is replete with studies 
on officer sick leave (for example see Bowker, Bullard, and Thomas). 
Moreover, it should be noted that when Grubb was conducting his enquiry 
in 1976, the Risdon Prison did not have a minimum-manning level. If a 
rostered staff member was absent from duty, the remainder of the posted 
men filled in and managed the absentee's tasks. The only call-backs 
(overtime on rostered " day-offs) for prison staff, until minimum manning 
69 Survey conducted by the author. 
70Grubb Report, op.cit. , p.5. 
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was implemented in the early 1980s, were at institutions like the Royal 
Hobnrt Hospital when an inmate required hospitalisation. 	Since the 
minimum manning agreement was reached between the Law Department and the 
TPOA , call-backs have become rife. 	There is no incentive for a prison 
officer to appear for rostered duty. 	He knows if he calls in 'sick' 
that this position will be replaced by someone of f duty. 	Grubb's 
trepidations have been echoed by at least one Parliamentary Enquiry and 
numerous internal 	investigations. 	Sick leave 	is more prevalent at 
present than during Grubb's enquiry ( see Figure 10). Budgetary 
estimates for overtime of $350,000 failed to allow for the substantial 
increase in sick leave in 1985-86. The actual amount spent on overtime 
was $528,897 - nearly 55 percent more than envisaged. 71 
7 ILaw Department explanatory notes, op.cit. , p. 1827. 
169 






1982-1983 161* 2132** 13.24 
1983-1984 158 2014 12.74 
1984-1985 170*** 2092 12.38 
1985-1986 168 2423 14.42 
1986-1987 163 2006**** 12.30 
Includes female and farm officers 
All numbers in days 
New recruit school had started 
Figures arbitrary, because of 38 hour week, some officers have 
days and hours off -duty . 	
72 
The other major point covered by Grubb was the difficulty management 
experienced in providing for the inmate's basic right to safety in the 
prison. 
Commenting on the need for protection of the youthful offender from the 
'heavy' institutionalised recidivist, he noted that 
The problem stems from the  impossibility of adequately segregating 
various groups, ages and classes of prisoners in this Prison. 73— 
Because all classes, ages and types of inmates reside in Risdon Prison, 
they will mix, unless protected or hospitalised, with the other inmates 
at either work, education, or leisure. Grubb realised the difficulties 
in providing segregated Divisions but recommended one step to increase 
surveillance on inmates: and that was the posting of two officers in 
72 Prison Records. 
73 Grubb Report, op .cit  . , p 1 1 . 
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each Division instead of the normal single manning. 74 	This,. of course, 
was never implemented because of the inescapable fact of staff shortage 
and lack of funding required to recruit the necessary personnel. 
Grubb also recommended that the Women's Prison - situated on the 
property - be used as a separate male Remand Yard. 75 Risdon's design 
precludes the separation of remandees from the sentenced population, 
because of the proximity of the present Remand Yard (see Figure 3) to 
the Reception Area. As this section is in the main part of the Prison, 
remandees visiting . it invariably meet sentenced inmates who are either 
working on the prison lawns, or moving about the institution. 
By far his most cogent recommendation was the separation of the prison 
staff 	structure 	into 	three 	divisions 	"Custody, 	Occupation 	and 
Rehabilitation". 76 	Additionally, 	he 	suggested 	that 	four 	separate 
orisons be established, 
each 	with 	its 	own 	Governor, 	but 	with 	a 	different 	salary  
classification graded downwards... " 
These were HMP Risdon - as a maximum security institution; Hayes Prison 
Farm; Medium Security, for low rating classification inmates; and the 
Women's Prison. 
Although nothing has been done on the creation of the separate 
divisional structure, some progress has been made, however, in relation 
74 ibid, 1.7. 
75 ibid, p.23. 
76 ibid, p.24. 
77ibid. 
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to his other recommendations. 	Risdon Prison remains much the same as in 
Grubb's 	period 	of 	investigation. 
	The 	Prison 	Farm 	had 	a 
Manager/Superintendent 	who looked after both crop production and 
animal husbandry along with the custodial requirements for the farm's 
inmates. 	Strangely, 	his was a non-uniformed position heading a 
uniformed 	custodial 	staff. 	With 	the 	present 	incumbent's 
fast-approaching retirement, the Law Department has decided to separate 
the farm and custodial functions. 	A farm manager will be recruited to 
oversee and plan crop and animal production. 	The custodial requirements 
will be handled by the newly. created Superintendent (uniformed) who will 
have a grading equivalent to Superintendent at Risdon. 78 The senior 
uniformed officer presently at Hayes Prison Farm is a CPO. 
Maximum Security has been closed since the riot in 1980 and no plans are 
evident for its future reopening, although increasing inmate numbers at 
Risdon have forced the prison management to reconsider its use. 79 The 
decision to reopen must, however, come from the Government. 
The female prison has been covertly upgraded in status. 	Although the 
interior has been subject to cosmetic change, the officer in charge - 
formerly the Matron - has been accorded Superintendent status. 	The 
former rank was equivalent to the male CPO. 	It is, however, a matter 	- 
for conjecture, whether she would take charge at the male institution in 
the absence of the other prison management hierarchy. 
78 Discussion with A/Director, 24.11.87. 
79 A report has been submitted to the Law Department. 
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The Liberal Opposition refused to take part in the enquiry claiming it 
to be "... inadequate and sterile". 80 They thought that it would be 
quite pointless to make any submissions or to have any discussions 
with Judge Grubb _ 81 
This, of course, upset the TPOA who accused the opposition of being 
"cynical . and .. -obstructive •. . 82 It should be pointed out that 
there was very little love between the TPOA and the Liberal Party for 
three good reasons. After the mass escape from the Remand Yard in 1970 
it was reported that the Attorney-General wanted to sack the on-duty 
staff. 83 
	
The TPOA was infuriated, threatening to stage a mass strike 
if this order was carried out. 84 	This threat had only subsided when 
the Attorney-General, worried about reported incidences of trafficking 
by prison staff, wrote to the Controller of Prisons enquiring into the 
feasibility of spot searches." The Controller agreed and pointed out 
that the power of search had existed when prison officers were not part 
of the Public Service. 	He blamed the "failure to amend Regulation 76(B)" 
which now meant that prison officers could not be searched. 	He added 
his reservations about such a move, claiming the TPOA would object. 86 
80Grubb Report, op.cit., Appendix P. 
8 libid. 
82TP0A information sheet formembers, August 1976. 
8 3From conversation with CPO's who were base-grade staff during this 
period. 
84TP0A information sheet, op.cit. 
85Law Department file 9/1/1, dated 29.4.71. 
86 ibid, 13.5.71. 
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The T PO.A , of course, fought the move. With a change of Government - 
back to Labor - the issue still remained. 
The Secretary of the Tasmanian Public Service Association - of whom the 
TPOA were an affiliated body at that time - wrote to the Labor Attorney-
General in November, 1977, about the proposed searching of officers and 
claiming that a legal interpretation of Statutory Rule ( 1977 ) No. 211 
is not authorised by Prisons Act 1977 and is hence void and 
ineffective ... 87 
However, 	an interpretation by the Solicitor-General contradicted the 
TPSA claim, 
In my opinion, a Regulation which empowers a Superintendent to 
require a Prison Officer to be searched when on duty outside a 
prison or at any time within a prison, is a Regulation with respect 
to the conduct of prison officers. 
He concluded: 
It might also be said to be a Regulation for the preservation of 
order .". 
The issue has now been resolved in favour of prison management, but 
there has been no overt use of it reported up until the present. 
By far the most serious disruption to relations between the -TPOA and the 
Liberal Party occurred in July 1975. The Opposition's Shadow Minister 
for Law accused the prison officers of negligence in performance of 
their duties. 89 A number of escapes, highly sensationalised by the 
87 ibid, 3.11.77. 
88ibid, file 27/125/77 dated 24.11.77. 
89The Mercury (Hobart) 9.7.75. 
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media prompted this action. 	In order to defend themselves, the TPOA 
took the unprecedented move of paying for space in the local paper 90 
(see open letter to the Shadow Minister for Law in Appendix C). 
Promotion 4:1 
The 	pattern, 	until 	recently, 	of 	recruiting 	officers 	with 	minimal 
educational qualifications will have a profound effect on the future of 
the management of Risdon Prison (see Entrance Examination, ;ppendix D). 
It was noted earlier that the average base-grade prison officer employed 
at Risdon is nearly 50 years old and has served, for approximately 23 
years. Two problems arise from this. The first arises from the growing 
age gap between base-grade staff and inmates (see Figure 4) which is 
likely to increase the difficulty of control in the case of riot or 
other disturbance. 	The second lies in the promotion of staff through 
the ranks. 	When asked what attributes and skills a prison manager 
should have, the former Controller of Prisons was adamant that a good 
prison manager should have come "up through the ranks". 91 When 
questioned why, he replied that it was imperative that senior management 
- be aware of the problems and difficulties faced at the grass roots 
level. 92 
	
No amount of theory of managerial skills gleaned elsewhere 
could compensate for experience• gained at the lowest levels. 93 	In 
Risdon's case this presents a special problem. 
90 ibid, 12.7.75. See appendix C. 




Until the change from Departmental status to Divisional category, it was 
possible, in theory, for a base-grade officer to continue through the 
ranks and gain the position of Deputy Governor, or, as it became known 
in the late 1970s, the Deputy Superintendent. The Prison Officers' 
A ward and classification covered from base-grade up to and including the 
Deputy Governor. The prerequisites for promotion were 5 years 
satisfactory service and the passing of a Senior Prison Of ficers' 
examination or experience deemed to be equivalent to the position 
applied for. In fact, most promotions to either SPO or CPO appeared to 
be on a seniority principle - those who gained the promotions having 
served a considerable amount of years (see figure 11). The one 
differing factor relating to the Deputy's position was the requirement 
of the 
Figure 11: CPO & SPO Age and Length  of Service  
	
No. of 	Length of 	Years in 
RANK 	positions Service position 	 AGE  
CPO 	 9 	26 . 10 	9 	3 	55 . 6 
SPO 	 17 	18 . 3 	 N/A 	48 . 11 
average figures only 
* * 	figures correct as at November, 1987. 	
94 
applicant to have the. qualifications for entry into the old Third 
Division classification - normally grade 12 education. 	Of course, the 
94 Author's survey. 
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recruiting practices of previous years. meant that whenever the Deputy's 
position became available in 1960, 1970 and on two occasions in 1980, 
none of the CPO's had the required educational qualifications. 95 This 
has led to 'outsiders' coming in to the system at senior management 
level. 	It also means that under the present requirements where the 
Deputy Chief Superintendent's position has been upgraded 	none of the 
present CPO incumbents have the necessary educational qualifications. 9 6 
Changes in the Management Services of the Prison have been 
necessary as a result of the creation of a Director of Corrective 
Services. 	As a 	result, 	management 	skills and administrative 
knowledge 	of 	Rrison operations 	is 	most 	essential 	within 	the 
Deputy's position;/ 7 
Of major concern to the Risdon Management is the failure of suitably 
qualified base-grade staff to apply for promotion to SPO level. 	Prior 
1980, the promotion of SPOs was entirely in the hands of senior 
management. 	Positions were not advertised but direct appointments were 
made. 	Although there was provision under the Pubic Service Act for 
appeals to be made, no-one challenged the management's choice. However, 
partly as a result of growing staff discontent about selection, 
management advertised vacancies from 1980 onwards, thus opening up 
competition. 	When two positions -fell vacant in 1984, 47 suitably 
qualified staff applied. 	In 1986 three positions became vacant and 27 
applications were received. 	In 1987, one position became available and 
95Controllers comments on applicants, prison file 7/1/26 dated 7.4.81 
and Prison file 7.1.18, dated 17.9.81. 
96See Prison Files 7/1/26 and 7/1/18. 
97Law Department file 7/1/18. 
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13 staff applied. 	Some reasons for staff failure to apply are "that the 
jobs are predetermined", "I'm not a bosses man", or, "my face doesn't 
fit". 98 	Management is now perhaps in the paradoxical position of not 
giving the job to the best person available through his disinclindation 
to apply. 	This failure to attract suitably qualified applicants has 
also affected the promotion of SPOs to CP0s.. 	Because of the 
paramilitary structure of staff at F.2 isdon Prison, promotions have al ways 
been made from the next rank under - P/0 to SPO, SPO to CPO. There has 
never been an occasion where a promotion has been over two levels, for 
example, PIO to CPO. 	Present serving SPOs are used as 'Assistant 
Chiefs' to gain experience in all aspects of the CPO position. 	Thus, 
whenever a CPO goes on leave, or is absent for some reason, an SPO comes 
up into an Acting CPO capacity - and is paid accordingly. 
Of the present contingent of SPOs , only five ( out of 16 - one position 
is currently advertised) will take an Acting position . 99 	Reasons have 
been the 'drop' in expected salary. 	The SPO can make himself available 
for recall to duty on double pay, and can work in a base-grade position 
when required. 	CPOs on the other hand only work recalls in CPO 
positions, or above - if required. 	Thus, acting as a CPO can cost the 
SPO a substantial amount of pay over a determined period. 	Others have 
declined the acting position because of the nature of the job. 
Essentially their perspective may be presented as: 
why should we have all the problems to put up with in directing 
staff and inmates, and begging staff to come to work, when we have 
the pick of the posts in the prison and unlimited overtime, if we 
98Comments made to author by base-grade prison officers. 
99From author's discussion with Deputy Chief Superintendent. 
need 	• 100 
Whenever a CPO position becomes available, management is faced with the 
problem of choosing from a limited number of candidates. As Bullard has 
noted, 1 ° 1 they may in fact be enhancing mediocracy through picking the 
best of the applicants - irrespective of whether or not the choice will 
make a good CPO. Additionally, a glance at Figure 12 will note the 
average age of SPOs. Further scrutiny of the CPO column will show that 
most CPOs will have retired within five years ( ( all will go within ten 
years if the retiring age is dropped to 60). 	In the same period, the 
average age of SPOs will be equivalent to the present CP0s. 	This, in 
effect, means that middle-level management will be constantly changing 
over the remainder of this decade - and a good part of the next. 	The 
possibility 	of 	stability, 	with 	its 	attendant 	benefits 	for 	base-grade 
staff and inmates, will be negated by these continual movements. 
Furthermore,  senior management strategies will depend greatly on a 
stable middle level management team. 
Although there is a prescribed chain of command between senior and 
middle-level 	management 	staff, 	the 	decision-making 	processes have 
largely been made at senior level, 	with little involvement by the 
middle-level echelon. The pattern of senior and middle-level 
interaction during the former Prison Department era was largely on an 
informal basis. The then Superintendent came to the CPOs messroom on a 
Friday afternoon to discuss various internal matters and enquire if 
178 
100Comments made to author by SPOs. 
101 Bullard, op.cit. 
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there were any problems. 102 After  the advent of the !_aw Department it 
was suggested that these links be formalised. 103 A committee was set 
up, comprising all the staff from CPO Up to, and including, the Chief 
Superintendent. 	Times and meeting places were to be planned and held on 
a regular basis. 	Provision was made to attract off-duty CPOs by 
offering a financial inducement to attend. Meetings were to be held 
... each fortnight and those officers who are off-duty shall be 
pa id . 104 
Meetings began in the conference room of the new Administration 3lock 
outside the main prison and were essentially designed to facilitate only 
the functioning of the male prison neither the female. Superintendent nor 
Farm Manager were required to attend, unless invited. 105 Initially, 
the meetings progressed fortnightly from the inaugural session in April 
1985, and met 17 times up until the end of the year. 106 However, a 
change of leadership 107 resulted in the meetings being held on a 
sporadic basis - 15 in the next 14 months. 108 A certain 
disillusionment has grown among the Chiefs as comments have been made as 
to their effectiveness. 109 Some CPUs maintain that the meetings have 
102 From discussions with the Principal Prison Officer. 
103 From conversation with A/Director of Corrective Service, 24.11. 87. 
104 Minutes of CPO meeting. 
105This practice has now ceased. Only Risdon Prison Staff attend. 
106Frorn minutes of CPO meetings. 
107The new Chief Superintendent of Prisons was appointed. 
108From minutes of CPO meetings. 
109Author's discussions with CPU's. 
to 
become 'bitch sessions' and management tools to inform of impending 
changes. 110 Certainly the off-duty Chiefs have been reluctant to make 
an appearance although provision has been made to remunerate them. The 
former Director of Corrective Services thought such meetings were of 
little value. 111 He considered that the Chiefs were paid to do a 
particular job and by holding meetings, the Prison was being deprived of 
their services. 112 He was firmly against "management by 
committee". 113 	The usefulness of these meetings has also been 
questioned at Law Department level. 114 	Letters have been sent to each 
CPO to elicit comments regarding their structure and suggestions for 
improvement. 11 -5 However, the recent secondment of an Acting Director of 
Corrective Services may promote meeting morale and direction. 
It must, however, be questioned whether meetings in this format have any 
sort of validity. Unless, in the Risdon instance, there is a specific 
Government directive as to the prison's use, the meetings can deal only 
with prison routine. If the Government does have a particular direction 
it wishes to take, there could be problems in getting it accepted at 
this type of forum. First, the question of the CPOs capacity to 
understand the concept has to be resolved. 	Second, even if the concept. 
110 ibid. 
'''Howe, op .cit  
112ibid 
113 i b id ■ 
114 See note for file, Law Department "CPO Meetings". 
115From Chief Superintendent of Prisons. 
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is understood, there remains the problem of getting it accepted. 	As was 
mentioned by the former Controller of Prisons, any programme for inmate 
improvement has to overcome staff allegations of discrimination in 
favour of the inmate. 116 Ho wever, as Hawkins points out 
Management must reflect the majority of the public's perception, 
not prison staff's perception. 117 
It must also be remembered that all of the Risdon CPOs have a 
considerable amount of service (See Figure 12 ) and the majority of this 
service has been completed during the era of custodially oriented 
directives. The custodial attitude has been reflected by the former 
Director of Corrective Services who, in a newspaper interview claimed 
The 	Prison Service is a paramilitary organisation 	run on set 
regulations and orders and in a disciplinary manner for staff and 
inmates. ' 18 
Third, as the CPOs are in charge of the daily shifts, they are the 
medium through which the programme is relayed to both staff and inmates. 
The difficulty here is threefold, encompassing consistency, 	ability to 
communicate, and appraisal and reporting. 	One of the most telling 
factors against the present middle management is the complaint by 
base-grade staff of the lack of consistency by CP0s. Base-grade staff 
maintain that each Chief has his own approach to routine work, 119 a 
view also substantiated by the CP0s 120 This, of course, confuses staff 
116For example, Hornibrook, op.cit. and Grubb Report, op.cit. , p.6. 
117Hawkins, op.cit. , p. 14. 
118Sunday Examiner, 28.7.85. 
119 From conversations with base-grade P/Os and au'thor's own 
experience. 
120Conversation with CP0s. 
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and the question always asked by on-coming staff is: 	"Who's the 
Chief?"; 121 	As noted earlier, the practice of hiring at the lower 
educational levels for one specific philosophical purpose, eg , custody, 
may mean that the middle-management staff have not got the ability to 
communicate ideas and make them understood. The problems of filtration 
of information in any organisation have been dealt with elsewhere, but 
the programme's success may very well be jeopardised at this very point. 
A gain, very few of the C POs have been taught the rudimentary aspects of 
appraisal methods. 	Most appear to make judgements based on 'their 
experience'. 	This failure combined with an inability - in most cases - 
to report in a detailed submission to higher management could leave the 
senior management in a state of false optimism - actual practice and 
reported practice may diverge widely. 	The reporting difficulty is 
compounded by the practice of verbal edicts and replies. 	Although there 
has been a move to formalise orders and routines on paper, the 
information flow is practically one-way - downward. Upward information 
is normally reported verbally unless a specific occurrence in the prison 
necessitates a written report. 
Prison Officer Unions 4:2 
Risdon Prison (and the Tasmanian Prison System ) has two unions 
representing all levels of staff ( both uniformed and non - uniformed). 
The majority of the uniformed staff, and an increasing number of 
non-uniformed staff working within the prison, are members of the 
Tasmanian Prison Officers' Association ( T POA). The other Union 
121 The author also asked the question when coming on duty. 
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representing members is the Tasmanian Public Service Association (TPSA). 
Originally the TPOA was an associated organisation under the wnbrella of 
the parent group which, apart from representing the majority of other 
employees working in the State Public Service, offered advice to the 
minor association. The nature of the TP0A was, literally, as an 
'in-house' 	union 	representing 	members 	on 	a 	day-to-day basis 	in 
interaction with management. For major claims by the TPOA such as 
industrial conditions or pay claims, the TPSA provided the expertise 
necessary to facilitate such claims and sent counsel to represent the 
TPOA at industrial tribunals and hearings. 
Upon entering the service during the 1970s, the recruit was offered 
membership in both the TPOA and the TPSA. 	He could refuse either 
membership, 	or 	join the TPSA 	(the general public service union) 
independently of the TPOA (the Prison Officers' Union). However, if he 
joined the TPOA and not the parent body as well, the TPOA had to pay his 
dues to the TPSA. This created some animosity between the TP0A 
officials and those of the TPSA. 
As a result of a large recruitment during the latter part of the 1970s 
(at least 60 base-grade staff ) interest in union matters began to grow. 
The same phenomenon has been noted in the English System by Thomas. 122 
There followed unprecedented questioning of the motives of the old 
established union hierarchy. During this period, the management of the 
union changed hands several times, inspired perhaps by a 'new breed' of 
officer coming from private enterprise where strong unionism existed and 
122Thomas in King & Morgan, op.cit., p.146. 
Wort:Int.; 
	conditio n s 	were 	carefully 	negotiated. 	The 	new of f u:er 
	
'A' a S 
appalled to find the apathy of the 'old guard' who were thankful .  
literally, of gainful employment. 
The changing union management structure and an unwillingness by the IPS A 
to become involved in many prison matters ( for which the TP.:..)A had been 
set up ) led to a breakaway by the T POA from the TPSA . 123 	Not all of 
the uniformed staff split from the TPSA: 	some continued membership in 
both organisations while several resigned from the TPO . Prison 
management became unwilling pawns in the succeeding industrial strife. 
The Management was approached by the TPO A demanding a 'closed shop'. 
When Management pointed out that it could not force anybody to become a 
member of any union organisation, the TPOA imposed overtime bans by its 
members. 
A s, by this time, the great majority of uniformed staff were TPOA 
members, and the Prison Management depended on overtime to staff and run 
the prison, it appeared that the TPOA tactic might succeed, not in 
accomplishing a 'closed shop' but in closing the. prison. - or at least 
shutting down some of the operations. Fortunately for management, 
during this period of overtime bans, sick leave dropped and a_ concerted 
deployment of TPSA members kept the prison functioning as normal. This 
was in no small measure due to some staff, who worked double shifts on 
rostered days and callbacks on off duty 'days. The TPOA called off its 
overtime bans after ten days. 
Since this initial action by the TP A , relations between them and the 
prison management have scarcely been harmonious. 	Several stopwork 
1 23This was accomplished by getting union members to sign a 
resignation notice to the TPSA and authorising the paymaster to 
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... we the members of the Tasmanian Prison Officers' Association 
disassociate ourselves completely from all action taken by [the] 
Chief Superintendent ... and further have no confidence in his 
ability to handle any future crisis situation within the Tasmanian 
Prison System. 126 
In a further move to undermine the managerial prerogative, the TPOA 
demanded that the Deputy Chief Superintendent be barred from sitting on 
selection panels for recruitment or promotion. A recommendation from a 
stopwork meeting in part read, 
... should [the Deputy Chief Superintendent] be retained on this 
Committee, industrial action will be instigated by all members of 
this Association. 127 
Considering their action further, the TPOA decided to declare overtime 
bans, 
That the Secretary of this Association be authorised to contact the 
Law Department, in writting (sic) ) that if [the Deputy Chief 
Superintendent] sits on the Board, overtime bans to take affect 
(sic) ) as from 2pm Thursday •128 
The Executive, however, was unsure of the compliance of members as it 
followed this by recommending 
That in the event of a member breaching the Union's directive, an 
immediate eight hour strike be implemented. 129 
A subsequent notice was posted informing members that 
... 	a 	compromise 	was 	[reached] 	that 	[the 	Deputy 	Chief 
Superintendent] remain on the Committee and a member representing 
the lower ranks (actually the Union Secretary - a Senior Prison 
Officer ) be placed on the Interviewing Panel. 
126TP0A Notice of Motion ( issued 11.10.87. 




The Law Department acquiesced to this demand and the Union sat in on the 
interviews. It is suggested that, as a result of this decision, any 
future Senior Prison Management policy that is not to the TPOA's liking will be 
subject to the threat of industrial action. It may be that to preserve 
industrial harmony, the Law Department is willing to relegate the role 
of Prison Management to an intermediary role a role increasingly 
recognised by all participants in the system as being powerless. 
The Management of overcrowding and violent inmates 4:3 
If need be, Risdon Prison could accommodate 354 inmates all in single 
cell accommodation. 	If overcrowding became an issue, the presently 
closed Medium Security Division holding 36 self-contained cells could be 
reopened. 	Risdon Prison has been fortunate that its capacity has never 
been stretched to the limit. 	It appeared that the high point of 
imprisonment had been reached in the late 1970s (see Figure 12) and that 
numbers would steadily fall, as a result of increased judicial use of 
alternative sentences such as work orders and probation. 
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247.15 3.49 60.09 308.73 365 279 
201.03 3.73 49.36 263.12 301 218 
202.32 5.62 33.43 241.38 269 221 
258.92 3.46 43.44 305.82 343 268 
231.28 5.18 43.36 279.82 309 256 
203.05 5.25 40.59 248.87 269 225 
130 
Numbers were certainly greater at the beginning of the decade with a DAP* 
of 359.09 in 1970, 385.85 in 1971, and 373 in 1972. 131 	Remarkably, 
however, numbers have again increased in the mid 1980s (see Figure 7). 
While no attempt is made in this thesis to explain the increase in 
numbers at present, one increase in late 1982 put unprecedented pressure 
on the system at Risdon Prison. 
During this period a large number of Franklin Dam protesters refused 
bail conditions 132 and were remanded in Risdon Prison. 	Daily average 
prison numbers at mid December were approximately 260 133 but after the 
130 From Controller of Prisons Reports to Parliament, 1977 - 82. 
131 ibid, 1971-73. 
132For a full account see Biles, D, Howe, 3, "Tasmania and the 
'Greenies': Research Note on Prison Crowding",, ANZ. J.Crim. , 17, 
1984, pp.41-48. 
133 ibid, p.42. 
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refusal of the 'greenies' to accept bail, numbers rapidly grew to 400 
(see Figure 13). 
Figure 13:  Tasmanian Privoners, I December 1982 to I March 1983. 











Although 	prison 	management had been forewarned that this civil 
disobedience would take place, the magnitude of the number of remandees 
presented immediate problems of shortage of bedding (supplies had been 
run down when the numbers fell below 250), increase in remandee visiting 
(the visiting box had only six cubicles) and general demands to the 
authorities to claim 'full rights' due to the unsentenced inmate. 
Although in theory the Prison should have coped easily, the realities 
were quite different. 	Requests to see, for example, the Deputy 
Superintendent went up by 800 percent. 	Movement about the prison was 
constant during unlock hours. 	An added problem was that the 'greenies' 
were contained separately from the sentenced inmates, but were housed in 
A and B Divisions (see Figure 3) which meant that they passed the other 
Divisions on their way to visits, meals and reception or interview 
rooms. Although there was little animosity between the 'greenies' and 
the sentenced inmates initially, the Management's granting of special 
vegetarian diets to 'greenies' combined with a 'superior' deportment and 
intellect amongst the group, soon began to erode inmate patience. In 
retrospect, it was to the prison's advantage that most of the 'greenies' 
only 'served' their week remand and then departed for other causes. 135 
As Biles and Howe have noted, it was probably fortunate that the Risdon 
Prison was underutilised when the environmental protest began. 	The 
135 Most, upon release, flew to Queensland to protest there. 
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Prison Management and staff coped well under these peculiar conditions, 
but in a different environment, such as Pentridge or Long Bay, the 
participants might not have enjoyed the same rapport. 	Comments from the 
'greenies' 	underline 	the 	prison's 	deficiencies 	for 	coping 	with 	an 
extremely large intake ( see Figure 14). 
Figure 14: 'Greenie' comments on Risdon Prison 1982-83  
Positive  
* special 	arrangements 	were 	made 	for 	access 	to 	legal 	advice 
* there 	was 	a 	good 	rapport 	with 	• prison 	officers 
* there was a good response by authority to individual problems 
* general acceptance by other prisoners of the new arrivals and the 
problems caused by them 
* good 	response 	to 	the 	request 	for 	vegetarian 	food 
* eventual tolerance of problems caused by the group solidarity of 
inmates. 
Negative  
• initial inability by some officers to deal with inmates as a group 
• inadequate facilities for visitors 
• inadequate recreational facilities and equipment 
• some petty bureaucratic 	attitude to obtaining of 	newspapers, 
reading material and personal items 
• initial 	unpreparedness 	for 	arrivals 	and physical 	requirement of 
arrivals 
inadequate briefing of arrivals on prison requirements and over-
zealousness enforcement of them in some cases. This in part was 
the cause of the detention of some of the detainees 
Structural problems  
• high turnover and shortness of stay 
• lack of facilities to deal with administrative demands such as 
deputy's requests etc 
• clothing. 	Three were two schools of thought relating to the 
wearing of clothing. 	One group changed into prison clothing to 
show a sense of identity with regular prisoners. 	The other wished 
to retain their own clothing to maintain group identity. 	The 
regular 	prison 	population 	seemed 	to. prefer 	the retention of 
individual clothing as it "added to the variety of the place" 
• as one would expect, older detainees seemed to cope better with the 
adjustment 	to 	prison 	conditions 	than 	did 	younger 	ones. 
136 
The management of any large group of men is always a demanding task in 
the prison situation. 	The real difficulties begin when a dangerous 
136Biles & Howe, op.cit. , p.47. 
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psychopath is imprisoned. 	There is a tendency in the English Prison 
System to 'disberse' dang.eroils and potentially dangerous inmates. 	It is 
felt that by spreading tllem into special sections within several prisons 
rather than holding all known dangerous inmates in one special purpose 
institution is a more desirable management tool. In Scotland, for 
example, special units have been set up to deal with this type of 
inmate. 137  The Australian experience has been to build "electronic 
zoos" 138 at Katingal in New South Wales and Jika-Jika (or H Division ) 
in Pentridge Prison, Victoria. Both are presently closed: Kat ingal 
after the New South Wales Royal Commission into Prisons, 139 and 
Jika-Jika after 5 inmates suffocated to death after a deliberately lit 
fi re . 140 	It has been noted by both Coyle and Hawkins, 141  that only a 
small percentage of inmates cause managerial problems. 	The method of 
dealing with these is determined by the facilities available to the 
prison management. 
At Ri.sdon Prison, the traditional maximum security . within maximum 
security has been the isolation wing known as N Division (see Figure 3). 
Until the late 1970s • the Risdon Prison Management also had available a 
four cell block known as S Division, where those who remained 
recalcitrant in N Division could be sent to solitary and have bread and 
137 See Coyle, op.cit. , pp. 200-220 . 
138Hornibrook, op . cit  . 
139Stein, P, "The New South Wales . Royal Commission into Prisons", in 
Encel, S, Wilenski, P, & Schaffer, (eds ) Decisions, Melbourne: 
1980, Longman Cheshire. 
140See, for example, The Mercury (Hobart) ) 3.11.87. 
141 Coyle , A G, "The Management of Dangerous and Difficult Prisoners", 
The Harvard Journal of Criminal Justice,  May, 1987, Hawkins, 
op.cit  . , p.16. 
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water rations imposed upon them. 	This Division was closed prior to 
1980. 	The original N Division had seven cells, two of which were the 
Death cells. 	Although inmates sentenced to execution were housed there, 
all the condemned men were reprieved and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Officers' sleeping quarters on top of N Division were converted to add 
an additional seven cells in the late 1960s while a further 20 cells 
were opened in 1982. 
Inmates are normally sent to N Division if they have been found guilty 
of a prison offence which warrants segregation. In recent times, 
however, the Division has been used for protection of inmates - who have 
either committed an offence marking inmate retribution or are too young 
to be sent among the general population. 	The Division has two sections, 
old and new, to cater for punishment with and without privileges. 	Thus, 
inmates now have an ultra maximum security section within the segregated 
Division. 
The management and staffing of N Division has been the subject of bitter 
debate between Senior Prison Management and the TP0A. 142 Over a decade 
ago Judge Grubb recommended that 
In view of the peculiar difficulties surrounding this Division ... 
it [should] be staffed by a permanent staff of one Chief Prison  
Officer and six specially selected Prison Officers who should not  
be called upon to man other than this Division. All these Officers 
should be men strong in discipline. 14.5 
The staffing has consisted of an SPO and the required number of men 
necessary to maintain three eight-hour shifts seven days per week. 	The 
1421n a letter to the A/Controller of Prisons, 23.8.83, the TPOA 
notified him that a resolution had been passed that N Division 
manning be on a rotating roster. ' 
I 43Grubb Report, op.cit. , p.25. 
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officers posted to the Division have normally remained there on a 
semi-permanent basis. At the time of the Union split - TPOA from TPSA - 
the permanent staff rostered in N Division were all members of the 
minority union - the TPSA. The TPOA negotiated with the Law Department 
to replace the TPSA members in the Division claiming that the. practice 
of permanent rostering was unfair to the rest of the staff. The TPOA 
maintained that every officer should be able to do all posts within the 
prison. 
The constant rostering (although the SPO is posted for six months at a 
time) combined with running two sections - one for punishment and one 
with privileges - has made the Division hard to manage. 	Until recently 
those on privileges gained tobacco rations. 	This gave rise to constant 
trafficking 	within 	the 	Division 	between 	privileged 	and 	punished. 
However, as a 	result of inmates setting fire to their bedding this 
privilege has been discontinued. Prisoners can only be moved 
individually and two officers must be present when movements are made. 
Exercise for those in the Division is limited to one half hour period 
daily - or more depending on inmate numbers - in a wire cage which is 
roughly 240 cms x 180 cms. Inmates entering or leaving the Division are 
subject to a strip-search to prevent passage of contraband. 
While most inmates accept their banishment to. N Division, there are 
those who create problems. Where an inmate is classified by the Courts 
as Not Guilty by reason of insanity, he is housed in the Prison Hospital 
under the Mental Health Act. 144  The Hospital also has a punishment 
I 44For a full account of the Prison Hospital, see Paterson, W C, 
Custody V Care: The Risdon Experience, unpublished Honours Thesis, 
University of Tasmania, 1986. 
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section. 	If, however, 	the inmate has psychotic tendencies and is 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, this option is unavailable, unless 
he is physically ill. If he creates a problem for management in the 
general prison population the final option is to segregate him in either 
of the N Division wings. Recently one interstate inmate has disrupted 
the functioning of N Division by wrecking his cell and destroying the 
exercise cage. After discussions at Prison Management, Law Department 
and Ministerial level, it has been decided to transfer him to his home 
state under the provisions of the Interstate Transfers Act. 145 
The Prison Hospital 4:4 
As well as directing prison staff, the Chief Superintendent has under 
his control the uniformed nursing staff. These consist of a Nursing 
Officer in Charge (NOIC) who is responsible 
Through the Medical Officer to the Chief Superintendent for the 
efficient organisation ... of the Prison Hospital ..., 146 
and six 	other nursing staff, both general and psychiatric. 	The 
difficulties of managing this complex are compounded by the rostering 
of a semi-permanent prison staff headed by a permanent SPO. Management 
has given equal weighting to the NOIC and SPO, thus authority in the 
hospital is subject to whoever takes what position 	medical or 
custodial (see Figure 15). 	This of course confounds the inmates who 
receive 'orders' from both streams. 	Difficulties are exacerbated by the 
I 45Statement to the press - radio and The Mercury, ABC-TV, 25 - 30' 
November, 1987. 
146Law Department Standing Orders, op.cit., H.2(1). 
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housing of "patients" under the Mental Health Act. 	Who gives directions 
to those who are not sentenced inmates - nursing staff or prison staff? 
Again, the combining within the prison hospital of both sentenced and 
Mental Health patients - without separation - has given rise to problems 
caused by the custodial staff's unfamiliarity with techniques designed 
to manage the unstable. Additionally, in most cases, because of the 
patient's mentality and propensity to violent tendencies, there have 
been clashes between both sets of inmates. The Prison Hospital has been 
subject 	to 	numerous 	enquiries, 147 	and 	measures 	to 	increase 	its 
usefulness are currently under investigation. 148 
Figure 15: Formal Flow of Authority, Prison Hospital  
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The foregone discussion has given a brief history of Risdon Prison and a 
summary of the prison's functioning. Several important elements in the 
prison's management have been noted and the combination of these make up 
the tasks that Prison Management have to deal with on a daily basis. 
I 47See Paterson, op.cit. 
' 148 Another Committee has been set up to investigate the role of the 
Prison Hospital and its facilities for psychiatric treatment. 
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Chapter V will deal specifically with Senior Prison Managers and their 
role within Risdon. Because of their positions and authority, decisions 
taken affect not only R isdon, but the Prison System in Tasmania per se. 
Using the principles of administrative management, a detailed study of 
current prison management practice will be attempted. 
CHAPTER V 
EVALUATION OF RISDON PRISON MANAGEMENT  
Although Archembeault and Archembeault maintained that the prison could 
only be investigated from an open system perspective and applied their 
adaptation of managerial principles accordingly, it has been argued in 
Chapter I that a closed systems approach is more appropriate to prison 
systems generally, and Risdon Prison in particular. 	The following 
evaluation was Archembeault and Archembeault's schema to analyse 
contemporary prison management at Risdon Prison. 
Staff Allocation 5:1 
Any discussion on organisations generally must consider the allocation 
of labour to the task desired. There is always a component of work that 
is unskilled, for example, unpacking, storing and distribution of goods, 
and general cleaning. It is a basic managerial exercise to allocate 
these tasks to the unskilled employee - whose salary is commensurate with 
his skills. If the employee wishes to progress through the organisation 
he must gain some further skills through either in-service training, or 
courses designed to meet the needs required. The stable functioning of 
any 	large 	organisation 	correlates 	with 	the 	necessary 	skills 	and 
attributes its employees possess. An organisation which fails to adapt 
to a changing environment and technological innovation must surely 
suffer as a consequence - either in the market place, if a private 
concern, or by assimilation into another agency if a government 
enterprise. 	Yet, the prison organisation's method of division of labour 
is arbitrary and capricious. 	It appears to be based on an assumption 
that all prison officers have equal skills and attributes, and that they 
can manage all tasks within the prison. 	This is not only a fallacious 
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assumption but is based on a practice that no longer exists - the 
segregate or congregate systems where inmate silence and unquestioning 
obedience to authority were the norm. 
At Risdon Prison, the decision by the Law Department to allow a rotating 
roster in the punishment and segregation N Division has not been 
enforced elsewhere. 	There are 80 rostered posts in Risdon Prison ( see 
Figure 1 ) but many have attained a degree of permanency. 	There are 
Senior Prison Officers in permanent positions at the Court, Reception 
area, and the Hospital. 1 	The Senior Prison Officer in charge of N 
Division is based there for a six month period. 	Base-grade staff are 
permanently rostered in the Reception area , 2 and others are to be . found 
in the Kitchen, Laundry, Education section, Main Gate area, Hospital and 
Female Division .  3 Officers can also change from rostered duties by 
submitting a 'change of shift' form which has to be approved by both 
Deputy Chief Superintendent and Principal Prison Officer. Whilst in 
theory they have the power of veto, the practice has been to approve 
most, if not all, of the applications. Some officers may use the change 
of shift forms to keep away from confrontational posts, eg, the Prisons 
Divisions, whilst others may change for a different • time slot, eg , 6am - 
2pm , to 2pm - lOpm. Although the principle of a rotating roster for all 
prison staff has been a TP0A objective, the reality is quite different. 
1 Management considers these are 'specialist' positions. 
2 They,  , however, work recalls on days off duty. 
3The 'Female Prison' Officers man the entrance gate, and are 
normally officers who are reaching retirement age, or are 
recovering from injury. The Female Prison has its own female 
custodial staff. 
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Figure 	1: 	Rostered Posts and Hours of Duty at HMP Risdon 
POST 6-2 2-10 10-6 9.30 	8.30 8-4 • 9-5 	7-3 	Day 
to 	to 
5.30 4.30 Workers 
A 	Division 1 1 1 
Main Gate 2 1 1 1 
B Division 1 1 
East Tower 1 1 1 
C 	Division 1 1 
West Tower 1 1 1 
D 	Division 1 1 1 
Division Front 1 1 
E 	Division 1 1 
Kitchen/Bake 1 1 
F 	Division 1 1 
H 	Division 1 1 1 
N 	Division 	No. 1 1 
Hospital C/C 1 1 1 
Spares 2 2 1 
Female Gate 1 1 1 
Main Gate 1 1 1 1 
Reception 1 2 
Reception 2 
Security 1 
Court Escort 2 
Escort 	Reliefs 2 
Medic Parades 1 1 
Kitchen 1 1 1 
Laundry 1 
Games 	: 2 
Main Gate 3 1 
Cross Gates 1 1 
Hos . Gen . Duties 2 2 
Reliefs 1 
Workshop Fr. 1 
Workshop Ga. 1 1 
N 	Division 1 1 
Education 1 
TOTAL 	(80 POSTS) 22 18 10 4 1 6 4 4 11 
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As a management tool in the 1980s, the rotating roster in the prison is 
an anachronism. 	It means that management cannot deploy the staff to 
suit particular environments. 	Apart from approving the proposed roster, 
management, in effect, have little say in the posting of officers. 	The 
allocation of posts is the domain of the rostering officer. 	There is no 
mention of a rostering officer in the Corrective Services Division 
Prison Standing Orders. Provision was made, however, under the old 
Prison Department Standing Orders for the Principal Prison Officer to 
provide rosters at least four weeks in advance. The duties were passed 
to a Chief Prison Officer in 1975 after the retirement of the then 
Principal. 4 
	
In 1980, a change of Superintendent' saw the roster duties 
pass to a Senior Prison Officer. 5 	Up to 1986 the roster was based on 
an eight hour shift and 40 hour week. The granting of a 38 hour week to 
prison officers in 1987 necessitated the development of a new roster and 
formulae to accommodate the change in hours. On their completion, the 
roster duties passed to a base-grade prison officer. 6 
Management have made several attempts to implement some form of Unit 
Management but this has been vigorously opposed by the TP0A. 7 	The 
concept of Unit Management has been adapted for prisons by utilising the 
4 It was felt the duties of making up the Roster would be too 
difficult for the new appointee. 
5 Personality clashes and entrenched power were thought to be among 
the reasons for the change. By virtue of the position the 
Rostering Officer, at that time, was extremely powerful. He could 
place base-grade staff anywhere in the prison he wished. 
6 Since promoted to SPO. 
7Interview with TPOA Secretary, Dec. 1987. 
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semi-autonomous workgroup methods successfully applied in the motor 
vehicle industry. 8 The practice - known in Canada as 'The Living Unit 
System' - has several essential elements, 
All principles of the system are founded on the proper delegation 
of authority. 	Members of the team have the authority to make 
decisions and recommendations in well-defined areas. 	Team work is 
an integral part of the system. 	In addition to each member working 
closely as part of a team, each team must liaise with other 
departments, particularly the Security Department. 	Regular unit 
meetings are held. 	The process is subject to continuous planning 
and evaluation, both within the unit itself, within the context of 
the whole institution and within the context : the goals and 
direction formulated nationally . 9 
The concept was successfully introduced by the Bureau of Prisons in 
America in the early 1970s, 10 and by the Federal Canadian System 
in the late 1970s. 11 It has also been tried in Scotland at Cornton 
Vale, a female prison, and judged to be unsuccessful on the grounds that 
it was uneconomic. 12 Coyle, however, claims that the system is 
"..considered to be both efficient and economic". 13 
Among his recommendations in 1976, Grubb alluded to the unit management 
concept. Agreeing with the difficulties created by housing all types, 
ages, and classes within a single institution, Grubb suggested a "House 
8For a description of the concept see Wild, R, "Mass Production 
Work", Journal  of General Management, 1976, pp. 30-40. 
9Coyle, A G, Comparative Examination of the Prison Services in North  
America, Winston Churchill Memorial Fellowship, 1984, p.8. 
1 °Allen & Simonsen, op .cit. , p.447. 
''Coyle, (1984), op.cit., p.7. 
13 ibid, p.11. 
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System" 14 where an SPO would take charge of a particular Division with 
responsibilities 	of 	"Morale, 	Discipline, 	Security, 	Cleanliness 	and 
Comfort". 15 	inmates would be classified to particular Divisions where 
a permanent prison staff would be deployed. 16 	The rationale behind 
Grubb's proposal was that a feeling of 'trust' could be developed 
between staff and inmates. This trust would issue in increased safety 
for both groups, less tension in the prison, and on-the-spot decision 
making instead of the 'faceless' orders passed down from above. 17 
Although Grubb's recommendation was not implemented during the Prison 
Department era - probably because of the economic factor 18 - it was 
anticipated that the Law Department's statement heralding the Corrective 
Services Divsiion would initiate change. 19 However, the Unit 
Management idea was quashed by the Law Department ruling on the N 
Division dispute (see previous Chapter ). 20 
Management, however, has also been under pressure to implement permanent 
staffing arrangements in the Prison Hospital. 	The forensic psychiatrist 
in charge of inmate treatment considers it essential that properly 
14Grubb Report, op.cit. , p.25. 
15 ibid. 
17 ibid, particularly pp.25-28. 
18Grubb had recommended two officers be posted in Divisions at 
all times. 
19 Law Department, CSD Staff newsletters, oo.cit. 
20The issue is again being considered by present senior management. 
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trained staff be allocated on a long-term basis. 21 	It is unrealistic 
to believe that all prison officers have equal ability. 	The custodial 
aspect of the job may be accented by training but some officers list 
this as the least of their functions. 22 Other officers relish the 
'conflict' situation, and some are simply happy 'to get through the 
shift'. Upgraded educational pre-requisites for prison officer recruits 
may facilitate change, but there is little indication of such a move at 
Risdon Prison where the issue is also clouded by the politicking of the 
TPOA and the Law Department. 
Two recent Law Department decisions cemented the custodial direction of 
Risdon Prison. 	The first of these, the inclusion of a member of the 
TPOA executive on the 	panel for prison officer recruits, may be a 
covert admission by Head Office that Senior Management have not the 
capacity to select. 	Although it was claimed that this was a unique 
provision 	instituted 	only 	to 	prevent 	industrial 	action, 23 	it 	is 
suggested that the Union will pursue this course each time promotions or 
recruit schools are advertised. 	The TPOA has fought to safeguard the 
dichotomy of 'them and us'. 	Managerial acts aimed at granting inmate 
concessions are construed as a further denigration of prison officer 
contro1. 24 Representation on the selection panel gives the Union an 
opportunity to present its image of the preferred, that is, custodial, 
prison officer. 
21 See Paterson, op.cit. , for a full description. 
22 Peretti & Hooker, op.cit., p.193. 
23Discussions with Deputy Chief Superintendent 28.11.87. 
24See comments by Hornibrook, op.cit., and Thomas, in King and 
Morgan, op.cit. 
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The second and more remarkable decision was to transfer promotional 
interviews for SPOs from a panel of senior managers to a committee of 
CP0s, that is to middle management. 25 The inspiration for this change 
came from an unprecedented appeal in 1986 against three SPO promotions 
recommended by an interviewing committee comprising Chief 
Superintendent, Deputy Chief Superintendent and a CP0. 26 
Recommendations from this body had never been challenged - although 
provision was available to unsuccessful applicants to appeal under the 
Public Service Act. 27 It is suggested that this decision has  
reinforced the custodial emphasis of Risdon Prison and makes long term 
change extremely difficult. 
The Committee of CPOs between them has accumulated (at the time of 
interviews) 110 years and three months service - an average of 27.75 
years. 	They have been CPOs for an average of 12 years eight months, 
with one participant being appointed to the CPO position in 1961. 	Two 
members of the Committee served at the old prison at Campbell Street 
which closed in 1960. 28 	All have served the greater part of their 
prison career within the custodial philosophy. 	None of them had the 
25The Committee consisted of four Chiefs. The Training Officer - a 
CPO was excluded, and one member was also the President of the 
TPOA. 
26 Nine officers originally filed appeal notices although five later 
dropped them. 
27Later provision under the new state services legislation saw the 
appeal function in the hands of a Commission specifically set up 
for that purpose. 
28 Statistics from author's survey of prison service records. 
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prerequisites to be considered for Deputy Governor, 29 nor have they had 
any formal tuition in interviewing techniques, performance appraisal, or 
recommendation report writing. 
The combination of Law Department decisions, Union power ploys of the 
Union hierarchy and TPOA membership apathy, 30 serves to maintain the 
existing emphasis on custodial practices. Senior Management are 
presently caught between a Law Department philosophically committed to 
change, and TPOA intransigence and commitment tothe maintenance of 
custodial tradition. 
An Imperfect  Chain of Command 5:2 
Although the former Director of Corretive Services claimed that Risdon 
Prison was a paramilitary organisation with rules and regulations 
covering staff and inmates, 3 I the prison size and staff numbers make 
this proposition questionable. The paramilitary structure emphasises a 
rank hierarchy with orders being issued from above and passed through 
each level. Requests for direction should travel upwards to the next 
superior, 	but 	as Risdon Prison is so small, 	the 	formal authority 
hierarchy is normally bypassed. 	Senior Management inspect the prison 
daily and the opportunities for base-grade staff to approach them are 
29 See Prison file 7/1/26 comments by Controller dated 7.4.81, and 
Prison file 7/1/18 comments dated 17.9.81. 
30 Most of the membership individually do not like the direction the 
Union is taking, but collectively give tacit support. Author's 
conversations with individual prison offices and observations of 
groups of officers discussing union politics in the Mess Room. 
3 ISunday Examiner, 28.7.85. 
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unrestricted. 	In theory, if a base-grade officer wishes to seek an 
appointment with any of the Senior Officers, his first move is to the 
CPO in charge of the shift. The CPO in turn makes an appointment with 
the specific officer and arranges to have the base-grade officer 
relieved. 
If this practice is adhered to, two ranks are immediately by-passed 
the SPO and the PPO . 	The SPO position has long been looked upon as a 
'glorified' base-grade off icer 32 	Base-grade staff. work directly under 
the supervision of the relevant duty CPO. 33 	SPOs do not direct 
subordinates except when assuming the duties of CPO. 34 	The PPO is 
assumed to have "direct control over the Chief Prison Officers 	.", 35 
yet it clearly states in the Prison Standing Orders that if a prison 
officer has grounds of complaint about any directive given to him by a 
superior officer, he may appeal 
(a ), first to the Deputy Superintendent 
( b) then to the Superintendent 
(c ) then to the Chief Superintendent 
( d ) then to the Director, and 
(e ) lastly to the Secretary . 36 
Conversely, directives issued from above sometimes by-pass the formal 
chain of command. 	The Chief Superintendent or Deputy Chief 
32 From author's practical experience and discussions with senior and 
middle level managers. Likewise SPOs and base-grade staff have a 
similar perception of the SPO role. 
34 Either as Acting CPO or as Chief's Assistant. 
35Law Department, CSD Standing Order, p. 1 . 
36 ibid , CSD Standing Order 0D9. 
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Superintendent may issue instructions to SPOs instead of dealing with 
the direct subordinate. It is not uncommon for change to be implemented 
without the knowledge of the duty CPO. 37 
Implicit 	in 	the 	position 	of 	Senior 	Management 	is 	the 	notion of 
legitimised authority and the power that goes with it. 	In his Functions 
of the Executive, 	Barnard distinguished 	between 	the authority 	of 
position and that of leadership. 38 As Sofer comments 
This points to the fact that the success of the influence attempt 
( willingness to obey) depends in part on superior ability, 
irrespective of decision. 39 
This in turn leads to the notion of expertise. 	In a typology of power, 
French 	and 	Raven 	postulated 	five 	different 	categories: 	reward, 
coercive, legitimate, referent and expert . 40 	These separate categories 
can be used by management to effect their orders. 
Reward Power 
This is an ineffective mechanism in the prison setting as the primary 
reward is financial and this is controlled by the employing agency. As 
a public servant the prison officer in Tasmania has security of tenure 
and can only be dismissed, for example, if he commits a criminal act. 
Reward power may also be effected in the allocation of promotions, but 
37From observation and conversations with various CP0s. 
38Barnard, C I, The Functions of the Executive, Cambridge, Mass: 1938 
Harvard University Press. 
39Sofer,  , C, Organisations in Theory and  Practice, London: 1972, 
p.272. 
40French , R P, & Raven, B H, "The Bases of Social Power", in Studies 
in Social Power, Cartwright, D, (ed ) Anil Arbor: 1959, Uni. of 
Michigan Press, pp.150-167. 
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it is claimed that this power is only useful if the promotion is valued 
by the of ficer . 41 In Risdon Prison this does not seem to be the 
case . 42 
Coercive Power 
This power has little validity in Risdon Prison (See 5.10). 	Coercive 
power can manifest itself as physical force, 	a tongue lashing, or 
dismissa1. 43 In this situation, Reitz maintains that the power is only 
useful if the officer accepts the management's admonitions. 44 However, 
when the officer stands his ground and management cannot dismiss him, 
then management loses much or all of its coercive power over the 
officer. 
Legitimate Power  
Legitimate power is authoritative "when the people consider they must or 
ought to obey it". 45 As Reitz points out, the manager has legitimate 
power over the officer when he 
possesses attributes or resources which cause [the officer] to 
perceive that the [manager] has the right to influence him, and 
[the officer] has the obligation to obey. 46 
41 R eitz , H 3, Behaviour in Organisations, Homeweed: 1977, Irwin 
Dorsey, p.465. 
42 R efer to previous Chapter, Section on Promotion. 
43 Reitz, op .cit. , p.466. 
45A dams , R V, Energy and Structure, Austin: 1975, Uni. of Texas, 
p.30. 
46 Reitz, op.cit., p.467. 
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One of the problems with legitimate power is the confusion or 
disagreement about the range and scope of that power. The parties 
involved may agree that one has legitimate power over the other but will 
disagree as to the specific behaviours the managers can rightfully order 
the officer to perform . 47 At Risdon Prison, the prison officer is 
caught between the crossfire of managerial command and Union edict. 
Referent Power  
The manager has referent power when he possesses attributes such as 
charisma which can cause the officer to identify strongly with him. 48 
The former Controller of Prisons appears to have exercised such referent 
power . 49 
Expert Power  
Reitz maintains the manager has expert power if he possesses attributes 
and skills which make the officer believe that the manager has valid 
knowledge whch can be useful . 50 	There are,, however, several criteria 
for expert power. 	First, the officer must perceive the manager as 
credible. 	Second, 	he must perceive the manager as trustworthy. 
Finally, 	he 	must 	perceive 	the 	manager's 	knowledge 	or 	skills 	as 
useful . 51 
47 ibid, p.468. 
48 ibid. 
49 From conversations with the PPO and CP0s. 
50Reitz, op .cit . , p.470. 
5 1 ibid. 
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As the staff at Risdon have served, on average, for 15 years, 52 the 
interaction between middle-management and lower staff tends to be on an 
'accommodation' basis. 	Many of the staff, from CPO to base-grade level, 
mix 	socially 	after 	shift. 	This 	practice 	has 	influenced 	the 
administration of disciplinary measures by management. 	The proper 
medium of officer discipline is through the officer's immediate 
superior, in the case of minor transgressions, but management Inay well 
choose to issue its admonitions directly to preserve their tone. 
• 
corollary is the informal discussions between middle to base-level staff 
about the manager's actions. 53 
At Risdon, management's authority has been eroded, although covertly, by 
the creation of the Law Department. As Fox has commented on the 
American example, 
The 	primary difficulty 	with 	being 	a 	division 	within a 	larger 
department is that this set up adds a significant additional office 
through which the correctional administration must go for action 
and policy decisions. 54 
During the time of the former Prisons Department, all decision-making, 
minor and major, was made within the precinct. The present divisional 
structure requires major decision-making to take place in Head Of lice. 
Prison management is placed in the invidious position of trying to 
maintain control and direction, and at the same time defer to the Law 
52Tasmanian Public Service Staffing List - Prisons Division, 1979. 
53Commonly heard in the prison officers' mess room when the author 
was in uniform. 
54 Fox, V B, Introduction to Corrections, Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: 1972, Prentice Hall, p.141. 
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Department instruction and edict. 	The movement of the locus of 
authority outside the prison has certainly been noted by staff and 
inmates alike. 55 
Ambiguous Leadership and Declining Discipline 5:3 
According to Stoner et al 
Members in an organisation need to respect the rules and agreements 
that govern the organisation. 56 
They must be able to identify the leaders and know the incidence of 
responsibility. 	It was noted earlier that prison management has to be 
equitable in the dealings with staff and inmates. 57 	Leanings in either 
direction bring claims of bias by the other group. 58 	Such perceptions 
may arise from ambiguity of leadership at Risdon Prison. 	According to 
the Prison Standing Orders, the Chief Superintendent is responsible for 
the daily management of the prison system. 59 	This is also acknowledged 
by reference to the Statutory Rules and Prison Regulations . 60 	The 
Superintendent of Risdon is responsible to the Chief Superintendent for, 
inter alia 
55 From conversations with all levels of staff and with inmates during 
the course of duty. 
56 Stoner et .al , op.cit  . 
57 Rinaldi, op.cit. p.3. 
58 Interview with TPOA Secretary and discussions with inmates during 
Welfare duties. 
59 1 aw Department,CSD, OD1(1). 
60Statutory Rules 1985, No. 172, Prison Regulations, 1985, 89 ( 1). 
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... due order management and discipline of the prison under his 
charge. 61 
Because 	of 	the 	smallness of 	the 	Tasmanian 	system, 	the 	Chief 
Superintendent is also the Superintendent of Risdon Prison. 62 
Next in the hierarchy is the Deputy Chief Superintendent. 	As this 
position is relatively new, 63 standing orders are not yet available. 
However, the Deputy Chief Superintendent by virtue of his position is 
also the Deputy Superintendent of Risdon Prison. 64  His duties are, in 
part, to be 
responsible to the Superintendent for the due order and discipline 
of the prison. 65 
Prior to the creation of the Law Department, the Superintendent and 
Deputy Superintendent were both housed within the prison walls. 66 	The 
practice was that the Deputy was responsible for the day-to-day 
functions of the prison. 	On the retirement of the then Controller, the 
Superintendent moved up to Acting Controller. 	The Deputy automatically 
moved up to Acting Superintendent. 	A CPO was duly installed as Acting 
Deputy. 	The Acting Superintendent, however, carried out most of his 
former duties and effectively ran the prison. 
61 ibid, 90, 1(A) and Law Department CSD, 01)2(A). 
62There is a Superintendent at the Prison Farm and at tile Female 
Prison. 
63The position was finally gazetted in 1986. 
641t is argued by management that this is the case, but the two are 
separate positions. 
65Statutory Rules 1985, No.172, Prison Regulations 1985, 91(2), and 
Law Department CSD , 0D3(1). 
66See plan of Prison in Chapter IV. 
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When the Law Department took over the responsibility of the prison 
system, 	12 	months 	elapsed 	before 	the 	new 	position 	of 	Chief 
Superintendent was filled.  When this appointment was finalised, the 
Acting Superintendent resumed his duties as Deputy Superintendent. 
However, during this interim period, the new Administration Offices were 
opened outside the prison proper, providing accommodation not only for 
the clerical staff but for both the Director of Corrective Services and 
the Chief Superintendent of Prisons. The chief Superintendent and, by 
virtue of his office, the Superintendent was now officially stationed 
outside the main prison. 
The Deputy Superintendent did not assume the responsibiity in the manner 
he had previously done whilst acting as Chief Superintendent, 	but 
deferred responsibility to the 'new boss'. 67 	This apparent abrogation 
of the major authority role in the Deputy's position is now further" 
highlighted by the appearance of the Chief Superintendent at the 
disciplinary proceedings of inmates (as is his right ) and as Chairman of 
the Classification Committee. 	The Chief Superintendent is also the 
first arbiter of Union grievance. 	By a combination of these factors, he 
has assumed both formal ( by virtue of being Superintendent) and informal 
( recognised by middle-management, Union, staff and inmates ) control of 
the day-to-day running of the Prison. This has complicated matters as 
the Chief Superintendent is frequently tied up on other business in his 
outside office. 	The prison, as a functioning unit, needs a day-to-day 
Principal who is readily available. 	It would appear that the present 
67This was the perception gleaned by the CP0s. 
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pattern of management styles can only issue in another bypass of the 
formal chain of command - as has already happened in the case of SPO and 
PPO. 
Discipline of the staff relates back to the chain of command. 	Although 
the CPO is in charge of the particular shift, the grievance structure 
begins at Deputy Chief Superintendent level. in effect, the CPO can 
only manage his staff by virtue of his personality, and the staff's 
acceptance of his 'authority'. Generally speaking, there are few 
disciplinary proceedings against staff. This may arise from the 
informal nature of the prison where a quiet admonition is the norm, or, 
it may be that middle and senior management levels are prepared to 
ignore minor infractions of rules and regulations. The prison of ficer 
may be charged with 44 offences under the act. 68 
Lack of disciplinary action may be a factor in the increased amount of 
sick leave taken by staff. As the former Controller of Prisons pointed 
out, sick leave was negligible when the Government Medical Officer 
called to the 'sick' officer's home to verify his illness. 69 The 
shortage of staff at Risdon means that those who want to work overtime 
can do as much as they wish. 	Eventually they go off work 'sick' and 
other off-duty men are called in. 	If men cannot be found to replace 
those who are sick, on duty staff work double shifts. 
As noted in the previous Chapter Union stopwork meetings, overtime bans, 
and threatened strike action may also contribute to a deterioration of 
68Law Department, CSD, Standing Orders, OD 10. 
69Interview with Hornibrook, op.cit. 
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staff discipline. 	It 	is debatable whether 	Union action 	is always 
justified; the apparently confrontational attitude taken by the TPOA 
Executive each time they disagree with a management directive cannot 
always fall under the ambit of 'industrial relations'. Militancy on the 
part of the Union tends to correlate with degree of discipline as union 
members look for primary guidance to the Union executive. Increasingly, 
they will come to recognise the Union as the de facto controller of the 
Prison. 
Inmate 	disciplinary 	proceedings 	follow 	both 	formal 	and 	informal 
channels. 	Formal proceedings begin with the inmate being 'booked' by a 
prison officer who submits an incident report. The Director of 
Corrective Service Standing Orders for the general discipline of prisons 
clearly states that inmates must - 
1. Promptly 	obey 	all 	orders 	they 	receive 	from 	officers 
2. Attend all parades fully dressed and in a smart and uniform 
appearance 
3. Address all officers as "Sir" or "Mr" and answer all calls in 
this manner 
4. Behave 	in 	a 	decent 	and 	proper 	manner 	at 	all 	times 
5. March in single file when proceeding to or from labour and do 
not 	straggle 	or 	smoke 	whilst 	moving 	about 	the 	prison 
6. Stand by their cell doors in an orderly fashion at lock up. 
70 
In a booklet given to inmates upon their arrival at the Reception area, 
34 offences are specifically set out. 7 I 
Once an incident report is formally submitted, 	the offender appears 
before the Disciplinary Committee, consisting of the Chief and Deputy 
70Law Department, CSD, Standing Orders, A9. 
71 Instructions and Information for the Guidance of Prisons, Prisons 
Department, Tasmania. 
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Chief Superintendents. 	The Security CPO is also present in case of 
trouble. 	Although the Senior Management team is present, it is the 
Chief Superintendent who decides whether the charge is dismissed, or the 
inmate punished by admonition., loss of remission or incarceration in N 
Division - the prison punishment section. 
Although an officer can charge the inmate with any of fence he thinks is 
against the 'good order' of the prison ( see No. 34 in Appendix ) the 
realities are quite different. it is questionable . if the average 
officer is cognisant of all inmate offences, or of the offences which he 
can commit. 72 	Normally, the officer will make a report if he is 
abused, assaulted, or witnesses a fracas between inmates. 	The officer 
is encouraged to 'report' any infraction of the rules, but most are 
cynical about the outcome of the disciplinary meeting. Allegations of 
'softness' by Senior Management and 'being on the crim's side' combine 
with a reticence to be involved in inmate infractions to reduce the 
number pf reports submitted by experienced staff. 	The new officer will 
normally be 'tested' by inmates to determine his character. 	It is 
during this period, until he is 'accepted' by inmates, that an of ficer 
will write most reports. 73 
The 'case-hardened' officer has many informal mechanisms available to 
deal with inmate infraction. Although Standing Orders clearly point out 
that 
72 1n this author's experience, the only time that Standing Orders are 
opened and perused is when promotional opportunities become 
available. 
73 From personal experience and conversations with officers over the 
past 12 years. 
218 
Officers are not empowered to punish prisoners summarily for 
misdemeanours 74 
officers can delay requests, refuse to let inmates into cells other than 
at lockup, fail to pass on messages, limit movement about the prison, 
unduly search inmates and cells, and fail to pass on a request to, for 
example, the education or welfare sections. 
Risdon 	Prison, 	like 	any 	of 	its 	mainland 	counterparts, 	has 	few 
troublemakers amongst both staff and inmates who present management 
problems. 	Eventually the inmates are released. 	RiSdon staff have, on 
average, a long term of service. 	Disrupting inmate behaviour can, if 
need be, 	be overcome by 	force. 	Disrupting of ficer 	tactics are, 
ultimately, subject to decision beyond the Prison. 75 It is suggested 
that senior management at Risdon will increasingly be involved with the 
officer aspect of disciplinary procedure. 
Directim the Staff 5:4 
A fundamental management principle is that 
each 	employee 	must 	receive 	instructions 	about 	a 	particular 
operation from only one person . 76 
Smallness of scale and the four levels of middle-to-senior management, 
however, 	preclude a definite application of this principle at Risdon 
Prison. 	Base-grade staff purportedly work under the direction of the 
Duty CPO in charge of the shift. 	The daily prison inspect ion by the 
74 Law Department, CSD, Standing Orders AZ!. 
75Either by Law Department decision, or industrial Tribunal. 
76 Stoner et al, op.cit. 
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PPO, Security CPO, Deputy and Chief Superintendents, at varying times 
can issue in directives to officers. 	The major difficulty would appear 
to lie in the nature of the organisational structure. 	The prison 
essentially combines paramilitary and bureaucratic ideals. 	While the 
prison 	attempts 	to 	present 	the appearance of a 	highly stratified 
organisation with a determined chain of command the formal mechanisms to 
implement this are rarely activated. 	The tendency to use authority by 
virtue of rank precludes any movement towards formalising procedures. 
Coyle, in his seminal work on the Scottish Prison Officer, described the 
Scottish Prison system as a 'Machine Bureaucracy' . 77 	The basic 
elements of a machine bureaucracy are a highly rationalised operating 
core, 	standardised 	working 	procedures, 	obsession 	,vi th control, 	and 
considerable managerial power , 78 but as Mintzberg points out 
... the operating core of the Machine Bureaucracy is not designed 
to handle conflict ... . 79 
Thus, in' order to achieve the control it requires, 
it must mirror the narrow specialisation of its operating core in 
its management structure." 
To effect this control Machine Bureaucracy is left with "only one 
coordinating mechanism, direct supervision". 81 Management attempts to 
77Coyle, unpublished thesis, op .cit 
78 Mintzberg, op.cit. , pp. 314-322. 
79 ibid, p.340. 
 
8 libid, p.341. 
  
     
220 
achieve standardisation, 	or routine, 	in prisons. 	It is 	Mintzberg's 
conclusion that 
the greater the use of standardisation for coordination, th larger 
the size of the work unit. 82 
In this sense, Risdon Prison fits the typology presented by Mintzberg 
for several reasons. 
Risdon Prison has a 'flat' organisational structure. 	It has, in effect, 
three hierarchical levels (see Figure 2, previous Chapter). 	The largest 
work group, base-grade staff, is supervised by the CP0s. 	Their avenue 
of appeal 	against administrative direction, 	however, 	begins at 	the 
prison's top leve1. 83 	It may be argued that the CPO directly 
supervises his staff but, 	because the majority of the shifts have 
designated posts 	(see 	Figure l), 	he effectively only directs those 
officers who are 'spare'. 	His is a coordinating role for the shift; 	he 
arranges relief for the staff and, if necessary, arranges out-of-hours 
transport for inmate hospital requirements, or inmate receiving. 84 	The 
overall 	coordinating 	role 	for 	the 	prison 	belongs 	to 	the 	Chief 
Superintendent. 	He not only holds the formal power, by virtue of his 
work, but the informal power 
since that resides in knowledge, and only at the top of the 
hierarchy does the segmented knowledge [for the overall 
organisation plan] come together. 85 
82 ibid, p.139. 
83Law Department, CSD, Standing Order, 0D9. 
84 During the day, these duties are performed by the PPO who works from 
Sam - 5pm. 
85 Mintzberg, op.cit., p.322. 
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The prison senior management can, however, be placed in a paradoxical 
position if they insist on a formal chain of command reporting upwards 
to them. On the one hand, they may wish to preserve, or even enhance, 
the image of a paramilitary organisation with a well-defined rank 
structure. On the other hand 
a fundamental dilemma faces the top managers of the Machine 
Bureaucracy as a result of the centralisation of the structure and 
the emphasis on reporting through the chain of authority. In times 
of change when they most need to spend time getting the "tangible 
detail" they are overburdened with decisions coming up the 
hierarchy for resolution. 	They are, therefore, reduced to acting 
superficially, with inadequate, abstract information. 86 
It may be argued that the 'unity of command' principle has little 
application in Risdon Prison because of the organisational structure, 
and machine bureaucratic tendencies. Mintzberg has suggested that unit 
grouping is one of the most powerful design parameters available to 
management . 87 These units can be based on six broad groupings. 88 
These categories can all be found in Risdon with both positive and 
negative applications: 
a) 	Grouping_ by Knowledge and Skill 
Prison 	reception, 	prison 	records, 	finger 	printing 	and 	photographic 
facilities, and the admission and discharge functions 	including court 
warrants - could be centralised into one unit. 	At present they are 
located in three separate areas. 	The practice of keeping prisoner 
86 ibid, p.344. 
87 ibid, p.107. 
88 ibid, pp. I 08- I 1 1 . 
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records outside the prison in the 'Admin Block' means that they are not 
readily available out of hours; 	a consequence which could delay 
important information facilitation. 	Additionally,  the ready access to 
information 	could 	aid 	the 	daily 	Deputy 	Requests 	and 	bi -weekly 
classification Committee meetings. 	The present practice is to request 
files on an 'as need' basis. 
Another grouping could combine the educational, library and welfare 
sections. 	Currently the education section and library, are housed in the 
same building. 	A centralisation of these 'professional' services would 
have benefits for both staff 89 and easy inmate access to the Welfare 
Service when attending the education or library sections. Provision 
could be made for inmates who wanted to seek Welfare assistance outside 
library times. It also has the added advantage in controlling movement 
when services are based in the same building. 
b) 	Grouping by Work Process and Function 
The physical structure at Risdon Prison was purposely planned to keep 
the cell divisions in one part of the institution and the work shop 
areas in another: the only except ions being N Division (separate  
treatment ) and H Division ( Remandees ), and the Kitchen and Bakehouse 
which is adjacent to the main cell block ( see Figure 1, previous 
Chapter ) . The Hospital has been built at the rear wall of the Prison 
with access both from within the institution and from an outside main 
gate entrance. Staff are largely rostered by work process and function 
89The Welfare and Education sections sometimes overlap - especially 
when dealing with remedial level inmates. 
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- the process being the routine roster posts and functions being 
specific permanent posts. 
c 	Grouping_ by Time 
This is achieved in the Risdon staff example by virtue of the roster. 
The Workshops operate on a weekly basis from 8am - 4pm. The Prison 
Hospital operates on a 24 hour basis being staffed by both custodial and 
nursing of ficers. The non-uniformed administrative staff work normal 
public service hours on a weekly basis. 
d) Grouping bK Output 
This section applies mainly to the Workshop areas and the Prison 
Hospital in the custodial sector, and to the Administrative Officers in 
the non-uniformed sector. 
e) Grouoing_ b_y Client 
Although smallness of scale has prevented senior management from 
effectively segregating the various categories of inmates, some attempt 
has been made in this direction. 	B Division, for example, is used to 
house the inmates who work in the prison Laundry. 	E Division nor.nally 
houses those on protection; 	they mainly work in the Tailor's shop. 
Division is used for those employed in the Kitchen and Bakehouse and 
fire crew squads. 	A Division is used for the inmates employed on 
'outside' groups - Government House and Risdon Prison grounds - and for 
'first of fenders'. 	C <St D Divisions usually house the recidivists who 
work in a variety of locations. 
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f) 	Grouping by Place 
This section does not relate 	primarily to Risdon 	Prison, but 	the 
Tasmanian Prison System per se. 	The rationale behind this section is 
geographical location. 	Tasmania, as already noted, has a Prison Farm, 
a separate Female Prison, and several gazetted Prisons at Launceston, 
Devonport and Burnie. 
The 'Unity of Command' principle could, perhaps, be utilised in R isdon 
Prison if modifications were made using the unit system. 	A good example 
would be the unitisation of each of the Prison divisions. 	A permanent 
custodial crew could be allocated to a division under the command of an 
SP:). 	The SPO would be rostered day shift with the other of ficers 
working the 24 hour cycle. 	Sufficient staff would need to he provided 
to allow for days off duty but it is suggested that two SPOs and four 
base-grade staff would maintain this level. 
OperatiOnal  Direction 5:5  
Stoner et al suggests 
These operations 	within 	the organisation that have 	the same 
objective should be directed by only one manager using one plan. 90 
The major difficulty affecting R isdon Prison's direction is the emphasis 
placed by the Law Department on providing „ a  uniform approach to 
corrections philosophy". 91 	The amalgamation of the former Prisons 
Department 	with 	the 	Probation 	and 	Parole 	Division 	of 	the 
"Stoner et al, op.cit. 
9 ILaw Department CSD Staff Newsletter, op.cit. 
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Attorney-General's 	Department 	saw 	the creation of 	the Corrective 
, Services Division of the Law Department. The Heads of each former 
agency now came under the control of a 'Director of Corrective 
Services'. The Director is responsible to the Secretary of the Law 
Department for the 
	
control 	and 	adrninistrtion 	of 	the 	Corrective 	Services 	Division 
( including Prison, Probation and Parole Services ) . 92 
The change from Departmental to Divisional status has not materially 
affected the nature of the prison operations thus far. The only 
significant difference appears to he the perceived loss of authority of 
the Head of the prison branch - the Chief Superintendent. Industrial 
disputes 	involving 	the TPO A 	and Law Department hierarchy have 
highlighted his apparent demotion. 	This has been cemented by the 
location 	of 	the 	Director outside the 	main 	prison 	building in 	the 
Administrative Offices, 	next door to the Chief Superintendent. 	A 
similar situation occurred under the former Prisons Department. 
During 	his 	investigation 	into 	Risdon 	Prison 	Administration, 	Grubb 
commented on the fact that the Controller of Prisons was situated next 
door to the Superintendent of the Prison. 93 Grubb recommended 
that 	earnest 	consideration 	should  be given 	to 	establishing_ the 
office of _ Controller in the Administrative  Centre of the City of 
Hobart 
This 	recommendation 	was 	never 	implemented and 	prison 	staff 	still 
recognise the of fice of Controller, or as it is now known - Director of 
92Advertisernent for Director of Corrective Services, Tamsanian 
Government Gazette. 
93 Grubb Report, op.cit. , p.24. 
94ibid. 
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Corrective Services, as being the head of the system. 	Hpon the for , ner 
Controller's retirement, 	the Superintendent became Acting Controller, 
and following the creation of the Law Department, was then appointed to 
the first Director of Corrective Services. Prison staff, in the main, 
thought tha t the position of head remained unchanged, with the status 
being merely enhanced by a new title. 95 Again, this perception was 
reinforced by the Head of the new Division being the former Head of 
Prisons. 
As was noted earlier, the amalgamation has produced little apparent 
change in the functioning of the Prison. The creation of d CPO 
selection committee for promotional purposes has underlined the prison's 
custodial emphasis although the future appointment of a ne.w Director i.nay 
change this . 96 However, the integration of prisons with probation and 
parole has been questioned. 
'Ve . 	now 	have 	in 	Australia, 	'corrective', 	'correctional . ' 	and 
'corrections' rather than 'prison' departments. 	This is not so much 
a reversion to early nineteenth century English labelling but 
To ther follows the adoption of an American practice - a practice of 
very dubious validity - of grouping together prison, probation and 
parole personnel under a single admi nistra tion. 97 
It is perhaps too soon to predict the effect a new Director will have on 
R isdon Prison. 	His background and experience will no doubt be ma jor 
determinants. 	If he comes from a non-prison environment, he may wish to 
95 From general discussions with prison staff. 
96 A ccording to the Acting Director, the Law Department wishes to 
'upgrade' the position of Director and seek, perhaps, a 
criminologist to head the divsion - discussions with A/Director,  ,
25.11.87. 
97 Rinaldi , op.cit. p.3. 
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change the nature of the prison's operation. 	If, on the other hand, he 
has prison experience, he may retain the status quo. 	Again, he may 
leave the direction in the hands of the Chief Superintendent. 	The Chief 
Superintendent does, however, require a plan of action. 	The 	former 
Director of Corrective Services and the former Deputy Chief 
Superintendent have both claimed that they were given only 'operating' 
instructions. 98 The present prison management practices still appear 
to reflect the dominant persuasion of the early administrators. 
When the Gaol Department was established in 1936 the Governor was Lt Col 
M Mullen. 	His background was military and he had served as the 
Governor of Campbell Street Prison since 1928." He was followed by Lt 
Col 3 J Scanlon in 1945. 	The militaristic practice of management 
continued. 	Scanlon retired in 1955 and the Governrnent appointed the 
executive officer, W T Lonergan, to the position. 	Lonergan had --no 
practical 	prison 	experience 	and 	discipline 	rapidly 	broke 	down 	at 
Campbell Street. 100 	It was not until the appointment Of D Hornibrook 
in 1959 as Deputy Governor that order was restored. 101 	Hornibrook's 
background was, again, military, and he had already served in a senior 
prison management capacity as Director of a camp for insurgents in 
Malaya during the emergency. 102 	Hornibrook retired in 1981 and his 
98 See Howe, op.cit. , and discussion with B 3 Westwood, former Deputy 
Chief Superintendent. 
99 See Wettenhall , R U, A Guide To Tasmanian Administration, Hobart: 
1968, Platypus, p.91, for details of all Prison Governors and 
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position as the Superintendent of Risdon Prison was taken by a former 
Royal Air Force Of ficer. 103 
Until 	1985, 	with 	the 	exception 	of 	the 	period 	1955-1961, 	prison 
management practice has been governed by militaristic tendencies and 
procedures. Effectively, 50 years of this tradition has culminated in 
each successor continuing and building on a practice that reflected 
society's view of prisons as Paramilitaristic and custodial. The 
bureaucratisation of prisons has added to the firm grounding of these 
procediJres. The result, now, is that new administrators are schooled in 
the old practices and the system becomes self perpetuating, and inert. 
In his reply to a questionnaire from South Africa, the present Chief 
Superintendent did not view experience as a Prison Manager as a 
prerequisite for promotion .within the system. 104 Instead he was of the 
opinion that • a bureaucratic public service career "based on practical 
experience" was the necessary attribute. 105 
It would appear that in the Risdon Prison example, the formulation of an 
overall plan will not come from the prison branch; 	rather it will be 
left to either the new Director, or the Law Department. 	Failing this, 
the prison administration by senior management will be on a bandaiding 
basis, curing rather than preventing. 
103Howe, op.cit. 
104R e-i- p y to questionnaire from South African Prison Services, 1986, 
p.5. 	Prison File 13/1/2A. 
105 ibid, p.7. 
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Seeking_  a Common Goal 5:6 
A major difficulty in any organisation is the channeling of efforts to 
ensure efficiency, and it has been noted, 
In any undertaking, the interests of employees should not take 
precedence over the interests of the organisation as a whole. 106 
However, this is not always the case. 	The Public Service of Tasmania 
has a career structure based on a 'merit' rather than the 'seniority' 
principle. 107 	Whilst this is true for those who wish to advance within 
the 'generalist' framework of the service transferring between 
Departments as promotional opportunities arise - the 'specialist' nature 
of the prison organisation precludes the advancement of the prison 
off icer within other Departments. If he wishes to remain a prison 
of ficer his only avenue for advancement is promotion within the prison 
system per se. 	Again, because of the smallness of the system there is 
very 1itle prospect on average. 	The officer may enrol in courses to 
further his promotional chances hut the caining of qualifications does 
not ensure advancement. 108 Some research, however, claims prison 
of ficers can be investigated only by understanding the staffing model 
for their organisation. 
In 1982, King postulated three models of staf ring which Inight be applied 
106Stoner et al, op.cit. 
107 A recommendation of the Cartland Report into Tasmanian Government 
dministrtaion, [981. 	• 
108 A f ter management recommended the promotion of three base-grade 
officers - who had the minimal education and service 
qualifications, one officer - who had spent four years on an after 
hours supervising course - appealed and won. 
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to a prison service. 109 	The first is the military model - so called 
because of the adoption by 18th century prisons of the uniforms, 
trappings, 	insignia 	and 	rank 	structure 	of 	the 	military 	for 	their 
custodial staff. 	Criminologists have condemned this model and its so 
called 
military martinets who knew only how to obey an order and were 
resistant to reform. 110 
The second model is of a professional service, under which prison 
officers might be deemed to be in a position analogous to nursing staff 
in hospitals. As King suggests 
it is important to remember that prison of ficers did not resist 
treatment and training because they were obstinate and cussed, but 
because it did not make sense in the context in which they were 
required to work. 1 1 
The final model, a wage-labour model, is the one "which predominates 
toddy in the prison service". 112 King suggests that it is also the 
model which is likely to prevail in the forseeable future. 113 
The Tasmanian Prison Officer has moved along a continuum using King's 
first and third models, with his union - the T PGA - trying to maintain 
the military mode. 	The reality, however, is that of ficers in Risdon 
Prison approximate King's 'wage-labour' model. 	The limited promotional 
109 King, R 0, "Industrial Relations in the Prison Service", The Harvard 
Journal, XXI, 1982, pp.71-75. 
110 ibid, p.72. 
111 ibid. 
112d. 
113 ibid, p.73. 
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opportunities and lack of tangible job satisfaction (a consequence of 
non-involvement 	in prison programmes other 	than custodial ) ;nilitate 
against retention of interest in organisational goals. 	Fiven if the Law 
Department's statement of achieving a unified approach to corrections is 
taken 	at 	its 	face 	value, 	the 	motivated officer 	finds 	the reality 
different from the rhetoric. 	Tasmania, like other prison systems, has 
used specialists to cater for prison inmate programmes. 114 
The 	introduction of specialists continues to be ,a 	najor 	cause 	for 
concern, not only for these role incumbents, but for the whole prison 
system. 	Prison Officers see the professional staff as part of a 
liberalised approach to man-management which sometimes unacceptably 
criticises their own function. 	Thomas notes that the introcinction of 
specialists has had two effects on the English prison service. 	The 
first has been to narrow the role of the officer, "to heighten its 
coercive overtones" 115 and !I t o contribute to its definition as starkly 
custodial". 116 The second has been to add to the "overall 
deterioration in the administration of the service". 117 In the 
immediate future, Thomas sees the prison officer role as being purely 
custodial , and because of the primary controlling task, 
	
there 	is a simple, 	inescapable 	irreducible conflict between 	the 
staff, especially the uniformed officer, and the prisoner. 11 g 
114 Psychiatrists, Psychologists, Social Workers and Teachers. 
115Thomas (1972 ) op.cit., p.199. 
1 l6 
117 ibid. 
118 ib1d, p.162. 
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Emery agrees: 
given the requirements of security and good order, the role of the 
ordinary officer cannot be defined as that of also being the 
prisoners friend and counciller.  . 119 
However, specialists spend only a limited amount of tine with the inmate 
compared to the officer and, as Allen and Simonsen note, 
inmates are most strongly influenced by those persons who spend the 
most time with them. At present, correctional of ficers and work 
supervisors, rather than treatment specialists, are most likely to 
be influential. 120 
The authors claim that the correctional, or base-grade prison of ficer is 
long recognized as the single ;nost important agent for chan., e in 
institutions... [21 
Remuneration 5:7 
Compensation for work done should be fair to both employees and 
employers. 122 
In the 	prison system it 	is difficult 	to measure tangibles such as 
productivity. 	The yardstick must therefore be time spent by the staff 
on 	the 	job. 	Prison 	staff 	salaries 	for 	the 	financial 	year 	198()/37 
amounted to just under $5.5 million. The prison of ficer receives a 
basic salary and adds to this through penalty allowances for afternoon 
shift ( 15%), night shift ( 15% ), Saturday and Sunday ( 100% ), recalls from 
of f duty (200%) and other overtime ( 50%). He is granted allowances for 
119 Emery, op.cit., p.96. 
120Allen & Simonsen, op .cit , p.382. 
121 ibid. 
122Stoner et al, op.cit. 









2.3% award increase 	 - 
SO% and 100% 	 456,033 
15% 	 95,066 
523,397 
shift 	 57,318 
standby 13,709 
unarmed combat 	 47,803 
SPO examination 14,334 
weapon handling 	 19,072 
expenses of office I , 500 
other 	 2,402 
higher duty 	 30,573 
extra duty 12,311 
annual leave loading 	 79,854 
5,466,797 
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unarmed combat, weapon handling, higher duty allowance and for passing a 
promotional examination (see Figure 2). 123 The average salary of a 
base-grade prison of ficer at Risdon during the financial year 1986/87 
was approximately $26,000. 124 










If the officer is willing to work all available overtime, he can earn in 
the region of $30,000 at Risdon. 125 overtime payments in recent years 
have outstripped estimates. 126 	Management requires d prescribed number 
I 23From Law Department Consolidated Fund notes, op .cit , 1826. 
I 24From conversations with base-grade staff at f-I MP Prison. 
I 25This was accornlished by several base-grade of ficers last financi.il 
year. 
126 n amount of $350,000 was provided for 1935/36. However, the final 
cost reached $528,897. Law Department Consolidated Fund Notes, 
op .cit , p.1827. 
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of officers to run and service the prison. 127 	If Governments are 
reluctant to provide further staf fing it appears that overtime is the 
only option open for inanagement unless the organisation is 
restructured. 128 
One reason for the increase in overtime has been the formulation of a 
new roster to accommodate the 33 hour week. This provides prison 
of ficers with two leave periods a year, that is four ,veeks leave for 
each six months work period. Another lies in the „fact that no provision 
has been made for the creation of new positions like the recently 
created Education Section Prison Officer. This position has therefore 
been filled by taking an officer from the normal complement which staffs 
the roster. 	The loss of roster Staff is countered by of fering the blank 
space on the roster as a 'recall'. 129 	The constant working of both 
normal and overtime hours tends to increase staff sickness, 130 thereby 
perpetuating the overtime syndrome as off duty staff have to be recalled 
for those reporting sick. 
Since the creation of the new State Services Act for Tasmania, each 
Agency is allocated a finite amount of finance. 131 	The Head of Agency 
127 An agreement on minimum ;naming levels was agreed by La ,w Department 
and the TPOA 
128 Dr Ken Kerte points out that it is false economy having lin!ini tel 
e.Kpe:Iditure. 	'le claim.; 'overstaffing' is more cost ef iectve 
interview, Hobart, 3.2.33. 
129A 'double time' shift. 
130TP0A claims to rebut allegations of sick leave abuse. TPOA media 
release, October, 1986. 
131 Discussions with Chief Superintendent. 
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apportions the funds to each Division which has to submit an estimate of 
running costs for the coining year. 	The Prison Division has found that 
"it 	is 	absolutely 	i:npossible 	to 	keep 	to 	budget". 132 	The 	former 
Controller was quite explicit as to the reason. 	He claimed it was 
"considerable misuse 	.. and abuse of sick leave". 1 33 	The tenure of 
service enjoyed by prison officers in Tasmania negates most inanage , nent 
attempts at 	disciplinary 	dismissal. 134 	Those 	who 	'abuse' 	the 	sick 
leave provisions do so in the knowledge that . nanageinent can;i..)t 
this is the Law Department's domain - or are loathe to set in motion 
procedures which could materially affect the industrial harmony of the 
prison. 
The Centralisation of Prison Decision-making: a Two-Fold Exercise? 5:8 
Stoner et at comment, 
Decreasing 	the 	role 	of 	subordinates 	in 	decision-making 	is 
centralisation; increasing their role is decentralisation. 135 
This rationale is acceptable if the organisation is small and is not a 
subsidiary. 	Centralisation of the Tasmanian Prison System has occurred 
on two levels. 	The loss of Departmental status, and subsequent transfer 
of responsibili ty to the La Ar Department , has effectively reduced top 
level decision-making at senior-management level. 	Paradoxically, 	the 
132Hornibrook , oo.cit. 
133 ibid. 
1341t has become more difficult under the new State Services Act to 
dismiss employees because of the avenues of appeal. 
1 35 Stoner et at, op. cit  . 
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change 	in 	status 	of 	senior 	prison 	management 	has 	increased 
centralisation wi thin 	the prison. 	This antithesis has added to the 
strain of normal daily prison management. 
Both Thomas and Coyle 136 have remarked on the remoteness felt by staff 
towards Head Office. 	Before centralisation those directing the prisoi 
service vore !clown and recognisable. 	After centralisation, the leaders 
were not so identifiable. 137 	Whilst the same y not be so' evident in 
Tasmania, the authority of senior prison management has been diminished 
by the subjection of major decision-making to Head Office. 133 This 
loss of authority is also indicated by the negotiating attitudes of the 
TP0A, which frequently bypasses the chain of command, in seeking 
meetings with the Secretary of the Law Department. It [may be however 
that 	these 	meetings 	are 	not 	to 	be 	the 	decisioil—naking 	vehicles 
anticipated by the Union. 
In an address to the Prison Officers Association of Australia (POA ) 
Conference in Hobart, the Secretary of the Law Department recognised 
that the prison sta. If had reservations about the Head Office 
management. 139  On the other hand, 
Prison management and head office rnanage , nent were suspicious of the 
activities of the Union. 140 
136Thomas in King and Morgon, op.cit, p.138, and Coyle, unpublished 
thesis, op.cit. 
137Thomas, in King and Morgan, op.cit. 
138 Prison Officers of Australia Annual Conference, Ho:-)..- i rt, May 1986 
Minutes, p.5, Address by the Secretary of the Law Department. 
139 Prison Officers of Australia Annual Conference, Hobart, May 1986 
Minutes, p.5, Address by the Secretary of the Law Department. 
140ibid. 
237 
The ramifications of this centralisation policy ( which was inspired by 
a former Attorney 141 ) have yet to be understood. 	One major concern of 
staff is that Head Of fice has little prison knowledge. 142 	Another 
frequent criticism by those within the prison system is that the overall 
management of the service is handled by functional bureaucrats. The  
Tasmanian Head of Agency did lit tle to allay those fears when addressing 
the POAA conference: he spoke as one 
who comes to the Administration of prisons with., no background in the 
iflatter. 143 
Access to the Head is dependent upon the Secretary's schedule. 	The 
former Director of Corrective Services thought that the Secretary 
had too , nuch on his plate ... too difficult to contact. 144 
He maintained that prisons were a 
political football and in a day to day sit ation 	you cannot 
get „hold of the boss, what do you do? 14) 
The former Controller and Director were both adamant that the prison 
service needed its own identity separate from other -Agency control. 146 
141 See Bingham, op .cit. 
142A frequently heard staff observation is "what do they (Head Office) 
know?". 
143 P0OA Conference, o 	, p.4. 
144H owe , 
145 ibid. 
146 Hornibrook, op .cit , Howe, op.cit. 
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It was disastrous as far as the [prison] was concerned. 	Prisons are 
one 	of 	the 	most 	difficult 	portfolios 	... 	difficult 	for 	prison 
administrator if he cannot get [the] ear of the Minister .. . the 
administration should not have to go through another agent to ge t to 
his head. 147 
The former Director felt that there should be a "Justice Departmen with 
its own Minister". 148 Hornibrook, however summed up the fears of most 
staff about centralisation 
when authority is removed from management 	prisoners see a 
weakening of [the] position. 149 ' 
Centralisation within the prison has increased since the creation of the 
post of Chief Superintendent. 	The genesis of this may be traced to the 
last decade of the old Prison's Department. Although there .,vas 
designated hierarchy through which subordinates could rise, promot 
effectively stopped at the CP .) level. This was primarily a result of 
the 	niiii rnal 	educational 	prerequisite 	of 	Grade 	6 	for 	prison 	of f icer 
employment . 	The Deputy Governor/Superintendent position fell vacant on 
three occasions after 1970 but, despite many CPO applications, 
promotions were made within the prison becaus(,- the Devi ty posit on 
required at least matriculation qualifications. 	9 ornibrook was of the 
opinion 	that 	the 	best prison 	administrators came 	from 	those 	,vho 
progressed up through the ranks, 
but the Tasmanian Prison System was handicapped because of the 
recrui tiig p o li cy . 150 
147 Hornibrook, op .cit 
I 48Howe, op.cit. 
149Hornibrook, op.cit. 
1501-iornibrook, op. cit  
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His only other option in determining the future incu nhent was 
. 'appropriate 	insti tutional 	experience, 	or 	d 	related 	discipline 	such 
as probation and parole . 151 
It should be remembered that until the early 1970s the custodial nature 
of Risdon Prison was the dominant policy. 
The appointment in 1970 of a probation and parole officer, .1 Howe, to 
the Deputy's position saw a change in the , nanagemen t1 C 70 interaction. 
The 	previous 	docdde 	was comparatively 	stable . .vi ti 	the 	relationshio 
between the then Deputy and CP:Ds being developed over a long period. 
The new incumbent took two years to adjust to the position, 152 and it 
is possible that his later opinion was formulated during this period. 
Howe later claimed that he was "not happy with the calibre of CP0u. 153 
and found it di If icult to get a "chain of command , educationally". 154 
The domirlallt 	custodial nature of Risdon began to change during the 
early 1970s, partly as a result of the 1972 riot and, perhaps, because 
of the views of the Deputy on prison management. 	During this period, 
the CPOs had considerable delegated authority due to the then practice 
of the CP'D following, his 'shift' or group of staff for a set period. 155 
This practice enabled both the CPO and his shift to become familiar with 





155He worked with the same crew for a three week period. 
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1980 ended the arrangement with the result that during any one week, the 
group could have several CPUs in charge of a particular shift. Although 
the CPUs still retained the 'formal' delegated authority, the infor:ridl 
interaction base between CPO and group staff was eroded. 
At the beginning of the 1930s, 	the Controller of Prisons and 	he 
Superintendent announced their intentions to retire. 	Within a year he 
Deputy rose to be Acting Controller. 	An increased emphasis on inmate 
programmes, and the opening of the Prison lospita1 . , for. both psychiatric 
and general inmate patients, saw a deterioration in the CPU's authority. 
Not only had the CPO lost the group interaction, but he increasingly no.v 
had to refer to Senior Management as to prison practice and methods of 
handling inmates ho, ised in the Prison Hospital . 	A further erosion of 
his authority coincided 	with the subsequent hiring of prison, nursing 
staff. 	Prior to the Hospital's opening, a prison medical orderly looked 
after the inmates' medical requirements in conjunction with a visiting 
geiierdl 	practi tione( he 	CP7) acted a; intermediary bet •een inma tes' 
requests 	and 	treatment 	provision and 	directed 	the 	medical 	orderly 
regarding 	security 	arrangements. 	Immediately 	after 	the 	Hospi tal's 
opening, nursing staff were seconded from the Royal Der went Hospital but 
they 	were utilised only on a day shi f t basis. 	Because of their 
seconlme ■ it , these nurses still deferred to the duty CPO. The provision 
to stall the Hospital on a 24 hour basis led to the recruitment of 
prison nursing Staff and the appointment of a permanent Nursing :-)f f icer 
in Charge. The functions and authority originally held by the .C1 3 0 now 
passed to the Hospital staff. • 
The Deputy's position again became vacant ii l9I, through promotion tki 
the pus i tom) of Superintendent and as a result of the recruitment 
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prescription, and managerial preference for an outside appointment , I 56 
againa Literal aPPOintlient 	as made. 	The covert gap between senior and 
middle mangement perhaps became fonnalised at this point. As the 
training of the Deputy consisted of 'sitting in with the Governor'. [ 57 
or Superintendent. 158 it can be assumed that the attitudes of the 
previous Deputy were passed Oil. Any attempt by the CP -Ds to regain 
authority was shortcircuited by the re tire•nent of the Controller in 1931 
and the appointment of both Deputy and Superintendent to 
positions. 	Authority and 	power 	became centralised 	in 	these 	two 
posi tions. 
The creation of the Law Department took place in 1984. 	To facilitate 
the transfer of power and decision-making from the prison a Corrective 
Services Implementation Committee ;vas set up. 	Although the former 
division 	of 	probation 	and 	parole 	was 	to 	be 	included 	in 	the 	n(-_-.■/ 
Corrective Services Division, the committee was largely C01)(2(-' 1 ■ WC.1 	vi th 
prison iriat ters. 	The Acting Controller and Acting Deputy reprc.seiii.1 the 
prison on the Committee. 	Decisions taken by this Commi ttee very rarely 
filtered through to the middle rnandge , n, 	- the CP0s. 	Middle manage nen t 
and the rest of the prison staff let t isolated and the prison was ri fe 
t:h rumours. 	Much of the fear expressed by the CPOs was in relation to 
the alleged 	interchange of staff be t •ween prison and probation 	.ind 
par01 , ". 	t was rumoured that senior probation and parole st,if If .yere 
156 ibid. 
157 ibid. 
158 Discussions with Deputy Chief Superintendent. 
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eligible 	for 	promotion 	to 	the 	middle 	and 	senior 	levels 	of 	prison 
management. 	To alleviate these fears the Attorney-General issued a 
newsheet denying the intention of such change. 159 	The Attorney-General 
spec' f icall y stated that each branch of the Division would retain its 
separate identi ty and functions. 160 No transfers between branches and 
Ste f f wonld tat<e place. 16 1 
The establishment of the CPO Committee in 1984 appeared to restore some 
semblance of authority to middle management and, was initially vvel I 
received by CP0s. 162 Most were of the opinion that a form of democracy 
existed during this period. Meetings were held on a regular basis. No 
such format had existed before; 	"meetings happened when and if. [There 
was] no formal structure". 163 
	
The regularity of the rneetings decreased 
upon the appointment of the new Chief Superintendent and nost CPOs 
became disillusioned. The nature of the newly creeted posi i.),1 vas', in 
pert, responsible for this but the retire nent of the Director also meant 
that thi.s authority was vested de facto in the Chief Superintendent. 
The CP)s found the meetings to be vehicles for senior managerial fiat. 
Voluntary attendance of off-duty CPOs diminished. As one CPO has 




162Conversations with CP0s. 
I 63Howe, op.cit. 
164Conversation with CPO. 
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It would appear that many of the maoagerial problems evident in Risdon 
Prison can be resolved by a return of delegated authority to middle 
management aid perhaps a restoration of the former CPO roster. The 
chasm between middle management and senior level staff could be reducil 
if a promotion 	:flade .within the prison to Deputy Chief Superintendent 
level. 	'dowever, since there are no applicants from outside the prison 
for the position of CPO and the present group 	CPOs have only minimum 
qualifications, K 5 the chances of this happening ar:- iight. 
Diffusion of Power and Authority 5:9 _ _ 	 _ 
A central tenet of hierarchical organisations is tint 
The line of authority ... runs in order of rank from top management 
to the lo .vest level of the enterprise. 1) 
If the organisation is run on a bureaucratic premise this tenet should 
hold true. 	The formal rank structure of Risdon Prison ,was noted in the 
previous Chapter. 	It was suggested that, a!though the prison authorities 
perceive 	the 	organisation to be paramilitary, 	the actual chain of 
command bypasses several of the designated ranks. In this sense Risdon 
staff do not 'fit' into a formal legal-rational bureaucratic model, or 
the military concept of a structured rank hierarchy. The 
paramilitaristic trappings of uniforms and insignia may . be the only 
indications that the organisation is so modelled. Traditionally, former 
military personnel were attracted to the prison service because they 
thought that was an extension of military service. The authorities 
165Controller's comments on applicants, Prison files, oo.cit. 
I 66Stoner, et al, op.cit., p.48. 
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recruited ex-servicemen on the premise that they would obey commands and 
impose discipline on those under their charge. In reality, the prison 
environment is far removed from the structure and authority implicit in 
service life. Civilian recruits, on the other hand, may regard the 
wearing of uniforms as purely functional. 
It has been suggested that there are two major theoretical approaches to 




The classical view is that authority originates at the 
top level of society or organisation and is legitimately passed down 
through each subordinate level. 	Management has the right to give orders 
and subordinates have the obligation to obey. 	By entering and remaining 
in an organisation, the subordinate recognises this managerial right and 
normally accepts directives. 168 
The acceptance view of authority is that influence is the major 
determinant. 	If a group of people ref use to accept commands or 
directives, the authority of the order ceases. 169 Barnard has 
described the conditions under which a subordinate will accept higher 
authority: 
A person can and will accept a communication as authoritative only 
when four conditions simultaneously obtain: (a) he can and does 
understand the communication; 	( b ) at the time of his decision he 
believes 	that 	it 	is not inconsistent 	with 	the purpose of the 
organisation; 	(c ) at the time of his decision he believes it to be 
compatible with his personal interest as a whole; 	and (d) he is 
able mentally and physically to comply with it. 170 
167 ibid, p.355.. 
168ibid . 
169ibid. 
170Simon , H A, Administrative Behaviour: A Study of Decision-making  
Processes in Adminstrative Organisation, 1961: New York, Macmillan 
pp.133-134. 
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One of the major problems for staff at Risdon Prison lies in the 
contradictory directives to prison functioning issuing from the Law 
Department and senior management on the one hand, and middle level 
management on the other. Senior managerial practice is to take a more 
'humane' approach in dealing with inmates. The CPOs in the main are, by 
virtue of training and previous Departmental practice, custodially 
oriented, 	and 	base-grade 	staff 	training 	is 	directed 	towards 	the 
custodial nature of the work. 	Experience has taught that promotional 
prospects depend upon proven competence in this area. 	Faced with this 
divergence of perception senior management has to develop strategies 
aimed at reconciliation, but related to a general policy for the prison. 
There is a danger in developing strategies only to ease management and 
staff relationships: 
When a manager continually eases rules and changes procedure to 
accommodate subordinates, they will suspect that he or she is not 
flexible but weak and indecisive. 171 
Prisons :focus on power relationships. 	By virtue of his office, the most 
powerful person in the prison is the senior manager. 	Successful 
management of the prison will be largely determined by his use of power. 
Katter, in a study of American managers, suggested the following six 
characteristics were to be found among those who used their power 
successfully: 172 
1) 	Effective managers are sensitive to the source of their power 
and are careful to keep their actions consistent with people's 
expectations. 	For example, specialists with expert power in 
171 Stoner et al, op.cit., p.358. 
172 Katter, 3 P, "Power Dependence and Effective Management", Harvard  
Business Review, 55, No.4, (July-August 1977)pp.135-l36. 
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one 	field might 	lose 	credibility 	if they try to influence 
actions in a different area. 
2 ) 	Good managers understand - at least intuitively - the fine 
basis of power [reward, 	coercive, legitimate, expert, and 
referent] 173 and recognise which to draw on in different 
situations and with different people. They are aware of the 
costs, risks, and benefits of using each kind of power. 
3) 	Effective managers recognise that all bases of power have merit 
in certain circumstances. 	They try to develop their skills and 
credibiliity as they can use whatever method is needed. 	Thus, 
they 	establish 	useful 	alliances 	with 	others 	in 	the 
organisation, 	develop 	expertise, 	and 	generally 	display 
confidence at all times. 
4 ) 	Successful managers have career goals which will allow them to 
develop and use power. 	They seek jobs that will build skills, 
which in turn will make others dependent on them. 	They also 
seek jobs which demand a type of power that they feel 
comfortable using. 
5 ) 	Effective managers temper power with maturity and self control. 
They avoid impulsive or egotistical displays of their power and 
shun tactics which are unnecessarily harsh on others around 
them. 
6) 	Successful managers . know that power is necesary to get things 
done. They feel comfortable in the use of power and accept the 
fact that they must be able to influence the behaviour of 
others to achieve goals. 174 
It has been noted that the Risdon Prison hierarchy effectively consists 
of three levels . - senior, middle and base-grade. 	The senior level 
comprises two positions, those of 	Chief and Deputy Chief Superintendent. 
Authority,  influence and power, traditionally based in the middle levels 
have effectively passed upwards to senior management. 	They, in turn, 
have 	centralised 	the 	decision-making 	process 	and 	little 	delegated 
authority is passed downwards. 	The effectiveness of senior management 
173 F rench & Raven, op . cit  . 
I 74 Katter , op.cit. 
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leadership has been questioned by middle and base-grade levels, partly 
as a result of staff conservatism and inflexibility to change, unclear 
goals, and lack of direction. Management, on the other hand, is subject 
to Law Department edict, ad hoc contingency measures, and little 
long-range planning. According to the former Director, 
something [at the prison] has to go wrong before anything is done 
about it . 175 
The Failure to Appraise 5:10 
Of major concern to the Tasmanian Prison System is the practice of 
keeping all recruits and granting them permanency irrespective of their 
usefulness or capacity to do the work. During this author's 
service, 176 no recruit has had his employment terminated during his 
probationary period . 177 	Those who have left have gone voluntarily, in 
most cases because of the nature of the duties. 	It is highly improbable 
that the selection process is so refined that the correct choice is made 
in each case. 	Senior management selects the aspiring candidates but 
that appears to be the extent of its participation. 	Many of the CPOs 
emphasise that certain officers are incapable of anything but the most 
menial of duties, and then only under constant supervision. 178 There 
is clearly some failure in the appraisal system and a reluctance to 
dismiss those who are unfit for the position. 
175Howe, op.cit. 
176Twelve years - nine as a Prison Officer and three as the Welfare 
Officer 
177Two were advised to resign because of impending criminal and civil 
actions. 
I 78 Discussions with both middle and senior management. 
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Cartland, in his report on Tasmanian Government administration summed up 
the problem: 
The confirmation of probationary appointments calls for ... comment. 
Appointees to the permanent Public Service are usually subject to a• 
period of probation beofre their progression to permanent status is 
confirmed. 	Again, an assessment of their conduct, diligence and 
efficiency is required prior to their confirmation. 	Evidence and 
enquiry suggests that very few appointees fail their probationary 
assessment which appears to be treated in many places with only 
cursory • interest. Instead of expecting objectively high performance 
levels from appointees as evidence of their worth as permanent 
employees, it appears that in many cases, departments and agencies 
are content to grant permanency by default, in the absence of any 
serious misdemeanour of the appointee during the probationary 
period. The implications of such attitudes are both evident and 
serious - staff are admitted to permanencj of tenure in many cases 
on unacceptably low levels of performance. 119 
This retention of the unable means that management may not have 
sufficient staff who can rise through the ranks. Despite the fact that 
a number of officers have passed the promotional examination to the rank 
of SPO, this does not necessarily mean that they are capable of working 
as an SPO, or being promoted further. 
The 	SPO 	eligibility 	examination 	is 	little 	different 	from 	the 	test 
recruits sit in order to be confirmed as permanent public servants. 180 
The success rate for the examination is normally over 95%. 181 	Those 
who resit the paper have a 100% success rate. 182 This paper, like both 
179 Report of Phase II of the Review of Tasmanian Government 
Administration. Second instalment, E3.2.16, Cartland, Sir G, CMG. 
180See copy in Appendix. 
181 Statistics from author's survey of the promotional schools during 
the decade from 1975-1985. 
182ibid 
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initial entry and permanency examination tests, is designed so that 
candidates with the minimal grade 6 educational qualifications can pass. 
In fact, this is the final internal examination paper for promotional 
purposes. There is no promotional examination for CPO. A large number 
of SPOs refuse Acting CPO positions ( see previous Chapter, section on 
Promotion ), and it appears that the majority are quite happy remaining 
at that level. As the SPO level is a designated step in the formal 
hierarchy, the refusal of many to seek further promotion creates a 
barrier for such lower level staff as have aspirations to promotion. As 
it is highly unlikely that base-grade staff will be promoted to CPO 
without first holding the SPO rank, management are thus frustrated in 
their attempts to move the best base-grade prison officers up through 
the system. It is probable that any management attempts to bypass the 
formal hierarchy would meet with Union resistance. 183 
Two innovations, however, would do much to resolve this difficulty: 	the 
institution of a CPO qualifying examination, and the creation of a new 
position between SPO and CPO levels. The CPO qualifying examination 
would be open to anyone who has already passed the SPO course. Course 
length and component details would be subject to Law Department approval 
but should contain units from the behavioural sciences in those 
disciplines appropriate to the prison setting. The course should be of 
such a standard to allow the grading of officers according to ability. 
The duration and timing of the course should coincide with the officers 
183 Although the Secretary of the T POA claimed they would not object to 
this in an interview with the author. 
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work roster as management can substitute spare officers for fulltime 
participants and officers may be stimulated by the change from their 
normal working roster. 
Successful completion of the CPO course would place the individual in 
a category ( assistant Chief or Deputy Chief ) from which the new rank 
would be chosen. 	Selection to CPO level should only come from this new 
rank structure. 	Part of the requirements for rank incumbents is the 
willingness 	to 	be further promoted. 	Those 	failing to 	meet the 
requirements should be demoted. Whilst the number of positions is 
subject to requirements and agency and union negotiation, those who meet 
the initial course requirements could be gazetted in the positions. The 
remainder, and those from further schools could be graded in order of 
pass merit and seniority of course completion. 
While it is accepted that there will always be those who are quite 
willing ; to 	remain 	at 	certain 	levels, 	there 	should 	be 	available 
opportunities for those with higher aspirations. 	Adherence to the 
present 	method and 	prescription for promotion can only enhance 
mediocrity, and institutionalise the dominant custodial practice. 
Small-scale System Relationships  5:11 
According to some authors, "Managers should be both friendly and fair to 
their subordinates", 184 but 	it is suggested that this is 	subject 	to 
size of the organisation. 	A maxim of organisation theory is that the 
larger the organisation the more impersonal are relationships between 
184Stoner et al, op . cit  . , p.48. 
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senior management and the lower levels of subordinate staff. 	In a small 
prison such as Risdon the high intensity of interactions between senior 
management and subordinate staff renders equality of treatment difficult 
to achieve. 
Over a period of several days senior management meets all the staff 
except those rostered on nightshift, and those on leave entitlements. 
They observe the staff during the daily inspection tour of the prison at 
11 am and compare working practices and/or deviations from normal 
routines. This daily interaction has both advantages and disadvantages 
for senior management. 
The normal practice is for senior management to enquire during the 
course of their inspection if an officer has any problems. While this 
managerial approach may well elicit information, it may also be abused 
by those who wish to bypass the normal chain of command for requesting 
an interview with senior management. Acceding to such requests may 
alienate both the inmates on muster, as they must adhere to the formal 
request structure, and other prison officers, who may detect 
preferential 	treatment. 	Conversely, 	if 	management 	ignore 	the 
subordinate 	request, 	they 	invite 	allegations 	of 	remoteness 	and 
disinterest. 
Relationships between senior management and subordinates are perhaps 
most strained on the infrequent occasions when promotional opportunities 
occur. Prior to 1980 the successful appointee to SPO, CPO, or above was 
directly selected by senior management. 	This gave rise to claims of 
bias and favouritism. 	Since 1980 all those eligible for selection can 
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apply. 	The normal selection process is by interview. 	Most applicants, 
however, think that the result has been determined prior to interview. 
The aftermath usually sees a souring of relations between some of the 
unsuccessful applicants and senior management. This development is 
common to all types of organisations but it is exacerbated at Risdon 
because of the smallness of scale. 
On entrance to the prison service the recruit is informed of the 
hierarchical structure. 	He is told he must salute , his superiors and 
address them as 'Sir'. 	His superiors in turn will acknowledge the 
salute and address him as 'Mr' or 'Officer'. 	Since 1982 there has been 
a trend by senior management to address some subordinates on a first 
name basis. 	Although the majority of officers have not taken advantage 
of this situation, it has reduced staff respect for senior 
management. 185 It is common practice for CPOs and lower ranks to -give 
and receive orders on a first name basis, 186  but the limited practice 
by senior management has been greeted with scepticism and evokes charges 
of inequity. 
Risdon Staff Stability 5:12 
An organisation needs stability. Therefore, 
a high employee turnover rate is not good for the efficient 
functioning of the organisation. 187 
185 Many staff are confused, and embarrassed, when this occurs - 
author's conversations with staff. 
186It is normally only the recruit who addresses the CPO as 'Sir'. 
After a few months service he addresses and is addressed by the CPO 
on an informal basis. 
I 87Stoner et al, op .cit  . 
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The maintenance of a stable workforce does not necessarily mean that the 
organisation functions efficiently. The economic climate, lack of 
qualifications, and a better-than-average salary, have resulted in very 
little staff turnover at Risdon Prison for over a decade, apart from the 
normal retirements. This has had a three-fold effect on the prison: 
lack of upward mobility for staff; 	inertia; 	and an entrenchment of 
custodial practices. 	The lack of promotional opportunities has already 
received comment. 	The failure by many of the long-serving officers to 
attain a higher rank in the system, encourages 'disillusionment, and 
strengthens the intertia currently prevalent at Risdon Prison. 
Although many recruits view security of tenure and financial reward as 
the principal benefits of working in the prison, once the probationary 
period is completed the average recruit is ambitious to advance through 
the system. His aspirations however are not reciprocated by the 
majority of the long-serving staff who have become disenchanted with a 
system that fails to match reality with rhetoric. The oft-discussed 
in-service training does not occur except when used as a precursor for 
the SPO promotional examination. Arbitrary use of acting SPO positions 
has been a constant source of complaint with some officers working as 
SPOs whilst others continue normal base-grade posts ( see Figure 1 ) but 
receive the acting allowance. 	Some of ficers accept this situation 
philosophically. 	Others work as much overtime as possible and use sick 
leave entitlements. 
In Risdon 	Prison, 	the stability of the 	staff 	is not necessarily a 
positive attribute. 	As indicated earlier, a number of unsuitable staff 
have been given tenure. This creates problems for management because of 
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the TPOA policy of rotating rosters. 	Some CPOs have claimed that when 
incompetent officers are on shift work they require almost constant 
surveillance. 188 If one of these officers is posted to the Divisions 
on the rotating roster (see Figure 1), the inmates are certain to secure 
an advantage. 189 Of more serious concern, and a direct result of 
apathy and inertia, is the growing divergence between management goals 
and prison practice. 
Management has consistently tried to liberalise the custodial nature of 
the prison and, in comparison with the custodial practices of the early 
1960s, has succeeded in effecting change. The T POA , however, has 
opposed change, partly through lack of consultation, but mainly from the 
perspective that liberalisation diminishes control by the officer. 190 
The management of Risdon Jail was yesterday accused of being 
'increasingly slack' in its attitude towards prisoners and • of 
causing a threat to discipline. 191 
Paradoxically, the union wishes to be officially involved in reforming 
practices but only if the change benefits the Union and not the inmates. 
T POA policy may influence individual officers, although it is more 
likely that their antipathy to change arises from the custodial nature 
of their work. Officers are also aware that strict adherence to the 
custodial practice will be recognised by the CPOs as a positive 
attribute. Some of the long-serving officers use custodial rules and 
188Author's conversation with C POs. 
189 ibid  
190Interview with TPOA spokesman, 23.12.87. 
19 IThe Mercury, 2.10.87. 
255 
regulations as a device to control their own work practices, adhering 
sufficiently to the guidelines to satisfy senior management scrutiny, 
but failing to address adequately the fundamental entitlements of the 
inmate. These practices accentuate the custodial interaction between 
officers and inmates and, unfortunately, as new officers rely on 
experienced staff for advice, prejudices are passed on, and practices 
are perpetuated. 
Staff Leadership Qualities 5:13 
Human resources can be an organisation's most valuable assets. 	To 
determine leadership qualities, 
Subordinates should be given the freedom to conceive and carry out 
their plans, even though some mistakes may result. 192 
A progressive management staff should encourage subordinate initiative. 
However, the very nature of the prison situation - with its Prison Act, 
Statutory Rules, and Standing Orders - militates against any show of 
initiative by subordinate staff. Routines are covered by regulation and 
contingencies are set out in Standing Orders. 
It is not possible to set out in detail what actions should be taken 
in every conceivable emergency situation. However, officers are 
reminded tht their prime duty is to secure the security of the 
prison and the safety of their fellow officers and inmates and that 
they are to report immediately any matter which appears likely to 
affect or hazard security or safety. 193 
The concept of initiative is further discouraged by Section 97 of the 
Statutory Rules which states that a 
192 Stoner et al, op.cit. 
193 DS0, p.1. 
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prison officer shall obey all lawful instructions given to him by 
the prison officer under whose immediate control he is placed . 194 
This section, in effect, is used by senior staff to ensure that prison 
practice is routine and ordered. 
Since the establishment of the Law Department, and the resulting 
Corrective 	Services 	Division, 	delegation 	of 	authority 	and 
decision- making by senior management has been limited. The 
centralisation of power within the prison has been entrenched in the 
senior managerial positions by the creation of a •ew position and the 
apparent lack of desire to fill a previous senior post. Prior to the 
promulgation of the Corrective Services Division the sequential 
promotion steps, under the Prison Officers Award, were PLO, SPO, CPO, 
PPO and Deputy Superintendent ( the Superintendent position was in 
another award) . The creation of the Prisons Division issued in an 
upgrading of the senior posts to Chief Superintendent and Deputy Chief 
Suerintendent . A new Chief Superintendent was appointed and the Deputy 
Suerintendent was promoted to Deputy Chief Superintendent leaving the 
Deputy position vacant. This vacancy has been joined by two others that 
is, Deputy Chief Superintendent 195 and PPO, 196 and no appointment has 
been made to the position of Director of Corrective Services. 197 At 
present the Chief Superintendent answers to an Acting Director and has 
I 94Statutory Rules, 1985, No. 172, Part XVII, 97. 
I 95 R esigned to return to NSW 
196 Retired 
I 97The position will not be advertised until April 1988. 
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CPOs acting as Deputy Chief Superintendent and PPO. 198 	The Law 
Department used the State Services Act to advertise the Deputy Chief 
Sueprintendent's position on a temporary basis although the previous 
incumbent had given two months notice to facilitate the appointment of a 
successor. By using this tactic, the Law Department has forstered 
hostility to, and suspicion of, senior management's motives. The 
failure to fill the Deputy position in particular has created a vacuum 
between the middle and senior levels of management and led to 
restrictive practices especially at the CPO level. 
Middle management has been discouraged from showing initiative by 
directives from superiors which countermand their orders . 199 CPOs are 
reluctant to make decisions beyond the normal shift routine and depend 
on senior advice when some unforeseen situation occurs. This attitude 
has flowed on to those SPOs who are sometimes rostered in an Acting 'CPO 
capacity and are unwilling to jeopardise their chances of achieving 
promotion. The lack of initiative at base-grade level is demonstrated 
by refusal to apply for promotion, abuse of sick leave, and reliance on 
the custodial aspects of the position. 
Conclusion 5:14 
There appears to be a continuing lack of clear direction by those 
charged with formulating prison policy in Tasmania. 	TPOA fears that 
weak managerial practice can lead to inmate unrest 200  have been 
I 98Four CPOs will rotate on a three week basis as PPO and Deputy Chief 
Superintendent until at least March 1988.   
199 Conversations with CPOs by author. 
200Refer to The Mercury, 2.10.87. 
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substantiated by occurrences in mainland institutions. 201 	Their fears 
have not been allayed by the issuing of standing orders to deal with 
hostage situations. 202 
Until the Government gives a firm directive as to the purpose of 
imprisonment, 	the 	uncertainty 	prevalent 	in 	Risdon 	Prison 	will 
remain. 203 New recruits are still trained in the old custodial 
practices, 204  and those who seek promotion to vacant senior positions 
'are graduates of a similar practice. The introduction- of outsiders to 
senior positions is subject to constraints as invariably the incumbent 
takes time to adjust and win acceptance from the other ranks. 205 
The Government must publicly declare a policy for the maximum security 
prison at Risdon. 	When and if this policy is promulgated, the Law 
Department should determine the criteria upon which prospective senior 
managerial personnel are to be selected. 	The policy should also be 
reflected in ,base-grade recruitment and training. 	Current ad hoc  
management practices based on an unclear prison philosophy, combined 
with present training and work practice, may yet issue in industrial 
unrest or inmate insurrection. 
201 Riots have taken place in both WA and Queensland Prison Systems. 
22Law Department, CSD E7A 
2031nterview with D Hornibrook, former Controller of Prisons, 6.1.88. 
204 5ee recent training programme in Appendix. 
205The former DOCS took two years to be accepted when appointed to the 
old Deputy Governor rank - Howe, op.cit. 
CONCLUSION  
Despite claims to the contrary' the management of any prison or prison 
system is not determined by, or subject to, public scrutiny. 	It remains 
firmly in the hands of a few senior level public servants. 	Politicians 
may be called to respond to claims of mismanagement and issue statements 
regarding policy and practice. 	However, when the prison has ceased to 
become 'newsworthy', the routine of daily prison life continues. 
Sometimes, as a result of negative publicity, cosmetic changes are made. 
Invariably such innovations give way to the practice best understood by 
the majority of those who work in the system - custody. 
The philosophical gap between those who administer the system and those 
who manage can best be understood in the context of Government policy or 
lack of it. In the Tasmanian example, the failure by Government to 
formalise its prison policy has added to the difficulties of managing a 
20th Century prison which effectively maintains 19th Century principles. 
The difficulties of changing a conservative prison staff have already 
been noted by Thomas. 2 As long as prison officer training emphasises 
the custodial nature of the task, the cleavage between a liberal  
management and a conservative staff will be large - as the Risdon 
situation demonstrates. 3 	The management of the prison system can be an 
exacting experience for the most capable of administrators. 	The role, 
however, could be less stressful if objectives were clearly defined, and 
some western Governments have made this commitment. 
"For example, see Hawkins, op .cit  . 
2Thomas, in King and Morgan, op .cit  . 
3See , for example, the Tasmanian Prison Officer training schedule in 
the Appendix. 
260 
There is an increasing recognition by some jurisdictions that the main 
function 	of 	imprisonment 	is the segregation 	from 	society of 	the 
offender . 4 The English authorities have adopted this principle as 
policy, and have declared that some prisons will be used for 'humane 
containment': 
According to such an approach imprisonment justifies only that 
degree of interference required to achieve separation from the rest 
of the community: all remaining rights should be safeguarded . . 
[n]ormalisation requires that conditions within prison approximate 
as closely as possible to those outside and would encourage the 
retention of the rights and duties normally pertaining to free 
individuals. 5 
English prison managerial techniques and practices are based on the 
'humane containment' concept. 6 
Coyle, in his major work on the Scottish Prison System, is convinced 
that until authorities accept that the prison's primary function is to 
contain offenders in a duly controlled environment, the uncertainty in 
the past two decades caused by divergent perceptions will lead to 
further disruption . 7 He suggests that authorities have placed a 
greater emphasis on secondary goals such as treatment programmes, to the 
detriment of morale in both staff and inmates. 8 The policy of the 
Scottish Prison System is clearly defined: 
4 Richardson , G, "The Case for Prisoners' Rights" in Maguire et al 
op.cit. , pp. 23-24 . 
5 Maguire et al, op.cit  . , p.24. 
6Discussion with Tom Abbot, Director of Prisons, Office of 
Corrections, Victoria who is seconded from the English Prison 
System for three years. 
7Coyle , op. cit  . 
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Inmates of prisons, 	or other types of penal establishments in 
Scotland are punished by the courts by being deprived of their 
liberty. It is the duty of the Scottish Prison Service to contain  
them within secure conditions appropriate9 to their needs. 10 
Goals and objectives in prisons are, invariably, subject to criticism. 
On the one hand, there is the lobby who view the contemporary prison as 
being too liberalised, whilst on the other, there are those who demand 
action to curtail crime and reduce recidivism rates. 	At the centre of 
these extremes, 	the prison administrators and managers attempt to 
provide a service which balances both points of view. 	Unfortunately, 
this middle of the 	road approach has little chance of success. 
Initially, the prison manager is constrained by conflicting goals and 
philosophy: custody versus treatment. If he pursues a purely custodial 
function, he opens his system to accusations of a Victorian 'lock them 
up and leave them' .rnentality. If he pursues the treatment approach, he 
risks 	reaction 	from 	a 	staff 	who 	claim 	that 	security 	is 	being 
disregarded. Moreover, it may not be possible to quantify the success 
of treatment .It serves little purpose for him to claim that recidivism 
rates have been lowered due to particular philosophies or programmes. 
Cressey, for example points out that 
there are numerous external conditions [which] affect recidivism 
rates making it impossible to correlate either high or low rates 
with organisational activities. I I 
The 	mechanics 	of 	societal 	normalisation 	are 	as 	yet 	imperfectly 
understood, but prison management has accepted that some concessions 
9 Author's emphasis. 
10The Scottish Penal System, Factsheet 18, Scottish Information 
Office. 
11 Cressey, in March, op.cit., p.1038. 
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have to be made towards change in prison practice. 
The trend, 	however, 	to label our prisons and prison services as 
correctional 	institutions 	and correctional 	services when 	nothing has 
changed shows the governmental dilemma. Mitford points out that in 
order to understand the modern prison system "one must master the new 
terminology". 12 Commenting on the Attica Commission Report, 1965, she 
maintains that the committee's major accomplishment was to change the 
names of all the state's maximum security prisons: 
Effective 8 July 1970 ... there were no more prisons, in their 
places, 	instead, 	stood 	six 	maximum 	security 	'correctional 
facilities'. 	The 	prison 	wardens 	became 	'institutional 
superintendents' ... and the old line prison guards .. (suddenly) ) 
became 'correctional officers'. 13 
'Institution' 	may 	have 	been 	deliberately 	substitutted 	for 	'prison' 
because of its relatively neutral connotations. 
It 	is 	suggested 	that 	the 	first 	step 	in 	establishing 	stabiity 	within 
Risdon Prison is for the Government to recognise the prison as servicing 
one primary function - containment. All other goals of imprisonment can 
then be ranked in order of importance. A policy document would not only 
establish Government intention but would assist in determining a prison 
routine - which is fundamental to the prison's stable operation. It 
could also be of advantage to the establishment of the managerial 
functions and benefit those who determine managerial choice. Risdon  
senior management would have a policy by which guidelines could be set 




to direct both staff and inmates. 	Containment does not necessitate the 
return of the principle of retribution. 14 	A written policy would also 
estabish a training programme designed to accommodate the changing role 
of the prison officer. 
Chapter II discussed the role of the prison manager and presented 
profiles of both English and American incumbents. It was suggested that 
Australian prison management recruitment was largely an 'in-house' 
venture based upon the 'seniority' principle. The Tasmanian experience 
has been to recruit senior managers who have a military background. 
While this military background could be deemed appropriate for a 
custodial regime, it is unlikely to be adequate for the management of a 
changing system. It has been claimed that administrative competency is 
paramount for the organisation's success: 
In the lower ranks, professional competence is most important; 	in 
the higher, administrative competence is dominant, the more so the 
larger the organisation. 	If the workmen [prison officers], the 
foreman [CFOs] 	... 	lack technical competence, 	the technical 
capacity of the whole business is weakened; 	on the other hand, it 
is not essential that these agents be perfect administrators. 	But 
if the managing director and other top executives [senior prison 
management] lack administrtive capacity, the administrative 
capacity of the whole enterprise is reduced, little by little, to 
zero. 1) 
Risdon 	senior 	management 	training 	has 	consisted 	of 	'on-the-job' 
experience. 	It would appear that this tradition will be continued. 
Answering a questionnaire on the identification of potential prison 
managers within the system, the Tasmanian reply was they 	did not 
I 4Chappel, D, ( Director of the Australian Institute of Criminology ) , 
The Mercury, 20.10.87, p.15. 
I 5Fayol, in Dole, op .cit. , p.142. 
264 
specifically identify potential leaders with the aim of developing them 
as future managers. 16 The upward mobility in career of the CPOs was 
effectively questioned with a negative answer to the question on the 
necessity of holding prison rank prior to being appointed to senior 
managerial grades. 17 Further, the successful appointee neither 
required experience as an assistant prison manager, nor needed to 
complete a "course for Prison Governors". 18 Additionally, the career 
development programme for prison managers was "based on practical 
experience". 19 Finally, the prerequisites for a senior manager in the 
Tasmanian Prison System would appear to be 
High school graduation plus a broad experience in administration 
and staff rnanagement. 2° 
The Office of Corrections in Victoria has formulated a policy designed 
to train prison managers, and the first course for prospective prison 
managers has now been put into operation. 	The prescription for entry to 
this course is at least one year's experience as a base-grade 	officer 
with above average educational qualifications: 
Recruitment strategies must be developed and coordinated centrally, 
and must be proactive, ongoing, and include targeting of specific 
areas which are consistent with the job task/skill analyses ( for 
example, targeting of trade qualified people with supervisory 
experience and of tertiary qualified graduates).... 21 
16 Prison file 7/1/18, sec.A , Q. I. 
17 ibid, Sec B, Q.12. 
18 ibid, Sec B, Q.14. 
19 ibid, Sec B, Q.17.2 
	 Sec B, Q. 17. 1. 
21 Work Force Planning and Training Plan, Office of Corrections, 
Victoria, 1986, p.10. 
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The Victorian training programmes are a tacit admission that the 
previous policy of using the 'seniority' principle has failed to 
accomplish the task of choosing those who will manage their prisons. 
Likewise Tasmanian authorites should be cognisant of other systems 
managerial problems experienced in other systems and the methods used 
for their resolution. 
Although the Tasmanian prison system is small compared to other State 
and National systems, it is suggested that a programme be implemented to 
identify potential managers in the system, and to train them towards 
managerial level. Applicants should be encouraged to participate in 
educational courses at either intermediate or tertiary level to gain 
qualification in the social sciences and the generic field of 
management. 	Further practical experience can be gained by utilising the 
Governor programmes offered by, for example, the Office of Corrections 
Staff Training College in Victoria. The ad hoc managerial selection 
    
process currently used in Tasmania may only accentuate the differences 
between philosophical aim and management practice. However, it may well 
be that the notion of management of Tasmanian Prisons has never been 
seriously questioned. 	Tasmania's prison system does not suffer the 
overcrowding problems endemic in other states. 	Inmate and staff 
discontent are minimal when compared with other Australian 
jurisdictions, and staff stability is above average when compared with 
Victoria and NSW. However, as Fayol commented 
... it would be a gross error to conclude that success is always a 
sign of good administration . 22 
22 Fayol, in Dole, op.cit., p.141. 
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The leadership qualities required for middle managerial ranks at Risdon 
must be clarified. 	As noted in Chapter IV (4:1) the present incumbents 
have 	all 	progressed 	to 	their 	present 	position 	on 	the 	'seniority' 
principle. 	All have spent the major part of their prison service in a 
custodial-oriented regime. 	As senior management did not provide 
in-service management training, the CP0s, with one exception, have no 
qualification apart from experience. 	In the former Prisons Department, 
CPOs were the 'bosses' on a daily shift basis. 	Their role was clearly 
defined, and duties specifically laid out. 'Since the prison's 
absorption into the Law Department the custodial nature of the prison 
has slowly been changed, with a greater emphasis placed upon the 'human 
relations' approach. The changing nature of prison functioning has 
materially affected the CP0s. As Perrow has noted: 
Leadership is highly variable or 'contingent' upon a large variety 
of important variables such as nature of task, size of the group, 
length of time the group has existed, type of personnel within the 
group and their relationships with each other, and amount of 
pressure the group is under. 23 
The liberalising of the prison operation has unveiled the inadequacies 
of a middle management team trained and entrenched in custodial routine. 
It would appear that this custodial trait will be enhanced by the CPOs 
of the future. 
The lack of a promotion examination for the CPO rank makes experience 
the major prerequisite. The hierarchical prison structure makes it 
unlikely that a base-grade prison officer will be directly promoted to 
CPO. Thus, in the near future, the CPO •ranks will be filled from the 
23 perrow, in Dole, op.cit., p.166. 
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SPO position. 	It was pointed out, however, that few of the SPOs wish 
promotion - for essentially financial reasons (see Chapter IV). 	Those 
who wish promotion see in current CPO practices the style and approach 
necessary to achieve the rank. The potential CPOs mirror their 
performance on the present incumbents while serving in the Acting CPO 
capacity on the premise that the CPOs are providing adequate leadership. 
This may be faulty logic. As Perrow saliently notes 
... we have learned that beyond the threshold, of adequacy it is 
extremely difficult to know what good leadership is. 24 
Concomitantly, the CPOs will only choose those applicants who mirror 
their notion of the role, and of the prison operation. 
It is suggested that a promotional structure be implemented from 
base-grade 	up 	to 	and 	including the Deputy 	Chief Superintendent 
position 25 by open competition examination. Whilst it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to address the issue, some thought should be given 
to liaison with the Hobart Technical College, Tasmanian Institute of 
Technology, or University of Tasmania in the determination of an 
acceptable level of qualification for each grade. 	This would serve a 
two-fold purpose: 	first, it would encourage those within the system to 
work towards a career; second, and more important, management would be 
able to bypass the 'deadwood' and have a pool of suitably qualified 
applicants. 	Thus, 	it 	would 	end 	the 	'seniority' 	principle, 	with 
promotions being based on merit. 	However, this does not address the 
issue of the entrenched SPOs. 
24ibid . 
25This position is still under the Prison Officers Award - the 
necessary prerequisite being five years satisfactory service as a 
prison officer and the successful completion of an approved Senior 
Prison Officer examination but is now in the Administrative and 
268 
As there are a number of SPOs who are either unwilling or incapable of 
being promoted, a new rank structure must be created. Since the SPOs' 
average age is nearly 50 years (see Figure 2, Chapter IV) this precludes 
an early change of personnel in this rank. Apart from demoting those 
who do not wish promotion, the authorities are left with two choices: 
create a new rank between SPO and CPO or introduce the Victorian concept 
of 'fast track' legislation enabling those base-grade officers capable 
of being promoted to bypass the hierarchical and service constraints at 
present prescriptive for promotion. 26 
A new rank structure of 'Assistant' or 'Deputy' Chief - open by 
examination to those who have passed the SPO examination (nearly 80% of 
base-grade staff ) - 'could provide the mechanism for management to have 
an available pool of prospective CP0s. Promotion to CPO would naturally 
come from this new rank. However, there should be some in-built 
provisos that those who reach this rank must be willing to apply for 
further :promotion. 	If they are unwilling to do this, they can thus be 
demoted. 	A corollary of the position would be added responsibility 
commensurate with the rank. 
The industrial climate at the prison gives present cause for concern. 
It would appear that the managerial prerogative has been abrogated in 
favour of managerial acquiescence. The overt militancy of the TPOA has 
been encouraged by a lack of managerial resistance. Indeed, the TPOA 
Clerical Officers Award. 
26A base-grade officer must serve five years before being eligible to 
sit the SPO promotional examination. 
269 
have acknowledged the lack ot industrial acumen presented by management 
during negotiations. 27 
	
Perhaps this is a byproduct' 
	
the tormer 
Prison Department era when the tormer L.,ontrolier conducted negotiations 
witn me i rum. 	it ShOUIO be mentioned that during his tenure there was 
little industrial unrest. 	However. tne changeover irom Department TO 
Divisional status transierred negotiation trorri management to UT I icers 
trom the Law Department. 	Effectively this has meant that Risdon senior 
management only handle minor problems. 	Since 1984 major industrial 
decisions affecting the prison have been made in Head Office. 	The TPOA 
has, justifiably, complained that they, in negotiating with Head Office, 
are dealing with people who have little, if any, practical knowledge of 
grass root prison operation. 28 	In the contemporary industrial climate 
it is naive to assume that senior management incumbents can learn 
industrial relations techniques without expert tuition. 	The TPOA makes 
use of the Ta'smanian Union Training Authority's (TUTA) expertise in 
providing regular trade union negotiating skills courses. 	It would seem 
paramount that senior management be given similar consideration. 
Risdon senior management can alleviate most staff and inmate discontent, 
and maintain control of the prison, by introducing the concept of 
Functional Unit Management (FUM ). This is described as 
an organisational style which decentralises and therefore flattens 
the administrative structure of a prison ... Although Functional 
Unit Management (FUM) was initiated as a tool of classification and 
rehabilitation,it is proposed that the historical shift in goal 
orientation in corrections has mandated that the contemporary focus 
of FUM be the goal of 'humane control'. The decentralised, 
team-oriented, 	approach 	of 	Functional 	Unit 	Management 	is 
27 Interview with TPOA spokesman. 
28 ibid. 
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appropriate in the field of correctional administration and the 
goal of humane control. 29 
This type of concept was hinted at by Grubb during his investigation of 
the Tasmanian Prison System. 3° 
Some functional specialisation already exists at Risdon (see Chapter V), 
but 	the 	TPOA 	policy 	of 	a 	'rotating 	roster' 	precludes 	further 
development. 	This policy, however, is based on the notion that any 
prison officer can do any of the required duties at the prison. 	It is 
suggested that this assumption is illfounded and naive. 	There is ever 
increasing evidence that many systems are turning to the unit concept as 
a means of advancing staff job satisfaction, and inmate adjustment to 
prison life. 31  As Janus reports: 
The major advantage of unit management is that it increases the 
frequency of contacts and the intensity of the relationship between 
staff and inmates, resulting in. 
a) better communication and understanding between individuals 
b): more individualised classification and programme planning. 
c) more valuable programme reviews and programme adjustments of 
problems before they reach critical proportions. 
d) development of common goals which encourage positive unit 
cohesiveness, and 
e) generally, a more positive living and work atmosphere for staff 
and inmates 
f) more efficient accountability and control of inmates. 32 
29Janus, M, "Functional Unit Management: An Evaluation of 
Organisational Effectiveness in the Federal Prison System", US 
Department of Justice, 1982. 
30Grubb Report, op.cit, pp.11-12. 
31 For example, see Janus, op.cit., Coyle, 1985 & 1986, op.cit., and 
Egge, P M, The United States Prison System, Report of 1983 Winston 
Churchill Fellow, Sydney, NSW (Unpublished), Boyle, op.cit. 
323anus, op.cit., pp.4 - 5 
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It is suggested that the present divisions A - F could be used as units. 
Inmates could be classified to each division or unit which would have a 
permanent staff. 	Management may even introduce an incentive scheme 
whereby varying degrees of privileges are given to each unit. 	The 
inmate could progress from one unit to the next on the basis of his 
performance and attitude. By having a permanent crew in each unit, 
management would be both able to decentralise decision-making and 
appraise the officer's unit performance. It is suggested that officers 
posted to those units would be provided with training appropriate to the 
unit's function. These units would also provide an ideal training 
ground for potential senior managers. 
It is as yet unclear whether the absorption of the prison 'into the Law 
Department has been successful. 	Apart from several changes in senior 
position 	titles, 	and 	the 	centralisation 	of 	authority, 	nothing 	has 
changed. The prison is still the prison. The combining of probation 
and parole with the prison to form a 'corrective services' division has 
similarly meant little. Probation Officers do not wish to work in the 
prison's confines 33 and similarly prison officers have no wish to work 
in probation. 34 	The failure of this approach has been adequately 
covered by Fiori. 35 	Again, the lumping together of the 'Criminal 
Justice' components has met with harsh criticism. 36 
33 Discussions with visiting probation officers. 
34 Comments from prison staff. 
3 5Fiori, op.cit . , especially the 'Introduction'. 
36See Mitford, op.cit. 
The retitling of 
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prisons as 'Correctional Centres' is a purely cosmetic exercise. 37 	It 
is difficult, however, to change a Government policy once implemented. 
The decision to create the present Law Department was taken in the late 
1960s. 38 The then Attorney-General intended to implement a combined 
system of Crown Law Departments Probation and Parole, and the Prison, on 
a rather similar American model which was thought to work 
successfully . 39 	However, by the time he had regained office in the 
early 1980s, this concept had proved a failure with respect to its 
correctional component. 	Many united systems reverted to separate 
entities during the mid 1970s. 40 Indeed, the originator of the 
combined correctional departments, the English Prison System, separated 
the functions in the early 1970s; 41 and Scotland soon followed 
suit . 42 
It is suggested that the Prison be separate from probation and parole 
and become either a Department in its own right, or a separate Division 
within the Law Department headed by a Director of Prisons. The latter 
should have direct access to the Minister . 43 He should have a full 
mandate to manage and direct those in his charge, and he should be 
38 Interview with E M Bingham. 
39 ibid 
40For example, see Fox, V, op .cit . , Ch . 6. 
41 See Thomas ( 1972 ), op .cit . 
42coy l e ( 1986 ) op .cit . 
43 Interview with H 3 Howe, op .cit . 
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provided with sufficient staff and finance to implement strategies and 
programmes. 
Risdon Prison practice has not been subject to many mainland and 
overseas influences. In its favour the prison has a low occupancy rate, 
and its conditions may be favourably compared with most other Australian 
Prisons. While progress towards liberalisation has been relatively slow 
the inmate can be cared for and protected more readily because of 
smallness of scale. 	The smallness of scale, however, is a disadvantage 
because of the limited number of areas to place inmates. 	The 'short 
timer' is received, classified, allocated to work, and released, in a 
matter of months. The long-term inmate - and per capita Tasmania has a 
large number of Life Sentences - will over several years probably work 
in most of the industries. 	If he becomes frustrated with the system he 
could react against the staff. 	Staff are not trained in any meaningful 
fashion ( see Appendix A ) . 	Perhaps, because of the small scale, the 
reciprocity between staff and inmates is more positive than in other 
institutions. However, the familiarity syndrome does not compensate for 
adequate staff training, at all levels. 
R isdon Prison, and the Tasmanian Prison System although geographically 
isolated must not be attitudinally insular, or considered in isolation. 
Those in charge must be cognisant of the programmes and policies of 
other systems and evaluate their applicability to Risdon Prison. 
Forward planning is a managerial priority. 
The conclusions reached by this study are by no means negative. 	As 
Coyle comments on the Scottish Prison Service, the 
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compact nature of [Risdon Prison] is a singular advantage. 	Lines 
of 	communication 	are 	short, 	anonymity 	is 	not possible and 
accountability is an option. The structural weaknesses which ... 
have [been] identified can be discussed and, if accepted, can be 
remedied. 44 
44Coyle (1986) op.cit., p.220. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. That the Tasmanian Government introduce a written prison policy. 
2. That the Tasmanian Prison System identify potential prison managers 
and provide specialised training. 
3. That the Tasmanian Prison System upgrade middle-management 
qualifications. 
4. That provision is made for CPO promotion examinations. 
5. That either a new rank is introduced between SPO and CPO, or 'fast-
track' legislation is produced to promote on the basis of merit, 
rather than seniority. 
6. That the Law Department provide industrial relations training to 
senior level management. 
7. That the Tasmanian Prison Authorities introduce Unit Management at 
Risdon Prison. 
8. That the Prisons Division become a separate identity with either 
Divisional or Departmental status and with the Director of Prisons 
being directly responsible to the Minister. 
APPENDIX A 
PRISON OFFICER'S TRAINING COURSE 
Week 1 7/12/87 
Date 	Time 	 Activity 	 Personnel 
Monday 	9 am 	Class Assembles at Main Gate 	CPO Stalker 
7.12.87 	9.15 am 	Address by Chief Superintendent Mr 	Harvey 
10.15 am 	Issue of Uniforms 	 Storeman 
12 noon 	Conditions of Service 	 Mr I Abbott 
1 pm Lunch 
2 pm 	Training Films 	 CPO 	Stalker 
Tuesday 	8 am 	Locations of Posts 	 CPO Stalker 
8.12.87 	10 am Physical Training Mr 	Wright 
11 am 	Records 	 CPO Stalker 
12 noon 	Role of Prison Officer 	 CPO 	Stalker 
1 pm Lunch 
2 pm 	Female Prison 	 Supt McGregor 
3 pm Training Films CPO 	Stalker 
Wednesday 8 am 	Labour Parade 	 Duty 	CPO 
9.12.87 	9 am Law Department - structure 	 Mr 	Pat more 
11 am 	Chief Sup. Requests 	 Chief 	Supt 
12 noon 	Meal Parade 	 Duty 	CPO 
12.30 pm 	Lunch 
1.30 pm 	Drug Squad 	 Drug Officer 









Saturday 6 am 	Duty Posts 	 Duty 	CPO 
12.12.87 to Weapon Handling 	 CPO 	Stalker 
2 pm 	Tear Gas & Range Practice 	 CPO Stalker 
Sunday 	6 am 	Shift Procedure 	 Duty 	CPO 
13.12.87 to Security/Trafficking 	 CPO Burgess 
2 pm 	Standing Orders 	 CPO Stalker 
Handcuffs/Restraint Belts 
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PRISON OFFICER'S TRAINING COURSE 
Week 2 14/12187 
Date 	Time 	 Activity 	 Personnel 
Monday 	2 pm 	Classification 	 Chief 	Supt 
14.12.87 to Showers Procedure 	 CPO Stalker 
10 pm 	Shift Procedure CPO Stalker 
Tuesday 9 am 
15.12.87 	to 
5 pm 






Thursday 9 am 	Self Defence 
17.12.87 12 noon 	Meal Parade 	 Duty 	CPO 
1 pm 	Lunch 
2 pm Classification 	 Chief 	Supt. 
3.30 pm 	Report Writing Mr 	Hanson 
4.30 pm 	Lock-up Parade 	 Duty 	CPO 
Friday . 	8 am 	Labour Parade 	 Duty 	CPO 
18.12.81 8.30 am 	Standing Orders CPO 	Stalker 
10 am Psychology 	 Mr Harrington- 
George 
11.30 am 	Prisoner's Aid 	 Mr Batchelor 
1 pm 	Lunch 
2 pm Self Defence 
Saturday 6 am 
	
Shift Procedure 
	 CPO Stalker 





Sunday 	6 am 	Shift Procedure 
	 CPO Stalker 
to Duty Posts 
2 pm 	Remissions 
Prison Regulations 
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PRISON OFFICER'S TRAINING COURSE  
Week 3 21/12187 
Date 	Time 	 Activity 	 Personnel 
Monday 
	 OFF DUTY 
21.12.87 
Tuesday 	8 am 	Labour Parade 	 Duty 	CPO 
22.12.87 9 am Self Defence 
12 noon 	Meal Parade 	 Duty 	CPO 
1 pm Lunch 
2 pm 	Prisoner Behaviour 	 Dr Lopes 
4 pm Meal Parade 	 Duty 	CPO 
Lock up 
Wednesday 8 am 	Labour Parade 	 Duty 	CPO 
23.12.87 9 am Self Defence 
12 noon 	Standing Orders 	 CPO Stalker 
1 pm 	Lunch 
2 pm Searching 	 CPO Stalker 
3.45 pm 	Cease Labour Parade 	 Duty 	CPO 
4 pm 	Meal Parade 	 Duty 	CPO 
Lock-up 
Thursday 7 am 	Alarms 	 Security 
24.12.87 8 am Revision CPO 	Stalker 
10 am 	Fire Appliances 	 Fire 	Officer 
12 noon 	Meal Parade Duty 	CPO 
1 pm 	Lunch 
2 pm Duty Posts 	 Duty 	CPO 
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PRISON OFFICER'S TRAINING COURSE  
Week 4 18/1/87 
Date 	Time 	 Activity 	 Personnel 
Monday 	8 am 	Labour Parade 	 CPO Stalker 
18.1.88 	9.15 am 	Criminal Court CPO 	Stalker 
12 noon 	Meal Parade 	 CPO Stalker 
2 pm 	Classification Chief Super. 
Showers 
Duty Posts 
Tuesday 	8 am 	Standing Orders 
19.1.88 	9 am Prisoner Canteen/Hobbies 
10 am 	Prison Regulations 
11 am AIDS - lecture 
1 pm 	Lunch 
2 pm Prisons - Psychiatry 
CPO Stalker 
Mr C Wright 
CPO Stalker 
Mr G Stevens 
Dr Lopes 
Wednesday 9 am 	Probation/Parole 	 Mr M Cordwell 
20.1.88 	11 am Prison Welfare Mr W Paterson 
12 noon 	Meal Parade 	 Duty 	CPO 
1 pm 	Hayes Farm CPO 	Hodge 
4 pm Meal/Lock-up Parades 	 Duty 	CPO 
Thursday 9 am 	Standing Orders 	 CPO Stalker 
21.1.88 	9.30 am 	Ombudsman 	 Mr R Willee 
Mr Green 
11 am 	Reporting of Posts 	 CPO 	Stalker 
11.45 am 	Cease Labour/Meal Parades 	 Duty 	CPO 
1.15 pm 	Lunch 
2 pm 	Standing Orders - Prison 
Regulations - Revision 	 CPO 	Stalker 
Friday 	6 am 	Shift Procedure 	 Duty 	CPO 
22.1.88 	9 am Address/Discussion - A /Director 	Mr P Patmore 
10 am 	Searching 	 CPO Stalker 
11 am Revision CPO 	Stalker 
12 noon 	Examination 	 CPO Stalker 
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APPENDIX B 
PRISONS DEPARTMENT, TASMANIA  
SENIOR OFFICERS' TRAINING COURSE 
17.11.80 
Date Time Activity Personnel Venue 
Monday 9 am Official opening Mr Hornibrook Conf .Rm 
17.11.80 9.20 am Remissions Mr Stalker Conf .Rm 	. 
11 am Gov Standing Orders Mr Stalker Conf .Rm 
2 pm Training Films Mr Stalker Conf.  .Rm 
3.30 pm Parole & Prison Act Mr Howe Conf .Rm 
Tuesday 9 am Self Defence Mr Nakajima Rec Rm 
18.11.80 11 	am Mental Health Dr Hoddle Conf . Rm 
2 pm Maths Mr Perry Schoolroom 
3 pm English Mr Perry Schoolroom 
4 pm Welfare Mr McEwan Conf . Rm. 
Wednesday 9 am Remissions Mr Stalker Conf .Rm 
19.11.80 10 am Records Mr Stalker Conf .Rm 
11 am Sup. Requests Mr Howe D/Sup 	Office 
12 noon Reception Procedures Mr Stalker Reception 
2 pm Gov . Standing Orders Mr Stalker Conf.  . Rm 
3.30 pm Portable radios Mr Hanlon Conf.  .Rm 
4 pm Duplicate key safe Mr Smith Main 	Gate 
Thursday 9 am Self Defence Mr Nakajima Rec. Room 
20.11.80 11 am Ombudsman Mr Dixon Conf. Rm. 
2 pm Classification Mr Howe D/Sup 	Office 
3 pm Probation & PS Reports Mr McEwan Conf.  .Rm 
4 pm Handcuffs & Restraint Mr Barwick Rec. Rm 
Friday 9 am Vol .Organ 	Prisoners'Aid Mr Batchelor Conf. Rm 
2 1 . 11.80 10.30am Remissions Mr Stalker Conf .Rm 
12 noon Prison 	Hospital Mr Barrel! Pris.Hosp. 
2 pm Maths Mr Perry Schoolroom 
3 pm English Mr Perry Schoolroom 
4 pm Bails & Appeals Mr Howe Conf. R m 
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APPENDIX B 
PRISONS DEPARTMENT, TASMANIA  
SENIOR OFFICERS' TRAINING COURSE 
24.11.80 
Date 	Time 	Activity 	 Personnel 	Venue 
Monday 	9 am 	Govt Standing Orders 	Mr Stalker 	Conf. Rm 
24.11.80 10 am 	Remissions 	 Mr Stalker 	Conf. R m 
11.30 am Parole Board Mr Roach Conf .Rm 
1.30 pm Drug Squad 	 Sgt Belbin 	Conf. Rm 
4 pm 	Prison Regulations 	Mr Stalker 	Conf. Rm 
Tuesday 	6 am 	Shift Procedure 	 Duty CPO 
25.11.80 9 am 	Maths 	 Mr Perry 	Schoolroom 
10 am 	English Mr Perry Schoolroom 
11 am 	Rifle Range/Tear Gas 	Mr Stalker 	Rifle 	Range 
Wednesday 9 am 	Medium Security 	 Mr Stalker 	Med . Sec . 
26.11.80 10 am 	Remissions 	 Mr Stalker 	Conf.Rm 
11 am 	Fingerprinting S. Con. Woolley F/print Room 
12 noon Closed circuit TV 	Mr Stalker 	TV Room 
2 pm 	Fire Fighting appl . Mr Cochrane 	Conf. R m 
& Training films 
Thursday 9 am 	Maths 	 Mr Perry 	Schoolroom 
27.11.80 10 am 	English Mr Perry Schoolroom 
11 am 	Govt Standing Orders 	Mr Stalker 	Conf.Rm. 
12 noon Remissions 	 Mr Stalker 	Conf.Rnn 
2 Pm 	English Exam Mr Perry Schoolroom 
4 pm 	Duties of CPO 	 Mr Stalker 	Conf .Rm 
Friday 	9 am 	Maths Exam 	 Mr Perry 	Schoolroom 
28.11.80 10.45 am Penology Exam Mr Stalker 	Schoolroom 
2.30 pm Course Discussion 	Mr Howe Conf.Rm. 
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APPENDIX C 
ADVERTISEMENT: OPEN LETTER TO THE SHADOW MINISTER FOR LAW 
The Tasmanian Prison Officers' Association is insulted and appalled by 
statements made by Mr R W Baker as reported in The Mercury (9 July) and 
in a .television interview. L 1/743 
We remind Mr Baker that when his party was in power their attitude was 
one of rehabilitation and the Gaol Farm must surely meet his requirements 
in that direction. It is acknowledged that most "escapes" occur from 
the Farm but does Mr Baker now suggest the Farm is surrounded with high 
fencing. This must conflict with his party ideals. The Prison Service 
does not "lose" prisoners; 	and furthermore all abscondings are reported 
within minutes of their occurrence. 
There have been no escapes from the maximum security of Risdon Prison 
for seveeal years. 
There have only been two escapes from the Royal Hobart Hospital in the 
last twelve months, including this latest incident which has apparently 
given rise to the newfound desire to "knock" the Service. If Mr Baker 
is aware of all the features surrounding the security of an "infectious" 
prisoner he may have been less vocal on this occasion. We are not 
pleased with, nor excusing ourselves in this matter, but again Mr Baker 
should be aware of this Association's efforts to improve security at the 
Hospital. 
There have not been 40 escapes as was stated in the media. 	In fact 
the total number of individual escapes is about half that number and if 
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one considers the concept of "group escapes" the number is reduced to 
14. Some of the cases are still sub judice and therefore we will not 
pursue them here. 
Mr Baker must realise that his statements do nothing to maintain morale 
in the Prison Service. Furthermore, they do little to maintain prisoner 
morale amongst the vast majority of inmates for whom there is no need to 
"double the guard". 
Apparently Mr Baker wants the service to be directed towards 
rehabilitation, but at the same time criticises the service for "losing" 
prisoners. Take both of your ideals to logical conclusions Mr Baker and 
you will realise that the two propositions became mutually exclusive. 
This Association is proud of its record and all its members - the 
Minister and the Controller are assured of our continued loyalty and 
support,: whoever they may be. Escapes from penal institutions are an 
unfortunate fact of life and the record of the Tasmanian Prison Service 
compares with any other Service. 
We shall continue to function effectively and efficiently but our job 
will be much easier if we do not have to suffer the almost continual 
"knocking" from persons who should really know better. 
F H HINES, SECRETARY. 
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APPENDIX D  
LAW DEPARTMENT OF TASMANIA 
Educational Entrance Test for Prison Officers 
The total time permitted will be If hours for English and Mathematics. 
BOTH subjects must be completed in this time. 
Start with whichever paper you choose, but you must answer the English 
on separate paper from the Mathematics. 	Total time for these papers is 
11 hours. 	Dictation will be in addition to this time. 
Mathematics: Entrance Test for Prison Officers 
Be sure to number or letter your answers clearly. 
1. 	Evaluate (a) 0.4 x 0.5 
(b) 0.57 - 0.02 
(c) 0.2 x 0.3 x 0.4 
(d) 9.26  
2 
2 
(e) (4.1) 	x 0.02 
5 marks. 
2. 	Here is a table setting out the maximum speed (in kph) of some 
animals, including man: 




32 	 80 	 40 	 80 	 112 
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Show this information in the form of a column or bar graph. 
5 marks. 
286 
3. 	In the following expressions, substitute these values: 
a = 0, b 	1, c = 2, d = 3. 
Reduce each to the simplest numeral. 
i) a + d 
ii) 4a 
iii) 6c 
iv) 2b + d 
v) 2 
vi ) 
d + b 
9 
6 marks. 
4. 	Find the following: 	 Example of method, in case 
you have forgotten: 
a) 10% of 760 	 50% of 24 , 	50 x 24 
	
100 1 
b) 10% of 35 
lx 	24 
c): 25% of 320 	 2 	1 
d) 5% of 80 	 = 12 
e) 121% of 136 
5. 	A leading tyre manufacturer claims that his new type of tyre will 
average 12+% more wear than the previous type. 
a) If the owner of a taxi fleet finds that the previous type 
average 23,000 km before replacement, how many kilometres 
should he average with the new tyres? 
b) If the old type cost $72.50 each, are the new ones reasonable 
at $79.50? Why? 
6 marks. 
TOTAL MARKS 27 
English: Entrance Test for Prison Officers  
Be sure to number your answers clearly. 	Neatness and spelling will be 
taken into account when marking. 
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A. 
Advertisers have brought the art of propaganda very near to perfection. 
A consideration of the devices employed in advertisements may help us to 
recognise the tricks of other propagandists and to consider how immense 
and insidious is their influence. 	The advertiser has something to sell; 
it would be unreasonable to expect him to be disinterested, 	lie wishes 
to 	present 	his 	goods 	in 	the 	most 	favourable 	manner 	possible. 
Accordingly he is unlikely to provide us with all the information that 
would enable us to form an independent opinion of the value of the 
article advertised. 	Frequently he has to create in us a felt want for 
his goods. 	Accordingly, he will seek to arouse our emotions, appealing 
to our desire to be healthier, or more beautiful, or even better dressed 
than we are. At the same time, the skilful advertiser will support this 
appeal with some show of evidence that his goods are able to satisfy 
these desires. 
Looking at the advertisements in any newspaper or magazine I select a 
few speciments, slightly camouflaged to prevent complications. 	A man 
and a girl gaze at each other. 	An inscription says that as long as men 
can see they will respond to beauty. 	Then follows the advice: 	"Use 
this cream and awake the response that she does". 
A patent medicine is offered as an infallible cure for a common chest 
complaint. 	A promise is made that even the most obstinate cases will 
yield to this treatment. 	There follow 'letters of gratitude selected 
from hundreds'. 	A woman writes that she despaired of ever being well, 
but now she is 'a different woman'. 	Eminent medical men and well-known 
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public persons (unspecified) are said to have praised the treatment. 
The reader is assured: "Health is your right". He believes that he has 
been offered evidence that this medicine will enable him to attain his 
right. 
Often you see advertisements containing such captions as the following: 
They all swear by 	  
Everybody is doing 	  
We are going to do 	  Are you? 
Trust the 	  baker. 
Trust 	your 	dentist. 	He 	knows 	a 	good 	toothpaste. 
Some who know GOOD 	 made this. 
Goodbye 	to 	doubts 	when 	you 	see 	 trademark. 
Send 	them 	happy 	to 	school. 	Give 	them 	  
You want a healthy baby don't you? 	Then 
Here's Value you never saw before. 	Why not get a 
This is the brand that is used by men of action, men who DO things. 
This soap is different. 
These captions, often accompanied by pictures, are designed not only to 
arrest your attention, but also to appeal to your desire to do as others 
do Or to obtain something which, it is suggested, would be good for you. 
Something is wrong with you and the advertisement tells you to trust the 
expert upon whom you must in the end rely. The advertiser reckons upon 
your not pausing to ask for any evidence that 'they all' swear by the 
goods offered, nor for any of the credentials of the 'expert' who hides 
so modestly behind the description. The purpose of the whole layout of 
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the advertisement is to persuade you that you have been offered reliable 
evidence, although, in fact, you have not. 
Study the article carefully and write full answers to the questions 
below. You may need to write a paragraph in answer to some. 
I. 	"The advertiser has something to sell; 	it would be unreasonable to 
expect him to be disinterested." 	What does the writer mean when 
she says this? 
2. Why 	is 	the 	advertiser 	unlikely 	to 	provide 	us 	with all 	the 
information needed to form an independent opinion of the value of 
the article? 
3. The writer says the advertiser has to create in us a feeling that 
we want his goods. Express in your own words how he manages to do 
this, according to the author. 
4. In the advertisement by the patent medicine firm the advertiser 
assures us in three different ways that the medicine will meet our 
needs. What are the three assurances? Comment on any one of them. 
5. Look carefully at the advertisement captions. 	Choose one and try 
to show how the advertiser is presenting his product and trying to 
persuade you to buy it. 
Comprehension 15 marks. 
B. 	ESSAY  
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REVOLTA have just brought out a new model - a three cylinder family 
lift-back with many innovative features. 
Prepare the advertisement to launch this car. 




2. Open incitement to mutiny. 
3. Assaulting a police officer or a member of the public with whom the 
prisoner or detainee comes into contact. 
4. Stealing, unlawfully receiving, or embezzling any, article or thing. 
5. Preferring 	a complaint 	against 	a 	prison 	officer 	knowing 	the 
complaint to be false. 
6. Engaging in riotous behaviour. 
7. Instigating or encouraging another prisoner or detainee to riot. 
8. Assaulting a prison officer. 
9. Treating disrespectfully a prison officer, a person who visits or 
is employed in a prison with whom the prisoner or detainee comes 
into contact. 
10. Assaulting another prisoner or detainee. 
11. Committing a breach of the regulations under this Act or failing to 
obey an order lawfully given by a person having authority in a 
prison. 
12. Leaving or attempting to leave without permission the place at 
which he is directed or authorised to be. 
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13. Being idle or negligent at work. 
14. Mismanaging any work. 
15. Damaging or destroying any property. 
16. Setting alight to any inflammable article without authority. 
17. Having in his cell or possession an article or thing not furnished 
by the prison authorities or allowed to be in his possession. 
18. Trafficking with another prisoner or detainee or any other person. 
19. Disfiguring the walls or other part of a prison in any way or 
• defacing, destroying or pulling down • a paper or notice hung up by 
the prison authorities in or about any part of the prison. 
20. Behave indecently. 
21. Using insulting or threatening language. 
22. Cursing or swearing profanely. 
23. Being drunk or under the influence of an illegal drug. 
24. Behaving irreverently at or during a religious service. 
25. Committing a nuisance. 
26. Preferring a frivolous complaint. 
27. Making or attempting to make a wound or sore on himself. 
28. Maiming, injuring or tattooing himself or any other prisoner or 
detainee. 
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29. Feigning illness. 
30. Giving or lending to, or borrowing from, another prisoner or 
detainee anyfood or other article or thing without leave. 
31. Conversing 	or 	holding 	intercourse 	with 	another 	prisoner 	or 
detainee, except as authorised by the regulations under this Act. 
32. Engaging in disorderly conduct. 
33. Instigating or encouraging another prisoner or detainee to engage 
in disorderly conduct. 
34. Committing an act contrary to good order or maintenance of prison 
discipline or security. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
Adams, R N, Energy and Structure, Austin: 1975, Uni. of Texas. 
Allen, H E, & Simonsen, C E, Corrections in America: An Introduction, 
(3rd edn) New York: 1981, Macmillan. 
Archembeault, W G dc Archembeault, B J, Correctional Supervisory  
Management, Principles of Organisation, Policy & Law, Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: 1982, Prentice-Hall. 
Barnard, C I, The Functions of the Executive, Cambridge, Mass: 1938, 
Harvard University Press. 
Bartollas, Clemens, & Miller, S J, Correctional Administration: Theory  
and Practice, New York: 1978, McGraw-Hill. 
Blau, P M, & Scott, W R, Formal Organisations, San Francisco: 1962, 
Chandler. 
Bowker; L H, Corrections: The Art and the Science, New York: 1982, 
Macmillan 
Boyle, J, A Sense of Freedom, London: 1977, Pan. 
Bozeman, 	B, 	<5c 	Straussman, 	J, 	(eds) 	New 	Directions in 	Public 
Administration, Monteray: 1984, Brooks/Cole. 
Brockway, Z R, Fifty Years of Prison Service, Montclair, NJ: 1969, 
Patterson-Smith. 
Cartright, D, (ed) Studies in Social Power,  Ann Arbour: 1959, University 
of Michigan Press. 
295 
Clifford, 	W, 	Rights and Obligations in a Prison, 	Canberra: 	1982, 
Australian Institute of Criminology. 
Cressey, 	D R, The Prison: Studies in Institutional Organisation and  
Change, New York: 1961, Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
Dale, E, Readings in Management: Landmarks and New Frontiers, (3rd edn) 
New York: 1975, McGraw-Hill. 
Drucker, P, Technology, Management and Society, London: 1970, Heinemann. 
Drucker, P, Management, London: 1979, Pan. 
Dunphy, D C, Organisational Change by Choice, Sydney: 1981, McGraw-Hill. 
Eaton, J W, Stonewalls not a Prison Make, Springfield, Illinois: 1962, 
Thomas. 
Emery, F E, Freedom and Justice Within Walls, London: 1970, Tavistock. 
Encel, S, Wilenski, P, and Schaffer (eds) Decisions, Melbourne: 1980, 
Longman Cheshire. 
Etzioni, A, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations, Glencoe, 
Illinois: 1961, The Free Press. 
Etzioni, A, A Sociological Reader on Complex Organisations, New York: 
1969, Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
Etzioni, A, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations, Revised and 
enlarged Edition, New York: 1975, The Free Press. 
296 
Fayol, H, General and Industrial Management, London: 1949, Pitman & 
Sons. 
Fogel, D, "... We Are the Living Proof ..." The Justice Model for 
Corrections, Cincinnati: 1975, Anderson. 
Finlay, M, The State of the Prison, Bathurst: 1982, Mitchellsearch. 
Fitzgerald, M, Prisoners in Revolt, Middlesex: 1977, Penguin. 
Flew, A, Crime or Disease, London: 1973, Macmillan. 
Fox, L W, The English Prison and Borstal Systems, London: 1952, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Fox, V B, Introduction to Corrections, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 1972, 
Prentice-Hall. 
Garland, D, & Young, P (eds) The Power to Punish, London: 1983, 
Heinemann. 
Goffman, E, Asylums, Harmondsworth: 1976, Pelican. 
Gulick, L, & Urwick, L, Papers on the Science of Administration, New 
York: 1937, Institute of Public Administration. 
Hall, R H Occupations and the Social Structure, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
1975, Prentice-Hall. 
Hawkins, G, The Prison, Policy and Practice, Chicago: 1976, Uni. of 
Chicago Press. 
297 
Hazelrigg, L, (ed) Prison Within Society, New York: 1968, Anchor. 
Hrebiniak, L. G, Complex Organisations, St Paul: 1978, West. 
Ignatieff, M, A Just Measure of Pain, London: 1978, Macmillan. 
Johnstone, N, The  Human Cage: A Brief History of Prison Architecture, 
New York: 1973, Walker & Co. 
Kalinich, 	D B, 	& Pitcher, T, Surviving in Corrections, Springfield, 
Illinois: 1984, Thomas. 
Kasselliaum, G, Ward, D, & Wilner, D, Prison Treatment and Parole 
Survival: An  Empirical Assessment, New York: 1971, Wiley. 
Kast, F E, & Rosenzweig, J E, Organisation and Management: A Systems  
Approach, New York: 1970, McGraw-Hill. 
King, R D & Morgan, R, The Future of Prisons, Farnborough: 1980, Gower. 
Korn, R R, & McCorkle, L W, Criminology and Penology, New York: 1967, 
Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
Krech, D, Crutchfield, R S, & Ballackey, E L, Individual in Society, 
New York: 1972.,McGraw-Hil1. 
Likert, R, New Patterns of Management, New York: 1967, McGraw-Hill. 
Lipton, D, Martinson, R, & Wilks, J, The Effectiveness of Correctional  
Treatment: A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies, New York: 
1975, Praeger. 
298 
Lombardo, L X, Guards Imprisoned, New York: 1981, Elsevier. 
Maguire, M, Vagg, 3, & Morgan, R, (eds) Accountability and Prisons, 
London: 1985, Tavistock. 
March, J G (ed) Handbook of Organisations, Chicago: 1965, Rand McNally. 
Mann, B, Inside Justice, London: 1983, Associated University Press. 
Maslow, A H, Motivation and Personality, New York: 1954, Harper & Row. 
Mintzberg, H, The Structuring of Organisations, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
1979, Prentice-Hall 
Mitford, J, The American Prison Business, London: 1974, Allen & Unwin. 
Morris, N, The Future of Imprisonment, Chicago: 1974, Uni of Chicago 
Press. 
Morris, T, & Morris, P, A Sociological Study of an English Prison, 
London: 1963, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Mott, 3, Adult Prisons and Prisoners in England and Wales 1970-1982: a  
Review of the Findings of Social Research, Home office Research 
Study No.84. 
Murton, T, & Hymans, J, Accomplices to the Crime: The Arkansas-Prison  
Scandal, New York: 1967, Grove. 
Newman, D J, Introduction to Criminal Justice, (2nd edn) Philadelphia: 
1975, Lippincott. 
Phyrr, P A, Zero Based Budgeting, New York: 1973, Wiley. 
299 
Pugh, D S (ed) Organisation Theory, Harmondsworth: 1971, Penguin. 
Pugh, D S, Hickson, D 1, Hinings, C R (eds) Writers on Organisation, 
(2nd edn) Harmondsworth: 1964, Penguin. 
Reitz, 11 J, Behaviour in Organisations, Homeweed: 1977, Irwin Dorsey. 
Rinaldi, F, Australian Prisons, Fyshwick, ACT: 1977, F & M. 
Schein, E H, Organisational Psychology, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 1965, 
Prentice-Hall. 
Simon, 	H A, Administrative Behaviour: A Study of Decision-making 
Processes in Administrative Organisation, New York: 1961, Macmillan. 
Sofer, C, Organisations in Theory  and  Practice, London: 1972, Heinemann. 
Stonor, J A F, Collins, R R, & Yetton, P W, Management in Australia 
Sydney: 1985, Prentice-Hall. 
Street, D, Vinter, R D & Perrow, C, Organisation for Treatment: A 
Comparative Study of Institutions for Delinquents, New York: 1966, 
The Free Press. 
Sykes, G M, The Society of Captives, Princeton, NJ: 1958, Princeton Uni 
Press. 
Thomas, I E, The English Prison Officer since 1850, London: 1972, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Thompson, J D, OrganZtions in Action, New York: 1967, McGraw-Hill. 
300 
loch, H, Living in Prison: The Ecology of Survival, New York: 1977, The 
Free Press. 
Tomasic, R, & Dobinson, I, The Failure of Imprisonment, Sydney: 1979, 
Allen & Unwin. 
Vetter, H J, & Territo, L, Crime and Justice in America, St Paul: 1979, 
West. 
Vinson, T, Wilful Obstruction, North Ryde, Sydney: 1982, Methuen. 
Walker, 	J, 	Forecasting Prisoner Numbers: A 	Computer 	Model 	for  
Correctional 	Administrators, 	Canberra: 	1984, 	Australian Institute 
of Criminology. 
Wettenhall, R L, A Guide To Tasmanian Government Administration, Hobart: 
1968, Platypus. 
Zdenko ■iiski, G, & Brown, D, The Prison Struggle, Ringwood: 1982, Penguin. 
Journals  
Allinson, R, "Massachusetts Recidivism Drop Cited as Proof of Success of 
'Reintegration' Model", Criminal Justice Newsletter, 11, 3 March, 
1980. 
Archembeault, W G, "Management Theory Z: Implications for Correctional 
Survival Management", Federal Probation, 46, 1982, pp.7-11. 
Bailey, W, "Correctional Outcomes: An Evaluation of 100 Reports", J of  
Crim Law, Criminology, and Police Science, 57, June, 1966, 
pp. 153-157. 
301 
Barak-Glantz, I L, "Towards a conceptual schema of Prison Management 
Styles", Prison Journal, 61, No.2, 1981, pp.42-58. 
Barrington, B, Editorial, Keepers  voice, 7, 4, October 1986. 
Berk, B B, "organisational goals and inmate organisation", Amer 3 Soc, 
71, 1966, pp.552-535. 
Biles, D, & Howe, 3, "Tasmania and the 'Greenies': Research Note on 
Prison Crowding", ANZ J Grim, 17, 1984, pp.41-48. 
Boshier, R, & McDonald, D, "Living Alongside a Prison: How Does it 
Affect Children", ANZ 3 Crim, 6, 3, 1973, pp.182-188. 
Braithwaite, 3 & Cass, M, "Note on the Demographic Composition of 
Australian Police Forces and Prison Services", ANZ J Grim, 12, 
1979, pp.132-138. 
Cerrato, S, "Reform of Correctional Instability: Order or Stability", 
Crime and Justice, VII, 1984, pp.87-99. 
Cohn, A W, "The Failure of Correctional Management", Crime and  
Delinquency, July, 1973, pp.323-331. 
Cohn, A W, "The Failure of Correctional Management Reconsidered", 
Criminal Justice Review, 6, 2, 1981, pp.55-61. 
Conrad, J P, "The Managerial Model of Criminal Justice", British J  
Crim, 14, 1974, pp.177-184. 
Coyle, A G "The Management of Dangerous and Difficult Prisoners", 
The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 25, 2, May, %9&6, ??. 
302 
Duffee, 	D, 	"The Correctional Officer Subculture and Orgnaisational 
Change", Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, July, 1974, 
pp.155-172. 
Harding, 	R, "Prison Overcrowding: Correctional Policies and Political 
Constraints", ANZ J  Crim, 20.1.87, PP. 16-34. 
Homant, R 3 "Correlates of Satisfactory Relations Between Correctional 
Officers and Prisoners", Journal of  Offender Counselling Services  
and Rehabilitation, 4, ( I), 1979, pp.23-29. 
Jacobs, 3 B, & Retsky, H G, "prison Guard", Urban Life, 4(1), 1975, 
pp.5-28. 
Jagger, R, "A Principal Officer's View" 	Prison Service Journal, 57, 
1985, pp.15-16. 
Joplin, J W & Hendricks, J E, "Correctional Management: A Philosophical 
Perspective", Corrections Today, 43, 6, pp.85-88. 
King, R D, "Industrial Relations in the Prison Service", The Harvard  
Journal, xxi, 1982, pp.71-75. 
Katter, J P, "Power, Dependence and Effective Management", Harvard 
Business Review, 55, No.4, (July-August) 1977, pp. 135-136. 
Mainzer, L C, "The Scientist as Public Administrator", Western Political  
Quarterly, 1963, 16, pp.814-829. 
Martinsen, R, "What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform", 
Public Interest, 35, 	(Spring, 1974) pp.22-54. 
303 
McGurk, B J & McGurk, R E, "Personality Types among Prisoners and 
Prison Officers", BR._J.Crim, 19, 1, 1979, pp.31-49. 
O'Leary, V, & Duffee, D, "Correctional Policy: A Classification of Gaols 
Designed for Change", Crime and Delinquency, 17, 4, 1971. 
Peretti, P 0 & Hooker, M, "Social Role Self Perception of State Prison 
Guards", Criminal Justice and Behaviour, 3 June 1976, pp.187-196 
Poole, E D & Rigoli, R M, "Professionalism, Role Conflict, Work 
Alienation and Anomie: A Look at Prison Management", Social  
Science Journal, 20, 1983, p.63-70. 
Smullen, G J, "Recognising Inmate Groups. 	The Participation Management 
Model", Corrections. Today, 43, 5, 1981, pp. 58-63. 
Weinberg, R B, Evans, J H, Otten, C A, 7 Marlowe, H A, Jr, "Managerial 
Stress in Corrections Personnel", Corrective and Social Psychiatry  
and Journal of Behaviour Technology, 1985, pp. 39-45. 
Willett, T C, "The 'Fish Screw' in the Canadian Penitentiary Service", 
Queens Law Journal, Summer, 1977, pp.424-449. 
304 
Government Publications 
Appropriation Bill 1983/84 & 1867/87 (?) Law Department (Tasmania) 
Division II Explanatory Notes  
The Corrections Yearbook, New York: 1985, Criminal Justice Institute. 
Janus, M, Functional Unit Management: An Evaluation of Organisational 
Effectiveness in the Federal Sytem, US Department of Justice. 
The Lower Report: 	Recommendations of the Report Relating to the 
Department of Corrective Services, NSW Parliamentary Paper, No.81, 
of 1973-74. 
Nelson, E K (Jr) and Lovell, C H, Developing Correctional Administrators 
Washington, DC: Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower and 
Training, 1970. 
Office of Corrections, Victoria, Workforce Planning and Training Plan  
1986. 
Office of Corrections, Victoria, Annual Report, 1984-85. 
Outside Looking In, Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration 
Parliament of Tasmania, Controller of Prisons Annual Reports, 1966-78. 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice  
Task Force Report, Corrections, Washington, DC. US Government 
Printing Office, 1967. 
305 
Prisons and the Prisoner: The Work of the Prison Service in England and  
Wales, London: 1977, HMSO. 
Report on Phase II of the Review of Tasmanian Government Administration. 
Second Instalment (Cartland Report) 1981. 
Royal Commission into NSW Prisons, (the Nagle Report) 1976. 
The Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Administration of the  
Prisons in Tasmania, (the Grubb Report), 1976. 
The Scottish Penal System, Factsheet 18, 1982, Scottish Information 
Office 
Wilkins, M L, "Correctional Officers: Roles, Attitudes, and Problems", 
Ministry of Correctional Services, Ontario, 1979. 
Other Sources  
Coyle, A G, Comparative Examination of the Prison Services in North  
America, Winston Churchill Memorial Fellowship, 1984. 
Coyle, A G, The Organisational Development  of  the Scottish  Prison  
Service  with  Particular Reference to  the' Role and Influence of the 
Prison officer, PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1986, 
unpublished. 
Bullard, C G, A Sociological Study of Prison Officers in NSW: A  
Stressful Occupation, PhD Thesis, University of NSW 1977, 
unpublished. 
306 
Burke, R 3 & Weir, T, "Is managing a corrective institution a demanding 
occupation?" York University, Toronto, 1979, unpublished. 
Burke, R J & Weir, 1, "Life experiences, satisfactions and health among 
wives of correctional and probation/parole aftercare administrators" 
York University, Toronto, 1980 unpublished. 
Egge, P M, The United States Prison System, Winston Churchill Memorial 
Fellowship, 1983. 
Keating, J M, Jr, Public Administration and Management - A Primer for  
Masters, National Institute of Corrections, Washington, DC, 1983, 
unpublished. 
•Noad, 	B M ) (ed) Developmental Programmes for Prisoners, 
	Seminar 
Proceedings, 	No.), 	October, 	1984, 	Australian 	Institute 	of 
Criminology. 
Palumbo, 	D J, 	"Evaluating Policy Implementation: Central Issues in 
Comparative Analysis", paper presented to the International 
Political Science Association Meetings in Paris, France, July 1985, 
unpublished. 
Paterson, W C, Custody v Care: The Risdon Experience, BA (Hons) Thesis, 
University of Tasmania, 1986, unpublished. 
Prison Officers Association of Australia, 	proceedings of the Annual 
Conference held in Hobart, 24/25 May 1986. 
The Mellick Report (Tasmania) ) Law Department Internal Investigation, 
Hobart, 1986, unpublished. 
307 
Williams, T A, Custody and Conflict: an Organisational Study of Role  
Problems and Related Attitudes among Prison Officers in Western  
Australia 	, 	PhD Thesis, 	University of Western Australia, 	1974, 
unpublished. 
